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Policy Levers Tailoring Patent Law to 
Biotechnology: Comparing U.S. and 
European Approaches 
Geertrui Van Overwalle* 
In their animated book The Patent Crisis and How the 
Courts Can Solve It, Dan Burk and Mark Lemley give an account of 
their quest into the judicial treatment of patents in different industry 
sectors. They present an in-depth commentary on industry-specific 
differences in the patent system from both a legal and economic perspective. 
The present article attempts to enrich the conversation by sketching the 
situation in Europe and providing an interesting measure for comparison. 
In doing so, the paper mainly focuses on the legal situation, and does not 
enter into the economics discussion. 
The paper concludes that current European patent law holds 
substantial potential for technology-specific application. Even though the 
European Patent Convention (EPC) may have been conceived at its 
inception as a nominally neutral patent statute, our study clearly reveals 
that substantial discretion to differentiate the patent system by industry, 
and in particular to tailor it to the specificities of the biotechnology sector, 
has been built into the system over the years. Although the EPC was 
introduced as a unitary regulatory tool, intended to operate the same way 
across technologies, European Patent Office (EPO) case law has shown 
increased interest and ability in tailoring patent law to the needs of distinct 
technology sectors, and in particular the biotechnology sector. 
Given the civil law tradition in which European patent law operates, 
a prevalence of well-articulated macro rules openly set forth by the 
legislature was anticipated. However, a clear predominance of 
jurisprudential micro policy levers has emerged. 
 
* Professor of IP Law at the University of Leuven (Belgium), Professor of Patent Law and New 
Technologies at Tilburg University (the Netherlands). The research for the present paper was 
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acknowledges the support of the Vancraesbeeck Fund. 
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Not all European policy levers uncovered in the present study work 
to the advantage of the biotechnology industry. Closer analysis of the 
various policy levers reveals that rather than systematically expanding the 
patent system to accommodate biotechnology inventions and stimulating 
innovation in the biotechnology sector, some policy levers narrow down the 
patent potential for biotechnological inventions, in an attempt to respond to 
concerns of public health and ethical conscience. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. “The Patent Crisis” 
In their book The Patent Crisis and How the Courts Can Solve It,1 Burk and 
Lemley start from the observation that today’s technology world is characterized 
by differing innovation and patent patterns among sectors. Innovation is not all of 
a piece, and innovation patterns and research-and-development expenditures may 
differ from industry to industry in a variety of ways.2 Those differences extend to 
the way in which industry players experience the patent system and result in patent 
patterns which may vary from industry to industry as well. Firms’ propensity to 
obtain patents differs across sectors3 and some industries rely more heavily on 
patents than others. Patent prosecution processes diverge according to industry 
and getting a patent is quicker, cheaper, and easier in some industries than in 
others.4 Distribution of value itself varies systematically by industry.5 Even the 
effective scope of granted patents is different by industry, and there is not always a 
one-to-one correspondence between a single patent and a single product.6 And the 
construction of a patent portfolio is also industry specific.7 
 
1. DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN 
SOLVE IT (2009). 
2. Id. at 5, 38, 39–41 (“The evidence is overwhelming that different industries have different 
needs and experience the patent system differently.”). Even though “we have one set of legal rules . . . 
the industries affected by those rules operate in very different patent systems.” Id. at 65.  
3. Id. at 49, 178 (with reference to Erik Brouwer & Alfred Kleinknecht, Innovative Output and a 
Firm’s Propensity to Patent: An Exploration of CIS Micro Data, 28 RES. POL. 615 (1999); OTTO J. 
BACHMANN ET AL., PATENTS AND THE CORPORATION 195 (2d ed. 1959); F.M. Scherer et al., Patents 
and the Corporation, Harvard Bus. Sch. 195 (1959). 
4. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 41 (citing John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who’s 
Patenting What? An Empirical Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2114 (2000)). 
5. Id. at 52 (with reference to Mark Schankerman, How Valuable is Patent Protection? Estimates by 
Technology Field, 29 RAND J. ECON. 77, 79 (1998)). 
6. Id. at 53. 
7. Id. at 54 (citing Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1 (2005)). 
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Focusing on the pharmaceutical industry, Burk and Lemley set forth that the 
pharmaceutical industry is characterized by noncumulative innovation, where the 
need for further research on a particular drug after FDA approval is not high.8 As 
to patent protection, there seems to be a strong consensus that patent strategies 
are well established in the pharma industry, that this sector heavily relies on patent 
protection, and that it is one of the key users of the patent system.9 In the 
biotechnology sector, patent protection is quite often also seen as critical to 
innovation,10 even though concerns have arisen about the many upstream patents 
that might hamper the development of final drugs and therapies.11 As to patent 
prosecution, chemical, pharmaceutical, and biotechnological patents seem to 
spend much longer in prosecution, cite more prior art, and are abandoned and 
refiled more frequently.12 As to value distribution, the chemical and 
pharmaceutical industries hold patents with more consistent value.13 As to scope, 
the chemical and pharmaceutical sectors are characterized by a patent-to-product 
correspondence, where a single patent normally covers a single product, new 
chemical, or a new use for that chemical.14 And in industries such as 
pharmaceuticals, characterized by patent-to-product correspondence, patent 
portfolios are rare: pharmaceutical companies may seek a few patents covering the 
same pharmaceutical product, thus patenting metabolites, extended release 
formulations, enantiomers, or processes of use.15 These patents are usually used to 
try to extend patent life: rather than creating a “thicket” of patents surrounding a 
complex of products,16 they create a “cluster” of patents surrounding one product 
or technology to prolong the protection (and related income) of a blockbuster.17 
Based on the overwhelming economic evidence that innovation and patent 
patterns are different in different industries, Burk and Lemley conclude that a 
 
8. Id. at 33. 
9. Id. at 49 (with reference to Jean O. Lanjouw & Iain Cockburn, Do Patents Matter? Empirical 
Evidence After GATT (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res. Working No. 7495, 2000)). However, compared to 
other industries, the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries do not patent intensely, at least not 
in Europe. The European Patent Office (EPO) statistics of 2008 clearly show that the top of the 
leading twenty-five applicants were again Philips, Siemens (now up to second place), and Samsung. 
Not a single pharmaceutical or biotechnology company, apart from Bayer, was listed in the top 
twenty-five. See European Patent Office, Leading Applicants and Patentees in 2008, EPO Annual Report 
21 (2008). 
10. Id. at 4. 
11. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in 
Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998). 
12. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 41. See also John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who’s 
Patenting What? An Empirical Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2124–32 (2000). 
13. Id. See also Schankerman, supra note 5. 
14. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 53. 
15. Id. at 55. 
16. Id. at 55. 
17. See EUR. COMM’N, Final Report of the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Report, Communication 
from the Commission l (July 8, 2009), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals 
/inquiry/communication_en.pdf. 
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purely unitary system no longer fits the diverse needs of technology innovation. 
Burk and Lemley put forward a twofold solution. The authors first claim that an 
adequate response to industry-specific innovation and patent patterns requires 
tailoring the unitary patent rules to the needs of the different industries, rather 
than splitting the unitary patent system into industry-specific protection statutes.18 
The great flexibility in the patent statute presents an opportunity to take account 
of the needs and characteristics of different industries.19 The authors further argue 
that an adequate solution also requires letting the courts carry out the tailoring, 
rather than the Congress or the Patent Office.20 Courts have substantial ability to 
profile an industry inductively by hearing cases presenting recurrent themes.21 
Courts are equipped with precisely such discretion via a series of doctrinal policy 
levers.22 Policy levers permit to take account of the technology-specific nature of 
the patent system without inviting the rent-seeking and balkanization that 
specialized statutes would engender.23 
1.2. Objective and Scope of the Present Study 
The major objective of the present study is to discern policy levers in 
European patent law in biotechnology. We aim to portray specific policy levers as 
introduced by the European legislature in the sector of biotechnology and paint 
the way in which particular policy levers have been deployed in European case law 
to enhance innovation in biotechnology. By sketching the situation in Europe, we 
attempt to enrich the conversation by providing an interesting measure for 
comparison with U.S. policy levers. 
Before we start our European quest, let us first take a closer look at the 
concepts which are quintessential to our study. 
1.2.1. European patent law 
The present study will watch out for policy levers in European patent law, in 
other words in European legislation and case law. Given the civil law tradition in 
Europe, it is quite likely that we will not only uncover relevant policy levers that 
have been created not only by courts, but even more so by legislators sensitive to 
the needs and characteristics of different industries. Apart from courts applying 
the patent system differently, the legislatures may have created specific rules 
 
18. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 5. 
19. Id. at 109. 
20. Id. at 5. The authors reject the conclusion that different patent standards should be 
legislated for each different industry, and instead suggest a flexible common law approach of ongoing 
judicial oversight, which incorporates a dynamically interpreted statute, in order to meet the needs of 
so many disruptive industries. Id. at 95, 103. 
21. Id. at 105–06. 
22. Id. at 104. 
23. Id. at 95. 
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within specific industries as well. 
Legislation 
In Europe, patent legislation relevant to biotechnology comes about at three 
distinct levels: the national level, the European-EPO level, and the European-EU 
level. This needs some further explanation. For the time being, it is possible to 
obtain patent protection in Europe by separate application to each of the national 
Patent Offices within Europe (the so-called National Route). Almost every 
country within Europe has its own patent system as well as a Patent Office or 
equivalent bureaucracy to screen patent applications and to decide whether 
patents should be awarded. However, the disadvantage of a national patent is that 
it only offers protection in one country, and hence most applicants opt for a 
European patent through the European Patent Office (EPO) (the so-called 
European Route). On the basis of a single application and examination procedure, 
it is possible to protect an invention in up to thirty-eight European countries, all 
contracting states that have ratified the European Patent Convention (EPC).24 
After the uniform application and granting procedure have led to the deliverance 
of a patent by the EPO, the patent is then broken up into a bundle of national 
patents that are further subject to national legislation, and more particularly, to 
national rules with regard to nullification and impairment (see Art. 2 (2) and Art. 
64 (1) EPC).25 Note the European patent is granted by the EPO, an independent 
international organization, which is not part of the institutional framework of the 
European Union (EU). European patents have nothing to do with the EU except 
that all EU member states have also signed the EPC. 
However, in a direct bid to resolve some lacunae and clarify some confusing 
obscurities with regard to biopatenting in the EPC, and to harmonize EU member 
states’ emerging legislations in this field, the EU meddled in the debate. The EU 
interference led to the adoption of a Directive on the legal protection of 
biotechnological inventions in 1998 (EU Biotechnology Directive).26 At the same 
time, although the EU has no authority over the EPO, the EU Biotechnology 
 
24. Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention), Oct. 5, 
1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199 (entered into force Oct. 7, 1977), as amended by the Act revising the 
Convention on the Grant of European Patents of Nov. 29, 2000 (entered into force Dec. 13, 2007), 
its Implementing Regulations, Protocols, and Rules Relating to Fees [hereinafter European Patent 
Convention]. 
25. See id. art. 2(2) (“The European patent shall, in each of the Contracting States for which it 
is granted, have the effect of and be subject to the same conditions as a national patent granted by 
that State, unless otherwise provided in this Convention.”); id. art. 64(1) (“A European patent shall, 
subject to the provisions of paragraph 2, confer on its proprietor from the date of publication of the 
mention of its grant, in each Contracting State in respect of which it is granted, the same rights as 
would be conferred by a national patent granted in that State.”). 
26. Directive 98/44/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on 
the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13 (EC) [hereinafter EU 
Biotechnology Directive]. 
Assembled Issue 2 11-7-11 (Do Not Delete) 11/7/2011  10:16 AM 
2011] POLICY LEVERS TAILORING PATENT LAW 441 
 
Directive also represented a subtle attempt to steer the granting policy of the EPO 
in the field of biotechnology indirectly. The EU Biotechnology Directive was 
indeed incorporated into the EPC in 1999,27 thus providing more detailed 
guidelines for the EPO with regard to the patenting of biotechnological 
inventions.  
The present study will solely focus on European patents and not deal with 
nationally acquired patents. In view of the previous, statutes at all three legislative 
levels will thus (have to) be examined: First, the European EPO-level, including 
the EPC and its Implementing Regulations (IRs),28 which are an integral part of 
the EPC.29 The EPO Examination Guidelines30 will not systematically be 
discussed. Second, the European EU-level, encompassing the EU Biotechnology 
Directive. Third, the national level, focusing on a selection of national patent acts, 
in particular the patent acts of Belgium, the Netherlands, and France. 
Case law 
In Europe, case law on patents may emerge at the same three levels: the 
national level, the European-EPO level, and the European-EU level. Indeed, case 
law will develop within three distinct institutional constellations: the national 
courts, the EPO and—exceptionally—the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU). The national courts apply and discuss the scope of national patent 
acts in the framework of purely national or European patents. The Technical 
Boards of Appeal and the Enlarged Board of Appeal apply and interpret the EPC. 
The Court of Justice of the European Union may provide rulings on patent law, in 
response to questions triggered by national courts.31 
 
27. See European Patent Convention, supra note 24, pt. II, ch. V, r. 26–29 (Implementing 
Regulations inserted by decision of the Administrative Council of June 16, 1999, which entered into 
force on Sept. 1, 1999. 
28. A package of new measures amending the European Patent Convention Implementing 
Regulations entered into force on Apr. 1, 2010. These measures affect search, examination, and time 
limits for the filing of divisional applications. The amendments aim to improve the quality of 
incoming patent applications and expedite the grant process. The changes will allow examiners to 
better coordinate with applicants and therefore enhance the legal certainty for the third parties and 
public, consequently improving the quality of patent information, among other things. The present 
study could not take into account this newest version of the Implementing Regulations, as this 
version was not available when preparing and writing the present paper. For more information, see 
Realigning the European Patent Grant Procedure, EUR. PATENT OFFICE (Mar. 30, 2010), http: 
//www.epo.org/topics/news/2010/20102903.html. 
29. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 931/95 (Sept. 8, 
2000), O.J. E.P.O. 441 (2000) (Pension Benefit Systems Partnership). 
30. See European Patent Convention, supra note 24, Guidelines for Examination in the 
European Patent Office. By decision of the President of the EPO dated Nov. 19, 2009, and after 
consultation with the Standing Advisory Committee before the EPO (SACEPO), the Guidelines for 
Examination have also been amended. The amended Guidelines will apply as from Apr. 1, 2010. As 
the amended Guidelines were published on the EPO website in Nov. 2009, the newest version has 
been taken into account in the present paper, whenever cited. 
31. For the time being, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) cannot respond 
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For the present study, we mainly examine the case law of the EPO. Further 
research needs to be done to complement this analysis with a study of 
biotechnology-related case law of the courts in EPC-contracting states, and the 
rather limited case law of the CJEU.32 
1.2.2. Policy levers 
The present study will adopt the Samuelson and Scotchmer concept of 
policy levers and apply the Burk and Lemley macro/micro classification, but will 
deviate somewhat from the Burk and Lemley policy lever categories. 
According to Samuelson and Scotchmer, all intellectual property rights 
regimes—patent, copyright, trademark—have certain policy levers in common, 
wielded to a greater or lesser extent. Policy levers include, for example, length of 
protection, breadth of protection, and some fair use or policy-based limitations on 
the scope of protection. By handling the available policy levers appropriately, legal 
regimes can be made sensitive to the technological and industrial contexts they 
regulate.33  
Burk and Lemley build on the Samuelson and Scotchmer concept and 
identify a number of additional policy levers that already exist in patent 
jurisprudence to tailor the unitary patent system to the more complex realities of 
the world, such as eligible subject matter (abstract ideas), patentability 
requirements (nonobviousness and secondary indicia, utility), skilled person, 
enabling disclosure, pioneering patents, and experimental use.34 The levers are not, 
by any means, the only sources of judicial discretion in patent law. Burk and 
Lemley have concentrated on policy levers that seem to require, or at least permit, 
systematic variation in patent rules by industry.  
Burk and Lemley distinguish between macro and micro policy levers. Some 
policy levers operate on a macro level: they expressly treat different industries 
differently. Macro level policy levers may require courts to differentiate between 
industries (for example, treating biotechnological inventions differently than 
software inventions) or to focus on particular technologies (for example, treating 
 
to questions arising within the EPO. See infra, note 32. 
32. See Case C-34/10, Oliver Brüstle v. Greenpeace e.V., Oct. 18, 2011, available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6 (a request from the German Bundesgerichtshof (the Federal 
Court of Justice) of Dec. 17, 2009 concerning the ability of an inventor to patent methods and 
products involving the use of human embryonic stem cells (Article 6 of the EU Biotechnology 
Directive)); see also Case C-428/08, Monsanto Tech. LLC v. Cefetra BV, July 6, 2010, 2010 E.C.R. 7, 
available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/ (a request from the Dutch court of ‘s Gravenhage 
of Sept. 24, 2008 concerning the scope of patent claims for transgenic plants (Articles 8 and 9 of the 
EU Biotechnology Directive)).  
33. Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 
YALE L.J. 1575, 1581 (2002). 
34. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 109. 
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DNA differently than other technologies, for certain purposes).35 A more 
common set of policy levers operate on the micro level: they treat different 
inventions differently without express regard to industry.36 Micro policy levers 
apply to inventions in all industries, but have particular significance for certain 
industries.37 In other words, at the micro level, many of the characteristics that are 
not expressly industry-specific are nonetheless factors that vary systematically by 
industry.38  
Burk and Lemley describe a dozen policy levers courts already use to 
differentiate patent law in different industries. They split them up into three major 
categories: (1) patent acquisition and validity, (2) patent scope, and (3) remedies 
for patent infringement. We will break up the policy levers in the following three 
categories: (1) patent acquisition, (2) patent scope, and (3) patent rights and 
limitations. This differing classification is rooted in the current institutional-legal 
architecture, in which the EPO and European patents operate. In particular, our 
classification is based on the allocation of competences in European patent law 
and the foundational distinction between existence/exercise of patent rights. (See 
Table 1. Relation between categories of policy levers and allocation of 
competences for European patents).  
 
Table 1. Relation between categories of policy levers and allocation of 
competences for European patents 
 
Function Policy Lever Level of regulatory 
competence
Relating to the coming 
into existence of patents 
(Pre-grant levers) 
1. Patent acquisition 
2. Patent scope 
 
EPO 
Relating to the exercise 
of patents 
(Post-grant levers) 
3. Patent rights & 
limitations 
EPC contracting states 
(+ EU) 
 
The first two categories of policy levers—patent acquisition and patent 
scope—both relate to the coming into existence of patent rights: what policy levers 
can legislators and courts employ to modulate the coming into existence of patent 
rights in different sectors? The third category of policy levers—patent rights and 
limitations—relates to the exercise of patent rights: what policy levers can be 
observed to shape and limit patent rights? The first two categories are pre-grant 
 
35. Id. at 109, 129. 
36. Id. at 110. 
37. Id. at 123. 
38. Id. at 129. 
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policy levers, whereas the last category is a post-grant policy lever. According to 
prevailing case law, policy levers relating to rules or standards that affect the 
coming into existence and the scope of the patent—i.e., the determination of which 
subject matter is protected, and the extent of protection conferred by a patent—
are the exclusive competence of the EPO.39 Policy levers relating to standards that 
deal with the exercise of rights of the patentee—i.e., the rights conferred by a patent 
upon patentee, and the determination of how subject matter is protected—are the 
competence of the EPO contracting states, and may come under the scrutiny of 
the EU.40 
We expect that this division of competences will be reflected in the type of 
actors (legislators vs. courts; EPC Boards vs. national courts) putting policy levers 
into operation in Europe. 
1.2.3. Biotechnology 
In the framework of the present study, four general categories of 
biotechnological inventions have been envisaged: First and foremost, human 
DNA sequences, in the context of recombinant production of human therapeutic 
proteins, as well as in the context of genetic testing. Second, human stem cells. 
Third, transgenic plants and transgenic plant cells (lesser attention is paid to 
biological processes for the production of plants). Last but not least, transgenic 
animals and animal cells. 
The policy levers employed in the area of chemistry and pharmacy, bearing 
relevance for biotechnology, will also be discussed. 
2. BIOTECH-SPECIFIC POLICY LEVERS IN EUROPE 
2.1. Patent Acquisition 
Now that the objective and scope of the present study have been set forth, 
let us start our European quest for policy levers. We kick off by screening the 
elements pertaining to the acquisition of patents. In Europe, patents are available 
for any inventions, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve 
an inventive step and are susceptible of industrial application (Art. 52 (1) EPC), 
and disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be 
 
39. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Enlarged Board of Appeal, Case G 02/88 
101 (Dec. 11, 1989) (Mobil Oil III) (Reason 3.3). 
40. See Decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union, Case T-78/80, Deutsche 
Grammophon v. Metro, 1971 EUR-Lex. CELEX 61970C0078, at 499–500 (Apr. 28, 1971), Reason 
11 (“Amongst the prohibitions or restrictions on the free movement of goods which it concedes Art. 
36 refers to industrial and commercial property. On the assumption that those provisions may be 
relevant to a right related to copyright, it is nevertheless clear from that article that, although the treaty 
does not affect the existence of rights recognized by the legislation of a member state with regard to 
industrial and commercial property, the exercise of such rights may nevertheless fall within the 
prohibitions laid down by the treaty.”). 
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carried out by a person skilled in the art (Art. 83 EPC). In the U.S., patents are 
awarded for any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition 
of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof (35 U.S.C. § 101 (2010)), 
provided that the patent specification contains a written description of the 
invention in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person 
skilled in the art to which it pertains, to make and use the same, thereby setting 
forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention 
(35 U.S.C. § 112 (2010)).  
In what follows, we will examine how legislators and courts have modulated 
the basic requirements for patent acquisition—patentable subject matter, novelty, 
inventive step/nonobviousness, industrial applicability/utility, and enabling 
disclosure—to accommodate inventions in the field of biotechnology. 
2.1.1. Patentable subject matter—inventions and discoveries 
In general 
In the U.S., the Utility Patent Act (UPA) defines subject matter eligibility in a 
positive way—focusing on classes of invention—and leaves the exclusions to the 
courts. The EPC develops a positive approach—focusing on the invention 
concept—and immediately adds a series of negative definitions and exclusions. 
The EPC states that some subject matter “shall not be regarded as inventions” 
(Art. 52 (2) EPC). Both the U.S. and European approaches are permissible under 
the TRIPs Agreement, stating that “Members may exclude from patentability” 
certain inventions (Art. 27 (2) and (3) TRIPs Agreement). 
Defining patentable subject matter under U.S. patent law hinges upon 
statutory subject matter categories. According to U.S. patent law, patent 
protection can be awarded only when the invention falls within at least one of the 
four classes of statutory subject matter: processes, machines, manufactures, or 
compositions of matter (35 U.S.C. § 101 (2010)). Over the years, wide attention 
has been paid to the exact scope of the “great and distinct classes.”41 In 1980, the 
debate came to an end when the Supreme Court, in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 
interpreted these statutory classes expansively to encompass “anything under the 
sun that is made by man.”42 In U.S. patent law, far less attention has been 
accorded to the interpretation of the term “invention.” The UPA indicates that 
the term invention means “invention or discovery” (35 U.S.C. § 100 (2010)), 
providing little help on the issue. Courts and commentators have labored to settle 
on a universally applicable definition.43 It has been suggested that any inquiry into 
 
41. Ex parte Blythe, 1885 Comm’r Pat. 1885.  
42. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) 
43. See Manya S. Deehr & William C. Rooklidge, The Stage of Development of an Invention Subject to 
the On-Sale Bar to Patentability, reprinted in PRINCIPLES OF PATENTS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 380 
(Donald Chisum et al. eds., 3d ed. 2004). See also Paul M. Janicke, The Varied Meanings of Invention in 
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patentable subject matter should look into “the essential characteristics of the 
subject matter, in particular, its practical utility.”44 
Outlining patentable subject matter under European patent law revolves 
around the notion of invention: European patents shall be granted for any 
inventions provided that they are new, involve an inventive step, and are 
susceptible of industrial application (Art. 52 1 EPC). The EPC, however, does not 
provide a definition of this key concept and does not expressly define what an 
invention is. The EPC Implementing Regulations hint at the technical character of 
an invention, when they prescribe that the description shall specify the technical 
field to which the invention relates (Rule 42 (1) (a) EPC IRs); that the description 
shall disclose the invention, as claimed, in such terms that the technical problem, 
even if not expressly stated as such, and its solution can be understood 
(Rule 42 (1) (c) EPC IRs); and that the claims shall define the matter for which 
protection is sought in terms of the technical features of the invention 
(Rule 43 (1) EPC IRs). The Technical Boards of Appeal from their side take the 
view that the use of the term invention in Art. 52 (1) EPC, read in conjunction 
with the list of so-called non-inventions or “Nicht Erfindugen”45 in Art. 52 (2) 
and (3) EPC, implies a requirement of technical character or technicality, which is 
to be fulfilled by an invention as claimed in order to be patentable. An invention 
may be an invention within the meaning of Art. 52 (1) EPC if a technical effect is 
achieved by the invention or if technical considerations are required to carry out 
the invention. The term “invention” is to be construed as subject matter having 
technical character, and having technical character is an implicit requirement of 
the EPC to be met by an invention in order to be an invention within the meaning 
of Art. 52 (1) EPC.46 
 
Patent Practice: Different Meanings in Different Situations, reprinted in PATENT LAW PERSPECTIVES App. 1 
(Donald R. Dunner ed., 1970). 
44. State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
45. Rainer Moufang, Kommentierung des Europäischen Patentübereinkommen. Artikel 53: Ausnahmen 
von der Patentierbarkeit, in EUROPÄISCHES PATENTÜBEREINKOMMEN. MÜNCHNER 
GEMEINSCHAFTSKOMMENTAR 15 (1991). 
46. European Patent Office, Decision of the Technical Board of Appeal, T 931/95 (Sept. 8, 
2000), 2001 O.J. E.P.O. (C 10) 441 (Pension Benefit Systems Partnership) relating to 
EP No. 0 332 770. The Board agreed with the appellant that in order to be patentable there is not an 
explicit requirement of technical character of an invention under European Patent Convention (supra 
note 24) Art. 52, or under any other provisions of the European Patent Convention, which is 
concerned with substantive patent law. The European Patent Convention (supra note 24) Art. 52, and 
in particular in its paragraph 1, only makes it clear that for something to be patentable, it must be an 
invention. However, having regard to the case law of the Boards of Appeal and taking into account 
the frequent use of the term “technical” in the European Patent Convention (supra note 24), and the 
Implementing Regulations, which are an integral part of the European Patent Convention, and having 
due regard to the context in which the term “technical” is used there, the Board was of the opinion 
that the requirement of technical character is inherent to the notion “invention” as it occurs in 
European Patent Convention (supra note 24) Art. 52(1). Thus, the Board concluded that having 
technical character is an implicit requirement of the European Patent Convention to be an invention 
within the meaning of European Patent Convention Art. 52(1), following the decisions of the 
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In biotechnology 
In the U.S., the debate on eligible subject matter in the realm of 
biotechnology was recently reopened. Exactly thirty years after the trendsetting 
Chakrabarty decision, the District Court for the Southern District of New York 
ruled that genes are to be regarded as discoveries and should be excluded from 
patentability.47 Is the pendulum swinging back in biotechnology?48 
The EPC invention concept and the requirement of technical character have 
had a clear influence in the field of biotechnology, especially when the 
patentability of DNA was discussed. Some scholars took the view that DNA was 
an element of nature that had to be regarded as a discovery, and was therefore not 
patentable (Art. 52 (2) (a) EPC). Others argued that DNA was an invention as it 
required technical skill and human intervention to isolate from its natural 
environment.  
The heated discussion on the discovery nature of DNA was resolved by the 
EU Biotechnology Directive, stipulating “that biological material which is isolated 
from its natural environment or produced by means of a technical process even if 
it previously occurred in nature” shall also be patentable (Art. 3 (2) Directive; 
Rule 27 (a) EPC IRs). With regard to DNA sequences, the EU Biotechnology 
Directive stipulated more in particular that “the human body, at the various stages 
of its formation and development, and the simple discovery of one of its elements, 
including the sequence or partial sequence of a gene, cannot constitute patentable 
inventions” (Art. 5 (1) Directive; Rule 29 (1) EPC IRs), whereas “an element 
isolated from the human body or otherwise produced by means of a technical 
process, including the sequence or partial sequence of a gene, may constitute a 
patentable invention, even if the structure of that element is identical to that of a 
natural element” (Art. 5 (2) Directive; Rule 29 (2) EPC IRs). This approach, 
introducing a distinction between (unpatentable) discoveries and (patentable) 
inventions in the field of DNA research has been fiercely criticized. However, the 
EU and the EPO maintain the distinction between DNA in nature, which is 
considered a discovery, and isolated DNA, which can amount to an invention 
thanks to a technical intervention. 
Policy lever 
The technical character rule is a micro policy lever, applying to inventions in 
all industries, but with particular significance for certain industries, in casu 
biotechnology. The technical character rule and its application to DNA have 
 
European Patent Office, Technical Board of Appeal T 1173/97 (July 1, 1998), O.J. E.P.O (G 6) 15 
and 16 1998 (Reason 6). 
47. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 669 F. Supp. 2d. 365 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
48. See Aaron S. Kesselheim & Michelle M. Mello, Gene Patenting—Is the Pendulum Swinging 
Back?, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1855, 1855–58 (2010). 
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consciously been employed as a policy lever to fuel innovation in the 
biotechnology sector. Originated as a judicial policy lever, the technical character 
rule is now formally embedded in the EU Biotechnology Directive, which makes 
it a statutory policy lever. The EU Biotechnology Directive bears strong witness of 
the endeavor to stimulate biotechnology innovation through recognition of 
biological developments as inventions.49 
However, recent investigations have pointed to the potential detrimental 
effect all that many DNA patents may have on further research and development, 
and on access to healthcare. The omnipresence of patents for DNA may produce 
an anti-commons effect, threatening rather than stimulating downstream 
innovation.50 At present, it is being examined to what extent new models of 
collaborative licensing may facilitate access to gene patents and render clusters of 
patents more readily available for use in research and healthcare.51 
 
49. See Preambles 1 and 2 of EU Biotechnology Directive, supra note 26, at 13 (“(1) Whereas 
biotechnology and genetic engineering are playing an increasingly important role in a broad range of 
industries and the protection of biotechnological inventions will certainly be of fundamental 
importance for the Community’s industrial development; (2) Whereas, in particular in the field of 
genetic engineering, research and development require a considerable amount of high-risk investment 
and therefore only adequate legal protection can make them profitable.”). 
50. The alarming and trendsetting article came from Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 698–701 (1998). Since then, a vast body of literature providing empirical 
evidence emerged. Most empirical studies focus on the issuance of human gene patents by patent 
authorities. See, e.g., Michael M. Hopkins et al., DNA Patenting: The End of an Era?, 25 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 185, 185–87 (2007); MICHAEL M. HOPKINS ET AL., THE PATENTING OF HUMAN 
DNA: GLOBAL TRENDS IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR ACTIVITY (THE PATGEN PROJECT), A 
REPORT FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S SIXTH FRAMEWORK PROGRAMME PRIORITY: FP6-
2003-LIFESCIHEALTH-II (Nov. 2006), available at http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/documents 
/patgen_finalreport.pdf; Isabelle Huys, Nele Berthels, Gert Matthijs & Geertrui Van Overwalle., Legal 
Uncertainty in the Area of Genetic Diagnostic Testing, 27 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 903, 903–09 (2009); 
Kyle Jensen & Fiona Murray, Intellectual Property Landscape of the Human Genome, 310 SCIENCE 239, 
239–40 (2005); COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN GENOMIC AND PROTEIN 
RESEARCH AND INNOVATION, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, REAPING THE BENEFITS OF 
GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC RESEARCH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION, AND 
PUBLIC HEALTH (2005); Birgit Verbeure et al., Analysing DNA Patents in Relation with Diagnostic Genetic 
Testing, 14 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 26, 26–33 (2006); John P. Walsh et al., Where Excludability Matters: 
Material Versus Intellectual Property in Academic Biomedical Research, 36 RES. POL. 1184, 1184–203 (2007). 
See also Ben Depoorter & Sven Vanneste, Putting Humpty Dumpty Back Together: Experimental Evidence of 
Anticommons Tragedies, 3 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 1, 1–25 (2006). Some empirical studies focus on gene 
patents that have been asserted in court to assess the actual restrictive effect of patents. See, e.g., 
Christopher M. Holman, The Impact of Human Gene Patents on Innovation and Access: A Survey of Human 
Gene Patent Litigation, 76 UMKC L. REV. 295, 295–362 (2007). See also Ann E. Mills & Patti Tereskerz, 
DNA-Based Patents: An Empirical Analysis, 26 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 993, 993–95 (2008). 
51. See Geertrui Van Overwalle, Of Thickets, Blocks and Gaps: Designing Tools to Resolve Obstacles in 
the Gene Patents Landscape, in GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS: PATENT 
POOLS, CLEARING HOUSES, OPEN SOURCE MODELS AND LIABILITY REGIMES 381, 381–463 
(Geertrui Van Overwalle ed., 2009). 
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2.1.2. Patentable subject matter—morality 
In general 
In U.S. patent law, it has been suggested that the utility requirement 
encompasses a morality test and that the PTO has to examine whether the 
invention achieves a human purpose that is not illegal, immoral, or contrary to 
public policy.52 In the last decades, however, the courts and the PTO have 
virtually abandoned the requirement that an invention is morally beneficial.53 
European patent law also contains a morality test, but one that is formally 
and explicitly embedded in patent law. The EPC sets forth that European patents 
shall not be granted in respect of inventions the commercial exploitation of which 
would be contrary to ordre public or morality. Such exploitation shall not be deemed 
to be so contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation in some or 
all of the EPC contracting states (Art. 53 (a) EPC). 
EPO case law indicates that the exception has to be narrowly construed. The 
commercial exploitation of an invention must be in conflict with ordre public or 
morality, not just prohibited by statutory law.54 In other words, being forbidden by 
law and creating a possible conflict with simple statutory law, does not suffice to 
lead to a rejection under Art. 53 (a) EPC. 
In biotechnology 
In the U.S., morality hardly seems to have played a role in biotechnology 
patenting. The U.S. Supreme Court explicitly stated in the Chakrabarty case that it 
is not competent to rule on ecological and ethical matters and that such issues 
should be addressed by the political branches of government, i.e. the Congress 
and the Executive, instead of the courts.55 Only recently, Congress intervened and 
explicitly prohibited issuing patents for genetically modified humans.56 
In Europe, the morality clause figured discretely in patent law without 
causing a great stir for quite some time. With the advent of biotechnology, 
 
52. DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 4.01 (2006). The unpatentability of immoral 
subject matter seems to have originated with Justice Story’s opinion in Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37 
(C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 1217).   
53. CHISUM, supra note 52, at 751. See also BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 53, 111; the 
patents cited, supra note 6; Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property in Higher Life Forms: The Patent System 
and Controversial Technologies, 47 MD. L. REV. 469 (1988). 
54. Rainier Moufang, The Concept of ‘Ordre Public’ and Morality in Patent Law, in OCTROOIRECHT, 
ETHIEK EN BIOTECHNOLOGIE [PATENT LAW, ETHICS AND BIOTECHNOLOGY] 65 (Geertrui Van 
Overwalle ed., 1998). 
55. Geertrui Van Overwalle, Biotechnology Patents in Europe: From Law to Ethics, in 
BIOTECHNOLOGY, PATENTS AND MORALITY 139, 148 (Sigrid Sterckx ed., 1997). 
56. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108199, § 634 (2005) (“None of 
the funds appropriated or otherwise made available under this Act may be used to issue patents on 
claims directed to or encompassing a human organism.”). See also BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 
96. 
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however, the morality clause rigorously stepped into the limelight.57 It was felt that 
the ambivalence of biotechnology made the necessity of ethical monitoring more 
urgent. Although the confrontation of ethics and patent law is difficult, to say the 
least, and usually ethics are seen in this context as a disturbance—as the grosse 
Störung58—the ethical assessment of biotechnological inventions and related 
patents have always been high on the agenda in Europe. 
Initially, the ethical debate took place at the EPO level, because 
Art. 53 (a) EPC is the sole yardstick available to guide the EPO in delicate 
questions on the patentability of living material.59 Long after the first patents for 
human genes had been granted in the context of recombinant DNA technology as 
a matter of routine,60 the morality of gene patents became an issue. The ethics of 
gene patenting was fiercely debated when a patent coding for human relaxin was 
granted (Howard Florey Institute case).61 On opposition, the EPO Opposition 
Division concluded that an invention concerning a human gene was not an 
exception to patentability,  
[B]ecause it would not be universally regarded as outrageous: it 
did not amount to patenting life because DNA as such was not 
life but one of the many chemical entities participating in 
biological processes, and no offence to human dignity had 
 
57. An interesting table for comparison is provided by WIPO, listing subject matter which has 
been excluded in the past—partly—on the basis of public interest lever or the product of nature 
doctrine: forty-four out of ninety-two countries excluded pharmaceutical products from their field of 
patent protection; forty-four out of ninety-two excluded biological methods; forty-four out of ninety-
two excluded therapeutic methods; thirty-five out of ninety-two excluded food; twenty-two out of 
ninety-two excluded chemical compounds. World Intellectual Property Organization, Existence, Scope 
and Form of Generally Internationally Accepted and Applied Standards/Norms for the Protecting of Intellectual 
Property, WIPO Doc. WO/INF/29 (1988). 
58. See Van Overwalle, supra note 55. 
59. The morality clause triggered reflection and debate in some adjacent areas as well, such as 
informed consent and traditional knowledge. These issues will not be discussed here. For more, see 
Geertrui Van Overwalle, Biotechnology and Patents: Global Standards, European Approaches and National 
Accents, in GENETIC ENGINEERING AND THE WORLD TRADE SYSTEM 77 (Daniel Wüger & Thomas 
Cottier eds., 2008). 
60. European patents have been granted for the majority of recombinant DNA achievements. 
Thus, a European patent was issued for the production of -type interferon, γ-type interferon, 
clotting factor Factor VIII, tissue-type plasminogen activator or t-PA, erythropoietin (EPO), among 
others. A good example in this connection is the patent granted for -type interferon. An 
examination of the description and patent claims of the interferon patent reveals that protection was 
granted for a well-defined DNA sequence, a recombinant DNA molecule, a host transformed with 
said recombinant DNA molecule, an -type interferon produced by said transformed host, a process 
for producing the recombinant DNA molecules, a process for the transformation of the host, and a 
process for the production of an -type interferon. For details, see GEERTRUI VAN OVERWALLE, 
THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF BIOTECHNOLOGICAL INVENTIONS IN EUROPE AND IN THE UNITED 
STATES: CURRENT FRAMEWORK AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS (1997). 
61. See European Patent No. 0 112 149 (B1) (granted Apr. 10, 1991). Granted claim 1 reads as 
follows: “1. A DNA fragment encoding human H2-preprorelaxin, said H2-preprorelaxin having the 
amino-acid sequence set out in Figure 2.” 
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occurred as the woman who donated tissue was asked for her 
consent and her self-determination was not affected by the 
exploitation of the claimed molecules.62  
The EPO Technical Boards of Appeal later confirmed the Opposition point 
of view and concluded that the human gene patent claim was allowable.63 
The question of morality and plants came up with the grant of a patent on a 
genetically modified plant (Lubrizol case).64 On opposition, the EPO Opposition 
Division decided that the exclusion of patentability in Art. 53 (a) EPC for 
inventions, which are contrary to public order and morality, concern only extreme 
cases which are universally regarded as abhorrent. In view of the consideration 
that the actual patent related to an invention that might be used for creating new 
plants, the nutritive value of which is increased in comparison with conventionally 
obtained plants, and that the plants covered by said patent might give rise to a 
better management of food shortage in the world, the Opposition Division ruled 
that the exploitation of such an invention could not therefore be considered 
immoral or against public order and decided that a violation of Art. 53 (a) EPC 
was not apparent.65 In a later plant patent case (Plant Genetic Systems),66 the 
Opposition Division reached a similar decision.67 On appeal, the Technical Board 
of Appeal specified the twin concepts ordre public and morality in the latter case. 
The Board set forth that the concept of ordre public covers the protection of public 
security and the physical integrity of individuals as part of society, and the 
protection of the environment.68 The Board added that the concept of morality is 
 
62. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case V 8/94  (Aug. 30, 1984), 
O.J. E.P.O., 388 (1995). 
63. To assess the validity of the arguments put forward, European Patent Convention, supra 
note 24, Art. 53(a) was interpreted in the light of (the then-implemented) EU Biotechnology 
Directive, Art. 5 (Rule 29 Implementing Regulations European Patent Convention). See Decision of 
the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 0272/95 (Oct. 23, 2002).  
64. See European Patent No. 0 122 791 (B1) (granted Mar. 29, 1989), in particular granted 
claims 10 and 19. The present study only discusses the possible exclusion of transgenic plants on 
morality grounds, and will not enter into the complex legal-technical debate on the exclusion of plant 
varieties. For an in-depth analysis of that debate, and the current state of play, see MARGARET 
LLEWELYN & MIKE ADCOCK, EUROPEAN PLANT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 551 (2006); Geertrui 
Van Overwalle, Patent Protection for Plants: A Comparison of American and European Approaches, 39 IDEA 
143, 143–94 (1999). See also Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case 
T 1054/96 (Oct. 13, 1997) (Novartis), O.J. E.P.O., 511 (1998); Decision of the European Patent 
Office, Enlarged Board of Appeal, Case G 1/98 (Dec. 20, 1999) (Novartis), O.J. E.P.O. 111–41 
(2000), European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 1054/96 (Dec. 6, 2000). 
65. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Opposition Division, Mar. 31, 1992 (quoted 
in European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T694/92 (May 8, 1996)). 
66. See European Patent No. 0 242 236 (B1) (issued Oct. 10, 1990) (entitled “Plant cells 
resistant to glutamine synthetase inhibitors, made by genetic engineering”). 
67. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Opposition Division, (Dec. 15 1992), INT’L 
R. OF INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. (IIC), 618 (1993). 
68. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 356/93 (Feb. 21, 
1995), O.J. E.P.O. 557 (1995). See id. at  560 (Reason 14). 
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related to the belief that some behavior is right and acceptable, whereas other 
behavior is wrong, this belief being founded on the totality of the accepted norms 
which are deeply rooted in a particular culture.69 The Board concluded that the 
evidence provided by the appellant did not lead to the definite conclusion that the 
exploitation of the invention would seriously prejudice the environment and run 
counter to ordre public,70 and that plant biotechnology per se cannot be regarded as 
being more contrary to public morality than traditional selective breeding.71 
The issues of ethics and animals were heavily discussed with the (first 
refused, but later granted) patent for a transgenic mouse (Harvard onco-mouse 
case).72 The Technical Board of Appeal clearly stated that for each individual 
invention the question of morality had to be examined, and possible detrimental 
effects and risks had to be weighed and balanced against the merits and 
advantages aimed at.73 On further proceedings, it was confirmed that in the 
present case, the medical benefit outweighed the harm caused.74 
The prevailing EPO viewpoints on ethics and biopatenting were later 
consolidated by the EU legislator in the EU Biotechnology Directive. First and 
foremost, the Directive recognizes the EPO policy on human gene patenting by 
explicitly confirming the patentability of human genes (Art. 5 Directive). 
Furthermore, the Directive formally copied the EPC morality clause 
(Art. 6 (1) Directive) and additionally provided a nonexhaustive list of inventions 
that shall be considered unpatentable for ethical non-compliance: processes for 
cloning human beings, processes for modifying the germ line genetic identity of 
human beings, uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes, and 
processes for modifying the genetic identity of animals which are likely to cause 
them suffering without any substantial medical benefit to humans or animals and 
also animals resulting from such processes (Art. 6(2) Directive). By well 
deliberating which exceptions to include and not, the Directive enshrined the 
EPO approach with regard to transgenic plants (allowable, hence not listed) and 
 
69. See id. at 557 (Reason 6). 
70. See id. at 566 (Reason 18.6).  
71. See id. at 562 (Reason 17.1). 
72. See European Patent No. 0 169 672 (B1) (issued May 13, 1992) (entitled “Method for 
Producing Transgenic Animals”). 
73. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 19/90 476 (Oct. 3, 
1990), O.J. E.P.O. 476 (1990); Decision of the European Patent Office, Examining Division (Apr. 3, 
1992), O.J. E.P.O. 591 (1992). 
74. Without discussing this case in too much detail, it is relevant to note that on the basis of 
the morality clause, as worded in Art. 6 of the EU Biotechnology Directive, supra note 26, and 
operationalized in the European Patent Convention through its Implementing Regulations, supra note 
25, the Opposition Division limited the patent to rodents (European Patent Office, Interlocutory 
Decision of the Opposition Division (Nov. 7, 2001) (unpublished) (concerning maintenance of 
European Patent No. 0 169 672 in amended form)), and the Board of Appeal further limited the 
patent to transgenic mice (Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 315/03 
246 (July 6, 2004)). 
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transgenic animals (allowable, after a case by case balancing act, hence listed). 
Somewhat unfortunately, some issues remained unclear under the EU 
Biotechnology Directive.75 One of the outstanding issues relates to human 
embryonic stem cell patents. With the ascendancy of stem cell technology, the 
question of whether stem cells of human origin can be considered patentable has 
arisen. To what extent does Art. 5 of the Directive apply to human stem cells and 
what guidance can be found in Art. 6 of the Directive?76 The EPO became the 
focal level for guidance again and recently concluded (in the Thomson case)77 that 
the morality clause forbids the patenting of claims directed to products that at the 
filing date could be prepared exclusively by a method which necessarily involved 
the destruction of the human embryos from which the said products are derived, 
even if the said method is not part of the claims.78 
Policy lever 
In Europe, in principle, any invention in any field of technology has to be 
eligible under the ethical clause. However, the morality rule is put to test more 
often in biotechnology than in other industries. As a result, in Europe morality 
functions as a significant restriction on patenting in biotechnology. The morality 
doctrine therefore is a micro policy lever that is applied to exclude patents for 
certain life forms. Initially proclaimed in the EPC, the morality doctrine was 
further developed by the Opposition Division and the Technical Boards of 
Appeal of the EPO, turning the doctrine into a judicial micro policy lever. Later 
on, the EPO case law was embedded in biotechnology-specific statutes, namely 
the EU Biotechnology Directive, thus shaping the doctrine as a statutory policy 
lever. 
Patent law should undoubtedly take into account ethical concerns and pay 
 
75. For a discussion, see Geertrui Van Overwalle, Legal and Ethical Aspects of Bio-Patenting: 
Critical Analysis of the EU Biotechnology Directive, in DEATH OF PATENTS 212–27 (Peter Drahos ed., 
2005). 
76. See Van Overwalle, supra note 75. 
77. See Claim 1 of the European Patent Application No. EP 0 770 125 (submitted Jan. 20, 
1995) by Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF) (entitled “Primate embryonic stem cells”). 
The Examining Division decided on July 13, 2004 to refuse said patent application.  
78. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Enlarged Board of Appeal, Case G 0002/06 
(Nov. 25, 2008) (referral from the Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case 
T 1374/04). There is a vast amount of literature on this case and on human stem cells in general. See, 
e.g., EMBRYONIC STEM CELL PATENTS: EUROPEAN PATENT LAW AND ETHICS (Aurora Plomer & 
Paul Torremans eds., 2010); Geertrui Van Overwalle, Study on the Patenting of Inventions Relating to 
Human Stem Cell Research (European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the 
European Commission [EGE], 2001); Geertrui Van Overwalle, Patenting Stem Cell Research in Europe 
and in the United States, in CROSSING BORDERS: CULTURAL, RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL 
DIFFERENCES CONCERNING STEM CELL RESEARCH 519–46 (Wolfgang Bender et al. eds., 2005). 
On the question of the applicability of Rule 28(c) European Patent Convention Implementing 
Regulations, the Enlarged Board of the European Patent Office answered that the rule applied to all 
pending applications, including those filed before it entered into force. 
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special attention to the admissibility of patents for human life forms, in view of 
the principles of human dignity and noncommodification. However, patent law 
should only do so to the extent that it concerns matters directly and inextricably 
linked with patents and the exercise of patent rights. In this regard, the question 
arises whether the list of exclusions of Art. 6 (2) EU Biotechnology Directive 
should be taken up in patent law, as it does not seem to aim to limit the patent 
implications of certain biotech inventions, but rather wishes to exclude certain 
fields of research as such. Patent law should not interfere when research is ethically 
undesirable. Since a direct link is missing between ethics and patents in Art. 6 (2) 
EU Biotechnology Directive, it might be conceivable to abolish this provision and 
to take up these exclusions in research regulations.79 So the plea is not to abandon 
the morality clause, but rather to (re)direct it to its initial goal, namely the 
exclusion of inventions, the commercial exploitation of which runs counter to ordre 
public and morality. 
2.1.3. Patentable subject matter—medical methods 
In biotechnology 
A provision that only bears special significance in biotechnology in relation 
to health care, and for which no U.S. counterpart could be uncovered, is the 
medical method rule. The EPC puts forward that European patents shall not be 
granted in respect of methods for treatment of the human or animal body by 
surgery or therapy, nor in respect of diagnostic methods practiced on the human 
or animal body; however this does not apply to products—in particular substances 
or compositions—for use in any of these methods (Art. 53 (c) EPC). The reason 
for this exclusion of medical methods is not because they are not considered 
inventions, as is the case with subject matter listed under Art. 52 (2) EPC. Medical 
methods can be qualified as inventions but are carved out from patent law as a 
matter of policy, to ensure that those who carry out such methods as part of the 
medical treatment of humans or the veterinary treatment of animals are not 
inhibited by patents.80 
 
79. See Van Overwalle, supra note 75. 
80. The same policy argument was deployed under the initial European Patent Convention 
1973 counterpart from this exclusion (then Art. 52(4) European Patent Convention, supra note 24), 
but a different legal technique was employed to achieve the policy objective at hand. The 1973 
legislator, followed by the Technical Board of Appeal, implicitly recognized that medical methods are 
susceptible to industrial application as a matter of reality, but “shall not be regarded as” inventions 
which are susceptible of industrial application, by way of legal fiction. See Decision of the European 
Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 116/85 (Oct. 14, 1987), O.J. E.P.O. 13 (1989). In an attempt 
to openly recognize the underlying policy rationale of the exclusion of medical methods, the exclusion 
was rephrased and replaced as Art. 52(3)(c) by the European Patent Convention Revision Act in 2000. 
For more details, see Daniel X. Thomas, Patentability Problems in Medical Technology, 34 INT’L R. OF 
INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 847 (2003). See also Geertrui Van Overwalle, IPR Issues and High 
Quality Genetic Testing, in QUALITY ISSUES IN CLINICAL GENETIC SERVICES (Ulf Kristoffersson et al. 
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Policy lever 
The medical method exception was prompted by a clear concern about 
guaranteeing access to life-saving treatments. This approach undoubtedly is aimed 
at having effect in a very specific industry sector, namely health care. Expressly 
implementing the medical method approach into patent legislation makes it a 
statutory macro policy lever. 
However, the manner in which the exclusion has lately been implemented in 
the field of genetic diagnostics—allowing patents on diagnostic methods for 
testing early onset breast and ovarian cancer based on the genes BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 awarded to the U.S. company Myriad Genetics—led to some fierce 
debates about the perceived limited scope of Art. 53 (c) EPC.81 It should be 
noted, however, that the criticism voiced in the BRCA case was not always 
directed towards the grant of patents on genes and related diagnostic methods, but 
also to the restrictive licensing policy of the patent owners and their business 
strategy to maximize profit.82 In Europe, one response to address undesirable 
effects and unreasonable behavior from patent holders has been the introduction 
of the compulsory license for public health.83 
2.1.4. Novelty—first and second medical use 
In general 
Most patent systems require that an invention be new in order to be eligible 
for patent protection. U.S. patent law stipulates that whoever invents or discovers 
any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or 
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore (35 
U.S.C. § 101 (2010)). In the same line, European patent law prescribes that 
European patents shall be granted for any inventions, in all fields of technology, 
provided that they are new, involve an inventive step, and are susceptible of 
industrial application (Art. 52 (1) EPC), and that an invention shall be considered 
to be new if it does not form part of the state of the art (Art. 54 (1) EPC). 
Following this general principle, patent protection can be awarded for a 
substance or composition that is new. Conversely, patent protection cannot be 
granted for a substance when the substance is not new but only the use or 
application of that substance is new. The substance is part of the state of the art 
 
eds., 2010) and the references cited there. 
81. See GENE PATENTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH 241 (Geertrui Van Overwalle ed., 2007) and 
the references cited there. 
82. A lot has been published on the Myriad BRCA saga. The interested reader might take note 
of the following background publication: E. RICHARD GOLD & JULIA CARBONE, MYRIAD 
GENETICS: IN THE EYE OF THE POLICY STORM (2008). See also Geertrui Van Overwalle, Turning 
Patent Swords into Shares, 330 SCIENCE 1630, 1631 (2010). 
83. See infra Part 2.3.2. 
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and a novel use of a known substance does not modify the prior art status of said 
substance or composition. 
In medicine 
In the medical field, however, European patent law applies a divergent rule 
when it comes to the use of substances and compositions that are already part of 
the state of the art. When such a known substance or composition is used for the 
very first time in a surgical, therapeutic, or diagnostic method—in other words 
when the use of such substance is new for such methods—patent protection can 
be granted for the use in one of these methods. The EPC explicitly stipulates that 
the general anticipation rules “shall not exclude the patentability of any substance 
or composition, comprised in the state of the art, for use in a method referred to 
in Art. 53 (c) EPC [surgical, therapeutic, or diagnostic method], provided that its 
use for any such method is not comprised in the state of the art.”84 
EPO jurisprudence has extended this diverging rule to known substances 
which are used for second and further medical indications. On various occasions, 
the Enlarged Board of Appeal indeed clarified the question whether and in what 
way a known medicament for the treatment of a specific illness can be protected 
for the treatment of other illnesses. The Enlarged Board stated that it is legitimate 
to allow “claims directed to the use of a substance or composition for the 
manufacture of a medicament for a specified new and inventive therapeutic 
application, even in a case in which the process of manufacture as such does not 
differ from known processes using the same active ingredient.”85 Recently, this 
case law was codified and the EPC now clearly states that the general anticipation 
rules shall not foreclose “the patentability of any substance or composition for any 
specific use in a method referred to in Art. 53 (c) EPC [surgical, therapeutic, or 
diagnostic method], provided that such use is not comprised in the state of the 
art” (Art. 54 (5) EPC). In this way it is formally confirmed that also the second and 
further medical use of known substances or compositions are patentable. Most 
member states have adapted their national patent acts accordingly. 
Last but not least, EPO jurisprudence looked into the question of whether 
use claims are also permissible in nonmedical fields. Imagine the use of a chemical 
compound, for example, not as a growth regulator, which is known, but as a 
 
84. For an in-depth analysis of the EPO case law on first medical indication, see CASE LAW OF 
THE BOARDS OF APPEAL OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE 101–04 (Albert Ballester Rodès et al. 
eds., 5th ed. Dec. 2006). See also Vol. 2: Procedural Patent Law—Article 90 to Article 178 in MARGARETE 
SINGER & DIETER STAUDER, THE EUROPEAN PATENT CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 127–28 
(3d ed. 2003). See infra Part 2.3.2. 
85. Decision of the European Patent Office, Enlarged Board of Appeal, Case G 5/83 (Dec. 5, 
1984) O.J. E.P.O. 64 (1985). For an analysis of the case law on second and further medical use, see CASE 
LAW OF THE BOARDS OF APPEAL OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 84, at 104–13. See 
also SINGER  & STAUDER,  supra note 84, at 104–13. 
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fungicide, which is not yet known.86 The Enlarged Board stated that the 
patentability of a second nonmedical use of a product is already recognized in 
principle in the cases concerning the second medical use of a substance.87 
However, in those earlier decisions the exclusion from patentability of therapeutic 
and diagnostic methods had caused the Enlarged Board to allow only a special 
type of claim. These specific difficulties do not arise in the nonmedical field. There 
the question is of a general nature, concerned primarily with the question of 
interpretation of the general rules governing novelty.88 
Policy lever 
In current European patent law, the novelty assessment rules have been 
adapted to stimulate further research on the use of known medicaments in cases 
where surgical, therapeutic, and diagnostic methods have been excluded from 
patentability (Art. 53 (c) EPC), in respect of substances and compositions used in 
surgical and therapeutic treatment and in diagnostic processes carried out on 
humans and animals. The EPC has introduced a special concept of novelty 
unknown in other technical fields. Novelty assessment has been specially shaped 
to accommodate innovation in the pharmaceutical industry.89 The first medical use 
rule can be considered as a statutory macro policy lever. The second medical use 
rule, initially shaped as a judicial extension of the first medical use doctrine, is now 
embedded in the EPC, thus acting as a statutory macro policy lever in European 
patent law. 
2.1.5. Novelty—selection invention 
In general 
In many patent systems, such as the European system, selection inventions 
are considered patentable. Generally speaking, a selection invention is the 
invention of a more specific technical teaching than the general one that has 
already been disclosed, or put differently, a selection invention is an invention that 
is a selection from a previous disclosure. Selection inventions can constitute a 
substantial and nonobvious enrichment of technology and are therefore 
 
86. This question was at stake before the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case 
T 231/85 (Dec. 8, 1986), O.J. E.P.O., 74 (1989). For similar cases, see SINGER & STAUDER, supra 
note 84, at 130–31. 
87. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Enlarged Board of Appeal, Case G 5/83 
(Dec. 5, 1984), O.J. E.P.O. 64 (1985). 
88. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Enlarged Board of Appeal, Case G 2/88 
(Dec. 11, 1989), O.J. E.P.O. 93 (1990); see also Decision of the European Patent Office, Enlarged 
Board of Appeal, Case G 6/88 (Dec. 11, 1989); O.J. E.P.O. 114 (1990). 
89. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Enlarged Board of Appeal, Case G 5/83 
(Mar. 25, 1985) O.J. E.P.O. 65 (1985), where the Board noted that “the Technical Board of Appeal 
rightly stressed its importance, particularly for the pharmaceutical industry.” 
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acknowledged as being worthy of patent protection. 
The recognition of selection inventions calls for particular care with regard 
to the assessment of novelty and inventive step. Indeed, if all more specific 
technical teachings were to be regarded as disclosed by the general teaching, 
selection inventions would be excluded from patent protection, for the selection 
invention would be regarded as lacking novelty.90 In that regard, the EPO 
Guidelines state that a generic disclosure does not anticipate the novelty of a 
specific example that falls within the terms of that disclosure, but a specific 
disclosure does take away the novelty of subject matter claimed generically, e.g., a 
disclosure of copper destroys novelty of metal as a generic concept, but not the 
novelty of any metal other than copper.91 EPO case law has repeatedly confirmed 
this approach.92 
In chemistry 
Although there are no specific limitations on the types of protectable 
selection inventions, in practice selection inventions appear mainly in the chemical 
field.93 In European patent law and practice, two types of selection inventions are 
quite common in the chemical field: chemical substances and groups of substances 
in respect of general formulae (so-called Markush formulae) under which they fall, 
on the one hand, and products or processes defined by parameter ranges as 
against known products or processes characterized by wider or overlapping 
parameter ranges, on the other hand.94 The Technical Boards of Appeal have 
developed considerable case law on the novelty assessment for both types of 
selection inventions in the field of chemistry, and have thoughtfully developed 
criteria for selection inventions.95 
Policy lever 
In further shaping the novelty (and inventive step) requirement(s) for 
selection inventions, the selection invention doctrine can act as a judicially created 
 
90. For some literature on this issue, see SINGER & STAUDER, supra note 84, at 124 and the 
references cited there.  
91. See European Patent Convention, supra note 24, Guidelines for Examination in the 
European Patent Office, pt. C, ch. IV, § 9.5. 
92. For an overview of relevant case law, see CASE LAW OF THE BOARDS OF APPEAL OF THE 
EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 84, at 87. 
93. See Association Internationale pour la Protection de la Propriété Intellectuelle 
[International Association for the Protection of Intellectual Property] Resolution Question 209, 
Selection Inventions—The Inventive Step Requirement, Other Patentability Criteria and Scope of 
Protection (2009), available at https://www.aippi.org/download/commitees/209/RS209English.pdf. 
See also id. at Question 81—Protection of groups of chemical substances and selection inventions, 
without passing a resolution on the subject. 
94. See CASE LAW OF THE BOARDS OF APPEAL OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra 
note 84, at 87–88. 
95. Id. at 87–101. 
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micro policy lever, nominally applying to all inventions, and assisting, for example, 
in deciding how broad or generic the prior disclosure is, how narrowly the 
selection invention is defined, how far removed from any specific examples 
disclosed in the prior art the selection invention is, and whether the features of the 
selection invention have been explicitly or implicitly described in the prior art.96 
But the doctrine has major effects for specific industry sectors, namely the 
chemical and pharmaceutical field. It remains to be seen if—and if so, to what 
extent—this doctrine will extend to the biotechnology sector in the future. 
2.1.6. Novelty—testing exemption 
In general 
In U.S. novelty assessment literature, experimental use plays a relevant role.97 
Use or sale, which takes part in the framework of a bona fide experiment, is not 
novelty destroying and does not trigger the one-year grace period.98 In the 
framework of nonstatutory experimental use, courts have looked into a variety of 
factors to determine whether a patentee’s use is experimental, including whether 
the goods were sold, whether the patentee kept control over them, whether the 
patentee sought feedback, and whether the final product changed as a result.99 
In Europe a similar novelty approach seems to apply in testing cases.100 The 
Technical Boards of Appeal repeatedly pointed out that a product made available 
for test purposes is to be treated as confidential, and hence, not novelty 
destroying. Sale of the product in a limited quantity is regarded as sale for test 
purposes if the product is normally sold in large quantities.101 In the EPO 
approach it seems to be assumed that in testing cases a (explicit or tacit) 
 
96. Id. See also Association Internationale pour la Protection de la Propriété Intellectuelle, supra 
note 93, Resolution Question 209. 
97. Experimental use as discussed in the present section relates to the particular novelty 
approach for experiments in the framework of the patent application procedure, and not to 
experimental use as a defense in infringement cases. 
98. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 113.  
99. Id. 
100. In addition, European patent law also foresees a special novelty treatment for inventions 
displayed at international exhibitions. The European Patent Convention states that a disclosure of the 
invention shall not be taken into consideration if it occurred no earlier than six months preceding the 
filing of the European patent application and if it was due to the fact that the applicant or his legal 
predecessor has displayed the invention at an official, or officially recognized, international exhibition 
falling within the terms of the Convention Relating to International Exhibitions, Nov. 22, 1928, 111 
L.N.T.S. 343 (last revised Nov. 30, 1972). See European Patent Convention, supra note 24, art. 
55(1)(b). This type of nonprejudicial disclosure is not further discussed here. 
101. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 221/91 (Dec. 8, 
1992); Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 267/91 (Apr. 28, 1993); 
Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 782/92 (June 22, 1994). For a 
discussion of those cases, see CASE LAW OF THE BOARDS OF APPEAL OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT 
OFFICE, supra note 84, at 61. 
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confidentiality agreement existed beforehand. 
In medicine 
In Europe, the test exemption doctrine is employed quite regularly in the 
medical field. An illustrative case concerns the implantation of a correction device 
into a patient,102 where the Technical Board of Appeal had to decide on alleged 
prior use.103 The Board considered that a device having an investigational status, 
being implanted and tested within the restricted area of a hospital, under the 
responsibility of a surgeon operating within the framework of an investigator’s 
agreement provided with a clause of confidentiality, has to be regarded as a 
prototype device. Even without the production of more specific evidence, the 
Board was of the opinion that the clinical tests performed on the device under the 
conduct and responsibility of a surgeon conferred on the operation as a whole an 
implicit obligation of confidentiality which had to be extended to the whole team 
involved in that operation. Neither the fact that the device was received and 
prepared by hospital staff, nor the fact that it was visible to the hospital staff 
during the operation, was suitable to prove that the device was accessible to the 
public. The decision was based on the reasoning of a previous Board decision 
where prior use was acknowledged but the question of confidentiality was 
contested.104 In the latter case it was held that in the medical field there is a prima 
facie assumption that any person involved in a medical process is obliged to 
maintain confidentiality, given the need for patient confidentiality and the need to 
protect the development and testing of prototype devices.  
In microbiology 
The EPO also addressed the issue of prior testing in the field of 
microbiology. The Technical Board of Appeal explained that a reference to 
biological material in a scientific publication does not result in that biological 
material being considered publicly available.105 The Board also stated that for a 
complex biochemical to be made available to the public, the minimum that would 
seem to be required for publication was a notice to those in the field that samples 
 
102. European Patent No. 0 468 264 (B1) concerning a spinal column retaining apparatus.  See 
DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
103. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 906/01 (Sept. 28, 
2004).  
104. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 152/03 (Apr. 22, 
2004) concerning European Patent No. 0 803 230 (B1) relating to an endovascular electrolytically 
detachable wire for thrombus formation. See also Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of 
Appeal, Case T 158/96; Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 385/07. 
These cases may also be interesting in this context, as phase I clinical trials of the medicament in 
patients having the disease were not considered to anticipate therapeutic indication. 
105. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 576/91 (Oct. 20, 
1993), relating to European Patent No. 0 235 308 (B1) concerning a coated foodstuff.  
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of the biochemical could be obtained on request, and clear evidence of exactly 
what the biochemical was.106 
Policy lever 
It seems that in Europe, as well as in the U.S., the testing exemption doctrine 
is a judicial micro policy lever to accommodate inventions whose design requires 
testing. Such a doctrine equally applies to all inventions in all technical fields, but 
the effect of such a doctrine will mainly be felt in the pharmaceutical sector, where 
a lot of testing is necessary, and in the biotechnology sector when the shift from 
bench to bedside is being made. 
2.1.7. Inventive step (nonobviousness)—expectation of success 
In general 
Most patent acts require that an invention is not obvious in view of the state 
of the art to enjoy patent protection. U.S. patent law stipulates that a patent may 
not be obtained “if the differences between the subject matter sought to be 
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have 
been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill 
in the art to which said subject matter pertains” (35 U.S.C. § 103 (a) (2010)).  
In the same spirit, European patent law underlines that “an invention shall 
be considered as involving an inventive step if, having regard to the state of the 
art, it is not obvious to a person skilled in the art” (Art. 56 EPC). The EPO 
Guidelines clarify that the term “obvious” refers to what does not go beyond the 
normal progress of technology, but merely follows plainly or logically from the 
prior art, i.e., something which does not involve the exercise of any skill or ability 
beyond that to be expected of the person skilled in the art.107 Furthermore, the 
Technical Boards of Appeal have set forth that a course of action can be 
considered “obvious” if the skilled person would have carried it out in expectation 
of some improvement or advantage. An illustrative example is the patent 
concerning the modification of a layered tablet containing simethicone and 
antacid.108 The Board stated that the question regarding the inventive step is not 
whether the skilled man could have inserted a barrier between the layers, but 
whether he would have done so in expectation of some improvement or 
advantage. Since the tablet was, on the face of it and from what was assumed in 
 
106. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 128/92 (Nov. 
30,1994), relating to European Patent No. 0 091 539 (B1) concerning active interleukin-2. 
107. See European Patent Convention, supra note 24, Guidelines for Examination in the 
European Patent Office, pt. C, ch. IV, § 11.4 (2010). 
108. See European Patent No. 0 014 253 (A1) (filed Dec. 14, 1979) (concerning a simethicone 
antacid tablet, refused by Decision of the European Patent Office, Examining Division, July  20, 
1982). 
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view of its commercialization, a satisfactory answer to the problem of undesirable 
migration, the addition of a barrier would have appeared superfluous, wasteful, 
and devoid of any technical effect. In view of the recognition that a barrier has a 
substantial effect after all, the outcome was not predictable and the claimed 
modification involves an inventive step on this basis.109 In another case, it was 
held that obviousness is not at hand when the results are clearly predictable and 
when there is a reasonable expectation of success.110 
In biotechnology 
The EPO paid special attention to the expectation of success doctrine in the 
field of genetic engineering. The Technical Boards of Appeal pointedly and 
repeatedly examined whether it was obvious for the skilled person to try a 
suggested approach, route, or method with a reasonable expectation of success.111 
An interesting example is the patent relating to the isolation, characterization, and 
production of DNA molecules comprising the genes for preprochymosin.112 The 
Board considered that the teachings in 1981 on genetic engineering led to the 
conclusion that none of the difficulties expected from the prevailing knowledge 
on cDNA cloning would be encountered, and that the person skilled in the art 
would be fairly confident at the onset of the project that the combination of these 
teachings and such standard knowledge on biotechnological protocols from that 
time113 would lead to the successful cloning of the genes encoding 
preprochymosin and its maturation forms. The Board concluded that it thus 
appeared at the date of priority that the cloning and expression of the chymosin 
DNA would have been perceived as “an endeavor likely to succeed,” and that 
achieving this cloning did not pose such problems as to prove that this 
assumption was wrong. On this basis, the Board concluded that the claimed 
invention lacked an inventive step.114 This decision is not in contradiction with 
other appeal decisions in similar cases of the same time period, which 
 
109. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 2/83 (Mar. 15, 
1984), O.J. E.P.O. 265 (1984) 
110. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 149/93 (Mar. 23, 
1995), relating to European Patent Application No. 0 253 393 (A1), concerning methods for 
treatment of sun-damaged human skin with retinoids. 
111. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case 60/89 (Aug. 31, 
1990), O.J. E.P.O. 268 (1992) relating to European Patent No. 0 006 694 (B1) concerning a method 
of making a selected protein. For an overview of similar Board cases, see CASE LAW OF THE BOARDS 
OF APPEAL OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 84, at 132–34.  
112. See European Patent No. 0 077 109 (B1) (filed Oct. 13, 1982) concerning DNA 
molecules comprising the genes for preprochymosin and its maturation forms, and microorganisms 
transformed thereby). See also supra Section 2.1.11. 
113. See, e.g., SANDY B. PRIMROSE ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF GENE MANIPULATIONS 59–88 
(1980) and TOM MANIATIS ET AL., MOLECULAR CLONING: A LABORATORY MANUAL § 8 (1982). 
114. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 386/94 (Jan. 11, 
1996) (Reasons 42 and 59). 
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acknowledged the cloning of other specific cDNA molecules as involving an 
inventive step, such as tissue plasminogen activator,115 erythropoietin,116 
IFNgamma,117 interleukin-II,118 and human interferon,119 as the actual facts of 
these cases were different. 
Therefore, in the field of gene technology, inventive step may be 
acknowledged if there is no reasonable expectation of success that the cloning and 
expression of a given gene can be carried out. Conversely, inventive step cannot 
be acknowledged in cases where, at the priority date, a skilled person can expect to 
perform the cloning and expression of a gene in a fairly straightforward manner, 
and the cloning, although requiring much work, does not pose such problems as 
to prove that the expectation of success was ill founded. 
Policy lever 
The expectation of success doctrine as applied in Europe is a judicial micro 
policy lever. The characteristics of this type of obviousness test are not expressly 
industry specific, but produce more effect in one industry compared to another. 
Young industries, such as biotechnology in its early years, where the level of 
uncertainty is high, are more prone to benefit from this approach, compared to 
established industries where the level of uncertainty is low(er). Further research is 
needed to examine to what extent the expectation of success doctrine as employed 
in biotechnology in Europe follows the theory on obviousness and uncertainty, as 
pioneered by Robert Merges.120 This theory suggests that where uncertainty is 
higher, courts should lower the standard of patentability to compensate for the 
risk of failure. 
2.1.8. Inventive step (nonobviousness) —secondary indicia—commercial success 
In general 
In U.S. patent law, Graham vs. John Deere121 and KSR122 define the standard 
 
115. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 923/92 (Nov. 8, 
1995). 
116. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 412/93 (Nov. 21, 
1994). 
117. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 223/92 (July 20, 
1993). 
118. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 128/92 (Nov. 30, 
1994). 
119. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 223/92 (July 20, 
1993), in which it was decided that the expectation of success was not likely by the method known for 
interferon-ß. 
120. Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L. J. 1, 1–70 
(1992). 
121. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966). See CHISUM, supra note 52, 
§§  5.02 [5], 5.05. 
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for assessing nonobviousness, and set forth that secondary indicia can play a role 
therein. In European patent law, secondary indicia may equally be employed as 
auxiliary considerations in the assessment of inventive step in cases of doubt. 
Secondary indicia may encompass factors such as commercial success, the 
overcoming of prejudice, the age of the documents cited, the cost of advertising 
and the creation of a new market segment, the satisfaction of a long-standing 
need, the existence of imitations, and forms of infringement.123 In principle, 
commercial success alone is not to be regarded as indicative of inventive step. 
Commercial success can only be taken into account if—first—a long felt need has 
been demonstrated, and if—second—the commercial success derived from the 
technical features of the invention and not from other influences (e.g., selling 
techniques or advertising).124 
In biotechnology and medicine 
There is no specific EPO case law on the application of the secondary indicia 
doctrine in the biotech or medical sector. Secondary indicia have not proven to be 
particularly relevant in the biotechnology or in the medical industry, except for 
one well-known case, namely Viagra. Viagra is the brand name of sildenafil citrate, 
a substance vital in the treatment of impotence. When assessing the inventive step 
of the Viagra patent,125 the Board confirmed that the establishment of commercial 
success as an indicia of inventive step required two steps: “[F]irst, to show that 
 
122. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). See CHISUM, supra note 52, § 5.05. See 
also Timo Minssen, The U.S. Examination of Nonobviousness After KSR v. Teleflex with Special Emphasis on 
DNA-Related Inventions, 39 INT’L R. OF INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 886, 886–916 (2008) 
(discussing the impact of the KSR decision on DNA-related inventions). 
123. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 1072/92 (June 28, 
1994). The decision relates to European Patent No. 0 291 003 (issued Sept. 12, 1990) concerning a 
hollow plug for sealing a heat exchanger tube. The Board concluded that “daß Beweisanzeichen wie 
die Befriedigung eines langen bestehenden Bedürfnisses, die Überwindung eines Vorurteils der 
Fachwelt oder ein großer wirtschaftlicher Erfolg lediglich Hilfserwägungen für die Beurteilung der 
erfinderischen Tätigkeit bilden. Solche Hilfserwägungen können Voraussetzung für eine positive 
Beurteilung der erfinderischen Tätigkeit sein, sind dies jedoch nicht zwangsläufig.” 
[“[S]igns that demonstrate how to satisfy a long existing need, overcoming a prejudice of 
the professional world or a big commercial success, are only secondary considerations for the 
assessment of the inventive step. Such considerations may help achieve a positive assessment 
of inventive step, but these are not necessary.”] Id. at 13. See also the famous Epilady case, Decision of 
the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 754/89 (Apr. 24, 1991), relating to European 
Patent No. 0 101 656 (B1) concerning an electrically powered depilatory device comprising a helical 
spring. In this case the Board confirmed that in principle secondary indicia may be relevant to assess 
inventive step, but did not rely on secondary indicia in this case as the inventive step could be decided 
on the basis of a pure technically skilled assessment. 
124. See European Patent Convention, supra note 24, Guidelines for Examination in the 
European Patent Office, pt. C, ch. IV, § 11.9.4 (2010). See also HANNS ULLRICH, STANDARDS OF 
PATENTABILITY FOR EUROPEAN INVENTIONS 84–96 (1978) (in-depth comparative analysis of the 
subtest of commercial success between the United States and the European Patent Convention). 
125. See European Patent No. 0 702 555 awarded to Pfizer Ltd. 
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there has been commercial success and, second, to show that such success results 
from the claimed invention and not from one or more other causes.”126 Viagra 
had been the subject of various awards and praise in various journals. The Board 
stated that the prizes would have been significant if awarded by persons who 
understand patent law for the nonobvious nature of the technical contribution to 
the art made by the claimed invention. If, however, the prizes were awarded for 
the product’s life-enhancing nature, or for the appellants’ high standard of 
research, or for a high level of sales, then, for all that any of those reasons might 
well be prizeworthy, the prizes can have no significance in the context of inventive 
step. The Board arrived at the conclusion that the evidence did not establish that 
the “prizes and praises” resulted from the claimed inventive step.127 
Policy lever 
It is somewhat difficult to derive a conclusion on the basis of this one—
albeit eminent—EPO case in the field of medicine, as to the use of commercial 
success as a judicial policy lever. Further research is needed to examine to what 
extent commercial success is indeed put to work as a (macro or micro) policy lever in 
Europe in the field of biotechnology or medicine. 
2.1.9. Industrial applicability (utility)  
In general 
U.S. patent law states that whoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, may obtain a patent 
therefore (35 U.S.C. § 101 (2010)). In addition, U.S. courts have traditionally 
interpreted the utility requirement to mandate three separate tests: whether the 
invention has any purpose other than idle amusement, whether the invention 
actually works for its intended purpose, and whether the purpose is one that 
society would consider beneficial.128 
Under European patent law, an invention shall be considered as susceptible 
of industrial application if it can be made or used in any kind of industry, including 
agriculture (Art. 57 EPC). According to prevailing EPO case law, the industrial 
applicability requirement cannot be equated with the requirement for a “technical” 
contribution, and the terms “industrial” and “technical” can not be regarded as 
synonyms.129 The notion “technical” is a quintessential feature of an invention, an 
 
126. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 1212/01 (Feb. 3, 
2005) (Reason 6.2). 
127. See id. (Reasons 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5). 
128. See CHISUM, supra note 52, § 4.01. 
129. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 953/94 (July 15, 
1996). The decision related to European Patent No.  0 169 703 concerning a method of functional 
analysis. The Board stated that the requirement (defined in Art. 52(2) and (3) of the European Patent 
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“invention” being the very first requirement (defined in Art. 52 (2) and (3) EPC) 
of claimed subject matter.130 The notion of “industry,” on the other hand, implies 
that an activity is carried out continuously, independently, and for financial, 
commercial gain.131 
In biotechnology 
In the U.S., the utility requirement seems to have lost much of its force in 
the last several decades.132 The only exceptions to the elimination of the utility 
requirement in U.S. patent law can be found in the fields of biology and chemistry. 
The PTO’s Utility Examination Guidelines indeed require that the asserted utility 
of the subject matter claimed is “specific, substantial, and credible.”133 The three-
fold “specific-substantial-credible” requirement was ratified by the Federal Circuit 
in In re Fisher.134 
In Europe, the industrial applicability requirement is very much present in 
the field of biotechnology. First and foremost, the EU Biotechnology Directive 
explicitly stipulates that the industrial application of a sequence or a partial 
sequence of a human gene must be disclosed in the patent application 
(Art. 5 (3) Directive; Rule 29 (3) EPC IRs). The recitals and the parliamentary 
history indicate that the word “industrial applicability” should be read as 
“function,” amounting to the obligation to indicate the function of a partial 
 
Convention, supra note 24) that claimed subject matter be a nonexcluded “invention,” is distinct from 
the requirement (defined in Art. 57 of the European Patent Convention) that the claimed invention 
be “susceptible of industrial application.” Even though the former requirement may, cum grano salis, be 
equated with a requirement for a “technical” contribution, this is not the same as a requirement for an 
“industrial” applicability. At least in this context, the terms “technical” and “industrial” are not 
synonyms. The Board underlines that “In Article 57 of the European Patent Convention, the meaning 
of ‘industrial’ is evidently intended to cover commercial applications; this is made clear, for instance, 
by the German version (“gewerblich”). In the context of Article 52(2) of the European Patent 
Convention, this is clearly not the case for the meaning of ‘technical.’” Id. at 14–15 (Reason 3.11). 
130. Id. 
131. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 144/83 (Mar. 27, 
1986), O.J. E.P.O. 301 (1986). European Patent Application No. 0 005 636 was refused by the EPO 
Examining Division on the ground that, as far as the method relates to a cosmetic process, the subject 
matter of the claim was not susceptible for industrial application according to Art. 57 of the European 
Patent Convention, supra note 25: the treatment of a human being with naltrexone was considered 
essentially biological in nature and therefore the administration of the same could not be regarded as 
susceptible to industrial application. The Board took the view that the invention in case complied 
with the requirements of Art. 57 of the European Patent Convention, as it was beyond doubt that the 
invention can be used by enterprises whose object is to beautify the human or animal body. Such 
enterprises in the cosmetic field—such as cosmetic salons and beauty parlors—are part of industry in 
the sense of Art. 57 of the European Patent Convention since the notion of concept “industry” 
implies that an activity is carried out continuously, independently and for financial gain. 
132. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 111. 
133. See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 2107 Guidelines for Examination of Applications 
for Compliance with the Utility Requirement—2100 Patentability, available at http://www.uspto.gov 
/web/offices/pac/mpep/documents/2100_2107.htm (MPEP—Latest Revision July 2010). 
134. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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sequence of a gene.135 Furthermore, recent EPO case law emphasized that a 
“practical” application of the invention has to be disclosed. A typical case is the 
patent related to the production of the protein Tyrosine Phosphatase PTP20.136 
The Board underlined that merely because a substance—in casu a polypeptide—
can be produced in some way does not necessarily mean that the industrial 
applicability requirement is fulfilled, unless there is also some profitable use for 
which the substance can be employed.137 Biotechnological inventions are quite 
often concerned with substances found in nature (e.g., a protein, a DNA sequence, 
etc.). In cases where the structure and function of the substance is elucidated and 
means are provided for extracting it or producing it in large amounts, industrial 
applicability exists in relation to the possibility to exploit the information and 
technical means disclosed in order to manufacture the substance and use it for 
some function related to its natural one, or for some other previously unknown 
(now disclosed) function, or as a starting material for making useful analogs or 
derivatives with some improved features. If a function is well known to be 
essential for human health, then the identification of the substance having this 
function will immediately suggest a practical application in the case of a disease or 
condition caused by a deficiency, as was the case, for example, for insulin, human 
growth hormone, or erythropoietin. In such cases an adequate description will 
ensure, in accordance with the requirements of Art. 57 EPC, that the invention 
can be made or used in industry.138 In cases where a substance naturally occurring 
in the human body is identified, and possibly also structurally characterized and 
made available through some method, but either its function is not known or it is 
 
135. See European Patent Convention, supra note 24, Guidelines for Examination in the 
European Patent Office, pt. C, ch. IV, § 5.4 (2010). Particularly relevant are Recitals 22, 23 and 24 of 
the EU Biotechnology Directive, which run as follows:  
(22) Whereas the discussion on the patentability of sequences or partial 
sequences of genes is controversial; whereas, according to this Directive, the 
granting of a patent for inventions which concern such sequences or partial 
sequences should be subject to the same criteria of patentability as in all other 
areas of technology: novelty, inventive step and industrial application; whereas 
the industrial application of a sequence or partial sequence must be disclosed in 
the patent application as filed; (23) Whereas a mere DNA sequence without 
indication of a function does not contain any technical information and is 
therefore not a patentable invention; (24) Whereas, in order to comply with the 
industrial application criterion it is necessary in cases where a sequence or 
partial sequence of a gene is used to produce a protein or part of a protein, to 
specify which protein or part of a protein is produced or what function it 
performs.  
Id. (emphasis added).  
136. See European Patent Application No.  0 914 452 (A2) (filed Dec. 12, 1997) concerning 
novel PTP20, PCP-2, BDP1, CLK and SIRP proteins and related products and methods. 
137. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 870/04 (May 11, 
2005) (Reason 4) (unpublished), available at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/pdf 
/t040870eu1.pdf. 
138. Id. at Reason 5. 
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complex and incompletely understood, and no disease or condition has yet been 
identified as being attributable to an excess or deficiency of the substance, and no 
other practical use is suggested for the substance, then industrial applicability 
cannot be acknowledged. There must be a borderline between what can be 
accepted, and what can only be categorized as an interesting research result which 
per se does not yet allow a practical industrial application to be identified. Even 
though research results may be a scientific achievement of considerable merit, they 
are not necessarily an invention which can be applied industrially.139 A vague and 
speculative indication of possible objectives that might or might not be achievable 
by carrying out further research with the tool as described is not sufficient for 
fulfillment of the requirement of industrial applicability. The purpose of granting a 
patent is not to reserve an unexplored field of research for an applicant.140 
In one of the very first national court decisions on industrial applicability for 
biotechnological inventions, the U.K. Court of Appeal invalidated a patent for 
lack of industrial application,141 despite a ruling of the EPO Board that the same 
patent was valid.142 The case demonstrates the danger of allowing patents “too far 
upstream.” Justice Jacob contended that however clever and inventive discovering 
a gene sequence may have been, one cannot have a patent for it or for the protein 
for which it encodes if the patent does not disclose how it can be used.143 
Furthermore, “it is difficult to see why the mere fact of the T-cell activity of 
Neutrokine- may represent a valid basis for a possible industrial application.”144 
Policy lever 
In European patent law, the industrial applicability requirement constitutes 
both a macro and a micro policy lever in biotechnology. First and foremost, the 
industrial applicability requirement makes for a statutory macro policy lever. By 
expressly demanding the “function” of (partial sequences of) genes, European 
patent law establishes a specific standard for inventions in the biotechnological 
field. Second, the industrial applicability requirement also constitutes a judicial micro 
policy lever particularly relevant in the context of biotechnology. By repeatedly 
underlining that the notion of “industry” implies that an activity is carried out 
 
139. Id. at Reason 6. 
140. Id. at Reason 21. 
141. Eli Lilly and Company v. Human Genome Sciences Inc., [2010] EWCA (Civ) 33 (Eng.).  
142. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 18/09 (Oct. 21, 
2009) relating to European Patent No. 0 939 804, which concerned a Neutrokine- polypeptide, 
awarded to Ely Lilly. Claim 1 as granted reads as follows: “1. A nucleic acid molecule comprising a 
polynucleotide sequence encoding a Neutrokine- polypeptide wherein said polynucleotide sequence 
is selected from the group consisting of: (a) a polynucleotide sequence encoding the full length 
Neutrokine- polypeptide having the amino sequence or residues 1 to 285 of SEQ ID NO:2; (b) a 
polynucleotide sequence encoding the extracellular domain of the Neutrokine- polypeptide having 
the amino acid sequence of residues 73 tot 285 of SEQ ID NO: 2; (c) . . . (d) . . . (e) . . . (f) . . . .”  
143. Eli Lilly, [2010] EWCA (Civ) 33 at Reason 57. 
144. Id. at Reason 155. 
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continuously, independently, and for financial, commercial gain, the European 
industrial applicability requirement, being nominally neutral vis-à-vis specific 
industry sectors, favors technologies and/or industries which develop inventions 
which are more downstream and closer to the market. Applying the prevailing 
“industry” interpretation rigorously within the biotechnology industry, might 
ultimately lead to a patent scenario where precedence is given to end products 
with a definite commercial value over research tools. Such an approach definitely 
has positive effects, as products and processes which are useful for research are 
not appropriable by patents and will, in principle, be available for use to all. 
However, such an approach might also have negative effects, as research tools in 
the absence of patent protection are denied the patent incentive, possibly resulting 
in lesser innovation. 
2.1.10. Skilled person 
The role of the skilled person 
In U.S. patent law, the “person having ordinary skill in the art” (PHOSITA) 
plays a pivotal role in deciding on a series of factual questions, which are measured 
from his or her perspective. First and foremost, the PHOSITA plays an important 
role in the assessment of obviousness:  
 
A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the subject 
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject 
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was 
made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject 
matter pertains.145  
 
In other words, an invention may not have been obvious to a person with 
ordinary skill in the art to which the subject matter of the invention pertains at the 
time of the invention and in the light of the teachings of the prior art.146 The 
PHOSITA also comes to the fore to assess the adequacy of the patent disclosure:  
 
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and 
of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, 
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to 
which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and 
use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the 
inventor of carrying out his invention.147 
 
145. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2010). 
146. CHISUM, supra note 52, §§  5.01, 5.03 [4]. 
147. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2010). 
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Last but not least, the PHOSITA is also central in defining the patent scope. 
The patent claims are being assessed with regard to the knowledge of a person 
having skill in the art. 
In European patent law, the “person skilled in the art” (PSITA) also plays a 
key role. First, the PSITA is of importance in the framework of the inventive step 
assessment: “An invention shall be considered as involving an inventive step if, 
having regard to the state of the art, it is not obvious to a person skilled in the 
art.” (Art. 56 EPC). The PSITA also plays a vital role in the context of the patent 
disclosure: “The European patent application shall disclose the invention in a 
manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by a person skilled 
in the art.” (Art. 83 EPC). Sanctions for inadequate disclosure are fierce, ranging 
from opposition148 to revocation.149 Last but not least, the PSITA also shows up 
in the framework of claim interpretation and patent scope. The EPC is not very 
explicit about the role of the PSITA in this regard,150 but all the more so are the 
national courts of the member states, where quite often reference is made to how 
the PSITA would understand the terms in patent claims. Exemplary in this regard 
is the enunciation of the honorable Lord Hoffman, who stated that “The question 
is always what the person skilled in the art would have understood the patentee to 
be using the language of the claim to mean.”151 
 
148. See European Patent Convention, supra note 24, Art. 100(b) (stating that opposition may 
only be filed on the grounds that “the European patent does not disclose the invention in a manner 
sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the art.”). 
149. See id.,, Art. 138(1)(b) (setting forth that a European patent may be revoked with effect 
for a Contracting State only on the grounds that “the European patent does not disclose the 
invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the 
art.”). 
150. Id., Art. 69 (1) (stipulating that “[t]he extent of the protection conferred by a European 
patent or a European patent application shall be determined by the claims.”). Article 1 Protocol on 
the Interpretation of Article 69 EPC of Oct. 5, 1973 as revised by the Act revising the EPC of Nov. 
29, 2000 adds that  
Article 69 should not be interpreted as meaning that the extent of the 
protection conferred by a European patent is to be understood as that defined 
by the strict, literal meaning of the wording used in the claims, the description 
and drawings being employed only for the purpose of resolving an ambiguity 
found in the claims. Nor should it be taken to mean that the claims serve only 
as a guideline and that the actual protection conferred may extend to what, 
from a consideration of the description and drawings by a person skilled in the 
art, the patent proprietor has contemplated. On the contrary, it is to be 
interpreted as defining a position between these extremes which combines a 
fair protection for the patent proprietor with a reasonable degree of legal 
certainty for third parties. 
151. Kirin-Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Ltd., (2004) U.K.H.L. 46 34 (appeal taken 
from E.W.C.A. (Civ)). 
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The profile of the skilled person 
In general 
Having elucidated the role of the skilled person, who exactly is he or she? In 
EPO case law the profile of the skilled person has been extensively debated. For 
the purpose of the inventive step assessment, the PSITA should be presumed to 
be an ordinary practitioner aware of what was common general knowledge in the 
art at the relevant date, and who does not possess any inventive capability. 
Nevertheless, the PSITA is expected to look for suggestions in neighboring fields 
if the same or similar problems arise in these fields. If the problem prompts the 
PSITA to seek its solution in another technical field, the specialist in that field is 
the person qualified to solve the problem and the assessment of whether the 
solution involves an inventive step will have to be based on that specialist’s 
knowledge and ability. An interesting example relates to the assessment of 
inventive step of a cleaning apparatus for an endless conveyor belt, where the 
solution to the problem consists in discovering a rod-shaped elastic element which 
is less prone to breakage. Reference to the knowledge and capabilities of a 
materials specialist, rather than a conveying equipment specialist, will have to be 
made.152 In advanced technical fields the PSITA could be a team of two or more 
experts from the relevant technical branches. For example, for the assessment of 
an invention relating to an ion-generating plasma apparatus, the semiconductor 
expert would team up with a plasma specialist.153 Or in the field of advanced laser 
 
152. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 32/81 (Mar. 5, 1982) 
O.J. E.P.O. 225 (1982). This decision related to European Patent Application No. 0 004 809, 
concerning a cleaning apparatus for an endless conveyor belt. The application was refused by decision 
of the Examining Division arguing that by reference to the general knowledge of any technically 
skilled person the invention was certainly new but did not involve an inventive step. The Board 
argued that the problem to be solved consisted in discovering a rod-shaped elastic element which is 
less prone to breakage, which problem undeniably confronts the conveying equipment specialist; 
however, it prompts him at the same time to seek its solution in the field of material science. 
Consequently, the skilled person qualified to solve the problem cannot be a conveying equipment 
specialist, but has to be a materials specialist alone. Therefore, the assessment of whether the 
problem’s solution involves an inventive step must be made by reference to the knowledge and ability 
of a materials specialist, not a conveying equipment specialist. Id. at 227 (Reason 4.2). See also § 7.1.1 
of CASE LAW OF THE BOARDS OF APPEAL OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 84, at 
61. 
153. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 424/90 (Dec. 11, 
1991), relating to European Patent No. 0 084 970 concerning a magnetically enhanced plasma process 
and apparatus at Reason 1.3 (holding that the claimed apparatus is no doubt intended to be used in 
the reactive ion etching but not accepting that the competent skilled person is merely a 
semiconductor specialist). The Board considered that in real life, a semiconductor specialist would 
consult a plasma specialist, if his problem concerns providing a technical improvement of an ion 
generating plasma apparatus and the semiconductor specialist would be expected to form a team with 
the plasma specialist. In the Board’s view, it is appropriate to follow Decision T 32/81, and to base 
the assessment of whether the claimed solution involves an inventive step on the knowledge and 
abilities of the specialist in that technical field in which the objective problem prompts the person 
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technology, the PSITA would be seen as a production team of three experts, one 
in physics, one in electronics and one in chemistry.154 
For the purpose of disclosure, the PSITA should make use of his common 
general knowledge.155 Textbooks and general technical literature form part of the 
common general knowledge,156 whereas information which can only be obtained 
after a comprehensive search is not to be regarded as part of the common general 
knowledge.157 The PSITA should not employ any inventive effort over and above 
his ordinary skills.158 In new fields of research, where relevant technical knowledge 
is not yet available from textbooks, patent specifications and scientific publications 
may be considered to form part of the common general knowledge.159  
 
skilled in the art to seek its solution. 
154. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 222/86 (Sept. 22, 
1987), relating to European Patent No. 0 008 513 concerning a method and system to depict a picture 
of an object, such invention belonging to the technical field of laser engraving at Reason 4.2 (holding 
that laser engraving represents an advanced technology, where it is appropriate to identify the skilled 
person to be a production team of the following three experts: a physicist, who is competent for the 
laser, an expert in electronics, who is competent for the scanning and modulation, and a chemist, who 
is competent for the photosensitive layer of the recording carrier. The Board further underlines that 
the person qualified to solve a problem is regarded to be the specialist of the particular technical field, 
in which the particular problem prompts a skilled person to seek its solution, referring to Decision 
T 32/81). 
155. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 206/83 (Mar. 26, 
1986) O.J. E.P.O. 5 (1987), relating to European Patent No. 0 001 473 concerning herbicidal 
halogenomethyl-pyridyloxy-phenoxy-alkanecarboxylic acids and derivatives, and processes of 
controlling unwanted plants therewith at Reason 5 (stating that the person skilled in the art is 
expected to have common general knowledge at his immediate disposal and that it would be unfair if 
more were to be expected of him, i.e. an awareness of the whole state of the art).  
156. See id. at Reason 5 (holding that it is normally accepted that common general knowledge 
is represented by basic handbooks and textbooks on the subject in question. The skilled person could 
well be expected to consult these to obtain clear advice as to what to do in the circumstances, since 
the skills of such persons not only include knowledge about particular basic prior art but also 
knowledge as to where to find such information. Such books may indeed refer him to articles 
describing specifically how to act or at least giving a fairly generally applicable method for the 
purpose, which can be used without any doubt). See also Decision of the European Patent Office, 
Board of Appeal, Case T 171/84 (Oct. 24, 1985) relating to European Patent No. 0 003 870 
concerning polymer resin emulsions (holding that the document referred to by the appellant as closest 
prior art was neither cited in the patent specification in support of the disclosure, nor had it become 
part of common general knowledge, for example, through appreciation in a standard textbook). 
157. See id. at Reason 6 (holding that the indexes of Chemical Abstracts cover virtually the 
whole state of the art, and represent therefore much more than what is assumed to be the common 
general knowledge. Reliance on the contents of Chemical Abstracts to rectify insufficiency might be 
tantamount to leaving the skilled reader to carry out a search in the whole state of the art, which 
would be an unacceptable burden). 
158. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 10/86 (Sept. 1, 
1988), relating to European Patent No. 0 049 816 and concerning a process for obtaining energy from 
the mass-energy equivalence at the formation of protons and neutrons.  
159. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Technical Board of Appeal, Case T 51/87  
(Dec. 8, 1988), 1991 O.J. E.P.O. (C3) 177, relating to European Patent No. 0 002 615, concerning 13-
Halo and 13-deoxy derivatives of modified milbemycin compounds and their preparation. By contrast 
to previous decisions (see T 206/83, “Herbicides,” supra note 155, and T 171/84, “Redox Catalyst,” 
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Finally, for the purpose of claim interpretation, the PSITA is expected to rule 
out interpretations which are illogical or which do not make technical sense. He or 
she should try, with synthetical propensity, i.e., building up rather than tearing 
down, to arrive at an interpretation of the claim which is technically sensible and 
takes into account the whole disclosure of the patent (Art. 69 EPC), and he or she 
should construe the patent by a mind willing to understand, not a mind desirous 
of misunderstanding.160 
In biotechnology 
EPO jurisprudence has given special consideration to the PSITA in the field 
of biotechnology.161 The Technical Boards of Appeal have confirmed prevailing 
case law on the notion of “common general knowledge” and stated that common 
general knowledge can be considered the information contained in basic 
handbooks, monographs, and textbooks on the subject in question.162 
Furthermore, the Boards have argued that the PSITA in biotechnology is 
 
OJ EPO 1986, 95), where the Board held that patent specifications were not normally part of the 
common general knowledge of the natural skilled addressee, the Board argued in the present case that 
the starting compounds at stake (highly elaborated microbial metabolites) opened a brand new field of 
research, so that any technical knowledge acquired in this field at the beginning, through basic 
pioneering work had not yet been distilled into the form of textbooks. In prior decisions, the situation 
was quite different, as the PSITA was a person working in the field of classical herbicide chemistry, 
which was not a new developing field like that of the chemistry of C-076 compounds here. The 
PSITA, therefore, could not be presumed to possess the same common general knowledge in both 
cases. See id. 
160. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 190/99 (Mar. 6, 
2001) relating to European Patent No. 0 448 265 concerning a woven slide fastener stringer, at 
Reason 2.4. See also CASE LAW OF THE BOARDS OF APPEAL OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, 
supra note 84, at 205. 
161. An interesting measure for comparison may be found in E. Richard Gold & Karen 
Lynne Durell, Innovating the Skilled Reader: Tailoring Patent Law to New Technologies, 19 WASH. & LEE 
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 189, 189–226 (2005), where the skilled reader has been analyzed in Canadian case 
law in an attempt to prove that “one size does not fit all.” 
162. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 890/02 (Oct. 14, 
2004) O.J. E.P.O. 497 (2005) (relating to European Patent Application No. 96 920 888.3 and 
concerning DNA sequences of a gene of hydroxy-phenyl pyruvate dioxygenase and production of 
plants containing a gene of hydroxy-phenyl pyruvate dioxygenase, such plants being tolerant to 
certain herbicides, submitted by Bayer CropScience). The Board held that whilst not being stricto 
sensu encyclopaedias or handbooks, the ENZYME and the EMBL databases nonetheless answer to 
the definition of, respectively, an encyclopaedia or a handbook. Furthermore, they fulfill the three 
criteria set out in the case law when defining the common general knowledge, namely (a) they are 
known by the skilled person to be an appropriate source for obtaining the desired information, (b) 
looking for this information requires no undue effort, since no search strategy is needed but only the 
EC number or the enzyme name (in the present case the enzyme name is known from document D10 
itself), and (c) the information retrieved (for example, the nucleotide sequence) does not need any 
further research work, i.e. it is unambiguous and straightforward. For these reasons, in the Board’s 
judgment, the information in these databases ENZYME and EMBL meets the definition of common 
general knowledge given in the case law (Reason 9). See also European Patent Convention, supra note 
24, Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office, pt. C, ch. II, § 4.1 (2010) and the cases 
cited there. 
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considered to be conservative. He or she would never go against an established 
prejudice, nor try to enter unpredictable areas, nor take incalculable risks. The 
PSITA would perform a transfer of technology from a neighboring field to his or 
her specific field of interest, only if this transfer involved routine experimental 
work comprising only routine trials.163 The PSITA would not engage in creative 
thinking: the Nobel Prize laureate’s level of skill does not determine the PSITA, 
nor does it determine what must be considered as falling within common general 
knowledge of the time.164  
An illustrative example of the profile of the PSITA in biotechnology is the 
inventive step assessment applied to the identification, characterization, and 
production of human immune interferon. In this case the Board had to consider 
the knowledge and capabilities of the PSITA in the field of genetic engineering 
around October 1981.165 By this time, a considerably greater number of genes had 
been made the subject of cloning and expressing methods, and skills and 
experience in this technical field were developing rapidly. The PSITA had to be 
assumed to lack the inventive imagination to solve problems for which routine 
methods of solution did not already exist. The knowledge of the PSITA had to be 
 
163. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 455/91 (June 20, 
1994) O.J. E.P.O. 684 relating to European Patent No. 0 060 057 concerning the expression of 
polypeptides in yeast. In the Board’s view, the conservative attitude must not be seen in the sense of 
being reluctant or opposed to modify or adjust a known product or process, but rather in the sense of 
being cautious. For example, the skilled person in question would neither go against an established 
prejudice nor try to enter into “sacrosanct” or unpredictable areas nor take incalculable risks. 
However, within the normal design procedures, the said expert would readily seek appropriate, 
manifest changes, modifications or adjustments which involve little trouble or work and no risks or 
only calculable risks, especially for the sake of obtaining a more handy or convenient product or 
simplifying a procedure. In particular, the skilled person working in one field (see, e.g., expression in 
yeast) would regard a means conveniently adopted in a neighboring field (see, e.g., the bacterial art) as 
being readily usable also in that field, if this transfer of technical knowledge involves nothing out of 
the ordinary.” See id. at Reason 5.1.3.3.   
164. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 60/89, supra note 111, 
O.J. E.P.O. at 268 (1992) (relating to European Patent No. 0 006 694, Reason 2.2.4) (holding that the 
skill of the PSITA in the field of genetic engineering in 1978 is not to be defined as a Nobel Prize 
laureate, even if a number of scientists working in this field at that time were actually awarded the 
Nobel Prize. Rather, it is understood that the skilled person was to be seen as a graduate scientist or a 
team of scientists of that skill, working in laboratories which moved from molecular genetics to 
genetic engineering techniques, at that time). See also Decision of the European Patent Office, Board 
of Appeal, Case T 500/91 (Oct. 21, 1992), relating to European Patent No. 0 032 134 (concerning 
DNA sequences, recombinant DNA molecules, and processes for producing human interferon--like 
polypeptides), Reason 2.2 (holding that in accordance with the notion skilled person who may be 
represented by a team of appropriate specialists, the PSITA is oriented toward practicalities and the 
art does not involve performing scientific research in areas not yet explored).  
165. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 223/92 (July 20, 
1993) (relating to European Patent No. 0 077 670 concerning human immune (γ) interferon (IFN-γ) 
awarded to Genentech on June 28, 1989; Appeal against the Decision of the EPO Opposition 
Division from Jan. 13, 1992 rejecting the opposition filed against European Patent No. 0 006 694. 
This is more than one year later than in Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, 
Case T 500/91, supra note 164. 
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considered as that of a team of appropriate specialists who knew all the difficulties 
still to be expected when considering the cloning of a new gene. Similarly, in the 
case of the production of erythropoietin, it was agreed that the PSITA could be 
treated as “a team of three composed of one Ph.D. researcher with several years 
experience in the aspect of gene technology or biochemistry under consideration, 
assisted by two laboratory technicians fully acquainted with the known techniques 
relevant to that aspect.”166 
EPO jurisprudence also clarified that the same level of skill has to be applied 
when, for the same invention, the question of inventive step (Art. 56 EPC) and 
sufficient disclosure (Art. 83 EPC) have to be considered.167 Although the same 
level of skill is applied for both questions, the two starting points differ: for 
inventive step purposes, the skilled man knows only the prior art, whereas for 
sufficiency of disclosure, he knows the prior art and the disclosed invention.168 
Policy lever 
In Europe, the PSITA was formally called into life by the legislature and was 
mainly fleshed out by EPO case law: the definition of the role of the PSITA is 
mainly statutory, whereas the description of the exact profile of the PSITA is 
mainly judicial. Comparing the profile of the PSITA in general and in the domain 
of biotechnology does not seem to reveal different standards. Rather than 
variations between industry sectors, other differences come to the fore. First, a 
 
166. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 412/93, supra note 
116, relating to European Patent No. 0 148 605 concerning the production of recombinant 
erythropoietin and awarded to Kirin Amgen on July 25, 1990. The parties agreed that for this case the 
skilled person should be treated as a team of three composed of one Ph.D. researcher with several 
years experience in the aspect of gene technology or biochemistry under consideration, assisted by 
two laboratory technicians fully acquainted with the known techniques relevant to that aspect. This 
definition of the skilled person coincides with the view of the Board, and references in this decision 
to “skilled person” are to be interpreted as such. In Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of 
Appeal, T 223/92, supra note 165 at Reason 5.5, where the priority claimed was for much the same 
time—1983, as in this case—the Board considering that case defined the “skilled person” as a highly 
skilled technician, which in real terms would mean a Ph.D. researcher. The notional skilled person in 
terms of patent law can then be treated as comprising this researcher and two laboratory assistants 
having the necessary manual dexterity and lack of fatigue. See id. at Reason 4. 
167. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 60/89, supra note 111 
at 268. The case relates to European Patent No. 0 006 694 awarded to Harvard College concerning a 
method of making a selected protein by inserting DNA, and invented by Walter Gilbert, Reason 3.2.5 
(adopting the view that the same level of skill has to be applied when, for the same invention, the two 
questions of sufficient disclosure and inventive step have to be considered. 
168. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 694/92 (May 8, 
1996) O.J. E.P.O. 408 (1997), relating to European Patent No. 0 122 791 concerning plant gene 
expression and awarded to Mycogen Plant Science. Parting from previous case law (see, e.g., Decision 
of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 60/89, supra note 111), the Board underlined 
that “whereas for the purpose of evaluating inventive step the skilled person has knowledge of the 
prior art only, for the purpose of evaluating sufficiency of disclosure (and, hence, support) he or she 
has knowledge of the prior art and of the invention as disclosed.” 
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distinction between “old” and “new” fields of research can be disentangled. In 
“old” conventional technical areas the standard of the PSITA seems to be lower 
than the level of the PSITA in “new” technological fields. In conventional fields 
common general knowledge is formed by textbooks, whereas in new fields, 
common general knowledge encompasses patent specifications and scientific 
publications as well. Furthermore, a distinction between “low” and “advanced” 
technologies can be observed. In “low” technologies, the PSITA measuring 
certain factual questions can be a single skilled person. In advanced and more 
complex fields of research, the PSITA is not necessarily one skilled person, but 
can be held to be a team of skilled persons. Since the biotechnological field is both 
“new” and pretty “advanced,” the level of the PSITA can differ from other 
sectors, leading to the conclusion that the PSITA can, indirectly, be seen as a judicial 
micro policy lever. So, we tend to disagree with Burk and Lemley, who claim that 
the use of the PHOSITA is a judicial macro policy lever because it explicitly creates 
different standards for different technologies and different industries, thus 
creating the most fundamental policy lever, because it makes so much turn on the 
knowledge of scientists in any given field.169 
2.1.11. Enabling disclosure 
In general 
In the U.S., the UPA prescribes that the specification shall contain a written 
description of the invention (written description requirement) in such full, clear, 
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to make and use 
the same (enablement requirement), and shall set forth the best mode 
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention (best mode 
requirement) (35 U.S.C. § 112 (2010)). The modern purpose of the written 
description requirement is to provide evidence that the patent applicant has 
conceptual possession of the invention.170 
In Europe, the EPC equally prescribes that a European patent application 
shall disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete (written 
description) for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the art (enablement), but 
the EPC does not require best mode (Art. 83 EPC). EPO case law clarifies that 
sufficiency of disclosure must be assessed on the basis of the application as a 
whole, including the description and claims171 and not of the claims alone. EPO 
 
169. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 116. 
170. Id. at 118. See also CHISUM, supra note 52, at 751. 
171. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 14/83 (June 7, 
1983), O.J. E.P.O. 105 (1984) relating to European Patent Application No. 0 004 795, concerning a 
method for producing a vinyl chloride resin. The Board took the view that the “question whether an 
invention has been disclosed sufficiently clearly and completely is not to be decided solely on the 
basis of the content of the claims. If a chemical invention involves the task of manufacturing a 
product with certain measurable properties (e.g., gel content or degree of polymerisation of a 
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jurisprudence has further added that whether the invention is indeed disclosed 
sufficiently in accordance with Art. 83 EPC will be assessed through the eyes of 
PSITA’s common general knowledge at the relevant date.172 EPO case law also 
underlined that the disclosure should be reproducible without undue burden, apart 
from unexplored fields, where a reasonable amount of trial and error is 
permissible.173 Last but not least, it is required that an invention shall describe in 
detail at least one way of carrying out the invention claimed, using examples where 
appropriate (Rule 42 (1) (e) EPC IRs).  
In biotechnology 
In the U.S., the written description requirement has been enforced quite 
stringently in biotechnology. In various cases where human DNA sequences were 
claimed, U.S. courts repeatedly underlined that the written description 
requirement is not adequately met when the actual DNA sequence is not fully 
disclosed and that a full description of the DNA itself is required.174 Recently, 
guidelines have formally implemented this viewpoint. 
In Europe, the written description requirement has also been applied quite 
rigorously. According to EPO policy and case law, DNA sequences were to be 
 
copolymer), and this task is performed by means of a process involving several variables, then the 
means of its performance are to be regarded as sufficiently disclosed within the meaning of 
Art. 83 EPC if, encountering occasional lack of success notwithstanding strict adherence to the 
prescribed limits of those variables, clear information, contained in the description, regarding the 
effects of individual variables on the properties of the product enables the person skilled in the art to 
bring about the desired properties quickly and reliably in such an event.” Id. at 105–06. 
172. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 322/93 (Apr. 2, 
1997) (relating to European Patent Application No. 0 250 766 concerning microemulsions containing 
perfluoropolyethers), Reason 3.1 confirming that literally fulfilling the statutory requirements “does 
not automatically mean that the application as filed contains sufficient information to allow a person 
skilled in the art, using his common general knowledge, to carry out the invention without undue 
burden within substantially the whole area that is claimed. That has to be decided by appraising the 
information contained in the examples as well as the other parts of the description in the light of the 
skilled person’s common general knowledge at the relevant date.” 
173. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 226/85 336 (Mar. 
17, 1987) (relating to European Patent No. 0 009 942 and concerning a pourable scouring cleanser 
composition), Reason 8 (stating that even though “a reasonable amount of trial and error is 
permissible when it comes to the sufficiency of disclosure in an unexplored field or—as it is in this 
case—where there are many technical difficulties, there must then be available adequate instructions 
in the specification or on the basis of common general knowledge which would lead the skilled 
person necessarily and directly towards success through the evaluation of initial failures or through an 
acceptable statistical expectation rate in case of random experiments.”). See also id. at 336–37, 340 (“In 
the present appeal the sensitivity or inherent instability of the composition, or other unexplained 
circumstances are such that the skilled person can only reproduce the invention in a number of 
instances with some luck, if at all, in view of the unknown character of reasons which cause failure. 
For this reason, the patent is invalid in its entirety for not complying with the requirements of 
Article 83 [of the European Patent Convention].”); CASE LAW OF THE BOARDS OF APPEAL OF THE 
EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 84. 
174. Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & 
Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
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fully represented. Rule 30 EPC IRs now formally requires that if nucleotide or 
amino acid sequences are disclosed in the European patent application, the 
description shall contain a sequence listing conforming to the rules laid down by 
the President of the EPO for the standardized representation of nucleotide and 
amino acid sequences.175  
EPO case law on enablement has been focusing a lot on the one-way-rule. 
An illustrative example is the invention relating to the expression of 
preprochymosin.176 The patent specification provided a technically detailed 
example for the expression of preprochymosin and its maturation forms in E. coli. 
Although the parties agreed that sufficient information was given to reproduce the 
invention in E. coli, it was debated whether sufficiency of disclosure was achieved 
with respect to a process for expression in microorganisms in general.177 The 
patentee claimed that expression in microorganisms was definitely intended and 
that the references to expression sufficed to establish enablement, as the state of 
the art provided examples of foreign gene expression in eucaryots (such as yeasts) 
and procaryots; chymosin being an eucaryotic gene should be more likely to 
express in eucaryots than in E. coli.178 The Board believed that one way to carry 
out the invention was clearly indicated, that there existed no serious doubts that 
the invention could eventually be carried out with microorganisms other than E. 
coli,179 and decided that the invention was sufficiently disclosed. 
Another interesting case is the patent related to the production of 
recombinant interferon. The invention provided a route, through recombinant 
DNA technology, to certain types of interferons but in a manner that would not 
provide identical results each time when repeated. It was the view of the Board 
that variations in the construction within a class of genetic precursors, such as 
recombinant DNA molecules claimed by a combination of structural limitations 
and functional tests, are immaterial to the sufficiency of the disclosure provided 
that the skilled person could reliably obtain some members of the class without 
necessarily knowing in advance which member would thereby be made available. 
So, an invention may also be sufficiently disclosed where results are not exactly 
 
175. Rule 30 of the European Patent Convention, supra note 24, Implementing Regulations 
has been introduced as a result from the decision of the President of the EPO and the Notice from 
the EPO, 2007 O.J. E.P.O. (special ed. 3) (C.1–C.2) 29. It has been suggested that the requirement of 
the sequence listing is associated with the need to facilitate searching by the EPO rather than the 
“completeness” of the description. If such a list is not provided within a period of two months, the 
application shall be refused. See Rule 30 (3) of the European Patent Convention, supra note 24, 
Implementing Regulations. 
176. See European Patent Application No. 0 077 109 (concerning DNA molecules comprising 
the genes for preprochymosin and its maturation forms, and microorganisms transformed thereby). 
177. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 386/94 (Jan. 11, 
1996), O.J. E.P.O. 658 (1996), Reason 8. 
178. Id. at 666–67, Reason 9. 
179. Id. at 668, Reason 14. 
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repeatable.180 
Yet another prominent case is the invention relating to a method for 
producing transgenic animals, resulting in the famous Harvard-oncomouse 
patent.181 The claimed invention was defined by the incorporation of an activated 
oncogene sequence into the genome of nonhuman mammalian animals.182 The 
Examining Division took the view that the claimed invention referred to all 
nonhuman mammalian animals, whereas the invention described in the examples 
had been performed only on mice. Not convinced that a skilled person would be 
able to carry out the invention successfully on all other kinds of nonhuman 
mammals as it had been performed on mice, the Examining Division refused the 
application, inter alia, on the ground that the claims were unrealistically broad.183 
However, the Board argued that the mere fact that a claim is broad is not in itself 
a ground for considering the application as not complying with the requirement 
for sufficient disclosure. Only if there are serious doubts, substantiated by 
verifiable facts, may an application be objected to for lack of sufficient 
disclosure.184 
Policy lever 
It seems that the enabling disclosure standard is relatively high in 
biotechnology, especially in the area of DNA sequences. Initiated by EPO case 
law, the current enabling disclosure standard for DNA sequences is now formally 
embedded in the EPC. Thus the enabling disclosure requirement turned from a 
judicial into a statutory macro policy lever. 
Burk and Lemley quite understandably expect that a more stringent written 
description requirement results in DNA patents with a narrower scope—in other 
 
180. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 301/87 335 (Feb. 
16, 1989). See also Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 636/97 (Mar. 26, 
1998), Reason 4.5 (relating to European Patent No. 0 148 605 concerning the production of 
erythropoietin and awarded to Kirin Amgen: “For the board it is a fundamental principle of patent 
law that a claim can validly cover broad subject matter, even though the description of the relevant 
patent does not enable every method of arriving at that subject matter to be carried out. Otherwise no 
dominant patent could exist, and each developer of a new method of arriving at that subject matter 
would be free of earlier patents. In many cases in the field of biotechnology, patent protection would 
then become illusory. This is not to say that some claims might not be too broad in scope and not be 
enabled over their whole scope for the purpose of Article 83 EPC but this was not considered to be 
the case in respect of Claim 1 by this Board in T 412/93 on the evidence before the board and this is 
res judicata.”). 
181. See European Patent No. 0 169 762 (B1) (filed June 6, 1985 and granted May 13, 1992). 
182. See id. at Claim 19 (claiming “A transgenic non-human mammalian animal whose germ 
cells and somatic cells contain an activated oncogene sequence as a result of chromosomal 
incorporation into the animal genome, or into the genome of an ancestor of said animal, said 
oncogene optionally being further defined according to any one of the claims 3 to 10.”). 
183. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 19/90 (Oct. 3, 
1990), O.J. E.P.O. 476 (1990), Reason 3.2. 
184. Id. at 483 (Reason 3.3). 
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words, that the effect of a stringent written description requirement is narrower 
scope.185 However, scrutinous analysis of a large set of human DNA claims 
proved that this is not always the case, and that many broad and unclear DNA 
patents have been awarded.186 
2.2. Patent Scope 
Now that the policy levers affecting patent acquisition have been screened, 
we turn to policy levers dealing with patent scope. The policy levers affecting 
scope of protection and rights of the patentee are being treated separately. Indeed, 
European case law has introduced a clear distinction between the protection and the 
rights which are conferred by a patent. The protection conferred by a patent is 
determined by the terms of the claims (Art. 69 (1) EPC), and in particular by the 
categories of such claims and their technical features. In this connection, 
Art. 69 EPC and its Protocol are to be applied, both in proceedings before the 
EPO and in proceedings within the Contracting States, whenever it is necessary to 
determine the protection which is conferred. In contrast, the rights conferred on 
the proprietor of a European patent (Art. 64 (1) EPC) are the legal rights which 
the law of a designated Contracting State may confer upon the proprietor, for 
example, regarding the acts of third parties that constitute infringement of the 
patent, and the remedies which are available for any infringement.187 
2.2.1. Scope of product claims—absolute vs. limited scope 
In general 
U.S. patent law is conceived as a patent system providing absolute product 
protection.188 European patent law equally provides full product protection. EPO 
case law has pointedly expounded that the protection conferred by a product 
claim to a physical entity, such as a compound per se, confers absolute protection 
upon such physical entity, that is, “wherever it exists and whatever its context (and 
therefore for all uses of such physical entity, whether known or unknown).”189 
 
185. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 122 (“Application of the enablement requirement 
through the intermediary of the PHOSITA has the same narrowing effect. In certain industries, such 
as software, the enablement requirement is easily satisfied and therefore plays virtually no role in 
limiting the scope of claims. In other industries, such as biotechnology, the doctrine has been applied 
with much more vigor.”).  
186. See Huys, supra note 50. For a discussion, see infra Parts 2.2.2 and 2.2.3. 
187. Decision of the European Patent Office, Enlarged Board of Appeal, Case G 02/88 (Dec. 
11, 1989), O.J. E.P.O. 93 (2009) (Reason 3.3).  
188. See CHISUM, supra note 52, § 18. See also ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT 
LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 388 (4th ed. 2007) 
189. Decision of the European Patent Office, Enlarged Board of Appeal, G 02/88, supra note 
187, at 93. 
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In biotechnology 
From the early ages of biotechnology onwards, the EPO took the view that 
the absolute product protection regime would equally apply to biotechnological 
inventions. This approach was laid down and further elaborated in the EU 
Biotechnology Directive, which stipulates that the protection conferred by a 
patent on a product containing or consisting of genetic information shall extend 
“to all material, in which the product is incorporated and in which the genetic 
information is contained and performs its function.” (Art. 9 of the EU 
Biotechnology Directive). The wide approach put forward in the Directive causes 
a lot of controversy. The central question in this debate was whether a patent for a 
DNA sequence could encompass all possible future applications, or whether it 
should be restricted to the specific use described in the patent application. In 
other words, should DNA patents follow the regime of the classical, wide, 
absolute protection (absoluter Stoffschutz)? Or should a restricted purpose-bound 
protection (zweckgebundener or funktionsgebundener Schutz) apply? The European 
Commission emphasized that it does not intend to take a particular standpoint 
between classical and narrow scope of protection for DNA sequences.190 Based 
on an analysis of the EU Biotechnology Directive, the Commission concluded 
that a broad interpretation is acceptable (Art. 8, 9, 10 and 11 Directive) and that a 
narrow scope might find support as well (Art. 5 (3) and Recitals 23 and 
25 Directive).191 Next to the Commission, the European Parliament intervened in 
the debate and called on the EPO and the EU member states to introduce a 
restricted scope of patents on DNA sequences, and, more especially, “to grant 
patents on human DNA only in connection with a concrete application and for 
the scope of the patent to be limited to this concrete application so that other 
users can use and patent the same DNA sequence for other applications (purpose 
bound protection).”192 
At present, most EPO contracting states have opted for the conventional 
 
190. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLICATIONS OF 
PATENT LAW IN THE FIELD OF BIOTECHNOLOGY AND GENETIC ENGINEERING, COM (2005) 312 
final (July 14, 2005), putting forward the question “whether patents on gene sequences (DNA 
sequences) should be allowed in accordance with the classical model of patent claim, whereby a first 
inventor can claim an invention which covers possible future uses of that sequence, or whether the 
patent should be restricted so that only the specific use disclosed in the patent application may be 
claimed ‘purpose-bound protection’” (See Point K of the text adopted). 
191. See id. (the Commission intended to monitor for any economic consequences of possible 
divergences between member states’ legislation on this point, but so far, no such studies have been 
announced). 
192. See European Parliament Resolution on Patents for Biotechnological Inventions of Oct. 
26, 2005, 2006 O.J. (C 272) 440, 441 (EC). The European Parliament further called on the 
Commission to “examine whether this interpretation of the Directive can be achieved by means of a 
recommendation to the Member States or whether it requires an amendment” of the EU 
Biotechnology Directive.  
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absolute protection regime and only a few countries, such as France and Germany, 
have given effect to the cry for limited product protection in the field of 
genetics.193 Following a request for a preliminary ruling from the Court of The 
Hague (the Netherlands), the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
recently decided on the scope of DNA sequences incorporated in biological 
material.194 Unfortunately, the Court did not clearly express its view in the 
absolute/purpose bound debate.195 
Policy lever 
The use of the absolute product protection doctrine by some EPC 
contracting states to expressly define the scope of patents in the area of genetics 
and the introduction of purpose bound protection, turns this doctrine into a 
national statutory macro policy lever. In the purpose-bound approach, only the 
specific (disclosed) purpose of a substance is protected by a patent and any newly 
found purpose should be subject of a new patent application. Such an approach is 
motivated by the desire to restrict the stifling effect of gene patents on innovation, 
and to safeguard the incentive for the development of new applications. 
2.2.2. Clarity of claims 
In general 
European patent law requires that the claims “shall define the matter for 
which protection is sought” and that they “shall be clear and concise and be 
supported by the description.” (Art. 84 EPC). The Boards of Appeal have 
repeatedly added that claims have to be clear for the sake of legal certainty, as their 
purpose is to enable the protection conferred by the patent to be determined.196 
 
193. See Geertrui Van Overwalle, The Implementation of the Biotechnology Directive in Belgium and its 
Aftereffects: The Introduction of a New Research Exemption and a Compulsory License for Public Health, 37 INT’L 
R. OF INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 889, 889–1008 (2006). See also Timo Minssen, Es Bleibet 
Dabei: Eine Schwedische Stellungnahme zur Europäischen Debatte über den Absoluten Erzeugnisschutz bei der 
DNA-Patentierung [The Fact Remains: A Swedish Opinion on the European Debate on the Absolute 
Product Protection for DNA Patenting], 3&4 GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND 
URHEBERRECHT INTERNATIONALER TEIL [INTELL. PROP. L. INT’L R.] 93, 93–112 (2008). 
194. Case C-428/08, Monsanto Tech. LLC v. Cefetra BV, July 6, 2010, 2010 E.C.R. 7, available 
at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/. 
195. For a critical comment, see Geertrui Van Overwalle, The CJEU Monsanto Soybean Decision 
and Patent Scope: As Clear as Mud, 1 INT’L R. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. (IIC) 1–3 (2011). 
196. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 337/95 628 (Jan. 
30, 1996), relating to European Patent Application No. 901033381 concerning 3-(substituted phenyl) 
pyrazole derivatives, salts thereof, herbicides therefrom, and process for producing said derivatives or 
salts. The Board emphasizes that claims have to be clear to ensure “that the public is not left in any 
doubt as to which subject-matter is covered by a particular patent and which is not. This is one aspect 
of legal certainty which is a principle of paramount importance in any system where the rights of the 
public are affected by the granting of a monopoly (see J 34/92, not published in the O.J. E.P.O., No. 
4.1 of the reasons for the decision).” Id. at 632 (Reason 2.4). For similar cases, see CASE LAW OF THE 
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The EPC further prescribes that the claims shall define the matter for which 
protection is sought “in terms of the technical features of the invention.” 
(Rule 43 (1) EPC IRs). EPO case law has added that Art. 84 EPC has to be 
interpreted as meaning that a claim must not only be comprehensible from a 
technical point of view, but also define the object of the invention clearly, that is 
to say, indicate all its essential features, understood as all features which are 
necessary for solving the technical problem with which the application is 
concerned.197 
In chemistry 
In chemistry, European patent applications with an unclear scope are often 
filed, but rebutted. A typical example is the use of the term “active ingredient.” In 
a case relating to the production of a concentrated aerosol space spray, claiming “a 
composition essentially comprising 20–85% w/w active ingredient in adjunct with 
suitable propellants,”198 the Board decided that the term “active ingredient” was 
unclear, hence contrary to Art. 84 EPC.199 Another example is the use of the term 
“substantially pure.” In a case claiming “a substantially pure piperidine 
derivative,”200 the Board concluded that since there does not exist any unequivocal 
generally accepted meaning in the relevant art for the feature “substantially pure,” 
this feature casts doubts as to the actual subject matter covered by the claim and is 
to be considered unclear and contrary to Art. 84 EPC.201 
In biotechnology 
The clarity of European biotech patent claims has quite often been subject 
of disputes as well. A well-known example was the use of the term “higher” in the 
 
BOARDS OF APPEAL OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 84, at 186. 
197. See CASE LAW OF THE BOARDS OF APPEAL OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra 
note 84, at 189. 
198. See World Intellectual Property Organization International Patent Application No. WO 
9204419 (A1), published Mar. 19, 1992. Claim 1 runs as follows: “a dispenser for space spraying 
consisting of a container comprising a metering device, and a composition essentially comprising 20–
85% w/w active ingredient in adjunct with suitable propellants, solvents and other adjuvants.” Id. at 
16. (Claims are not available for corresponding European Patent Application No. 0 591 195(A1)).  
199. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 586/97 (Sept. 14, 
2000), relating to European Patent Application No. 0 591 195 concerning a concentrated aerosol 
space spray. The Board stated that when an essential ingredient comprised in a chemical composition 
is open to be labeled arbitrarily “active ingredient” or not depending exclusively on the mental label 
the user wishes to apply, thereby rendering the meaning of that feature protean, then the public is left 
in doubts as to the distinction which compositions are covered by the claim and which are not, which 
is at variance with the principle of legal certainty. Because of that lack of legal certainty, the claim fails 
to meet the requirement of clarity imposed by Art. 84 EPC. Id. at 7 (Reason 4.1.2.2). 
200. Claim 1 of European Patent Application No. 0 723 958 concerning substantially pure 
piperidine derivative compounds. 
201. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 728/98 (May 12, 
2000), O.J. E.P.O. 319 (2001) (relating to European Patent Application No. 723 958). 
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context of the production of erythropoietin. Here, the Board took the view that 
what was to be measured was clear, namely values of the molecular weight of 
urinary EPO, hence Art. 84 EPC was not violated.202  However, some observers 
claim that in many biotech cases, it is by far not clear what some terms mean. A 
key example is the use of the term “isolated.” According to the EU Biotechnology 
Directive sequences are patentable if “isolated” from the human body (Art. 5 (2) 
Directive). Following an in-depth analysis of diagnostic gene patents, they found 
that the term “isolated” was seldom clarified in the patent description, and if a 
definition was provided, instead of providing clarity, the intended meaning was 
often further obscured due to the use of unclear or broad terms in the definition 
itself, such as “substantially.”203 
Unclarity also reigns with regard to the terms employed to depict nucleic acid 
sequences. Such sequences may appear as DNA sequences, cDNA sequences, 
RNA sequences, short fragments, primers, probes and so forth. To determine the 
exact scope of the granted claim, and determine the freedom to operate—e.g., 
whether or not the use of a cDNA when performing a genetic diagnostic test 
infringes upon the nucleic acid sequence at stake—it should be identified what 
acts fall under the term “product” and under the term “use,”204 which, in this area, 
is not straightforward.205 
 
202. Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 412/93 (Nov. 21, 
1994) (relating to European Patent No. 0 148 605 (B1) concerning the production of erythropoietin 
and awarded to Kirin Amgen. Most relevant here is claim 20.) The dispute related to claim 19 of 
auxiliary request 11, which was based on Claim 20 as amended by the addition at the end of the claim 
of the feature. Id. at 48. This amendment was objected to by some appellants for lack of clarity: use of 
a term such as “higher” made this feature unclear and contravenes Art. 84 EPC. The Board 
underlined, however, that what is to be measured is clear. Id. at 49 (Reason 60) (“Values of the 
molecular weight of u-EPO measured by SDS-PAGE were part of the prior art. Frequently where 
something has to be measured there will be a grey area where measurement error may make it difficult 
to determine whether a particular product falls within a claim or not. This does not justify an 
objection under Article 84 EPC.”).  
 In Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, T 586/97, supra note 199, the 
Board decided differently. In the absence of any unambiguous reference point, a relative term such as 
“lower alkyl” in the field of organic chemistry does not have a generally accepted meaning with 
respect to its maximum number of carbon atoms, such a term is ambiguous and therefore not suitable 
for clearly defining the subject matter for which protection is sought in a claim which is directed to a 
group of organic compounds per se (Reason 2.8). Id. at 4. 
203. See Huys et al., supra note 50. 
204. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Art. 28(1)(a), 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 319 (“A patent shall confer on its owner the following exclusive rights: (a) where the subject 
matter of a patent is a product, to prevent third parties not having the owner’s consent from the acts 
of: making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes that product”) (emphasis 
added). 
205. Id. 
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Policy lever 
The demand for clear patent claims is put forward for any invention in any 
technological field. It might well be that in “new” technological fields, the 
requirement is applied more loosely, as no consensus has been reached yet on the 
exact description of terms and concepts employed. The clear claims requirement 
may then be employed as a judicial micro policy lever. Patent landscaping studies in 
the field of gene patents indeed suggest that unclear terms are often used.206 The 
downside of applying the clarity of claims doctrine with some flexibility is that it 
creates vagueness about the exact scope of the claims and, consequently, increases 
legal uncertainty. 
2.2.3. Breadth of claims 
In general 
In the U.S., pioneering patents have traditionally been given wide protection, 
allowing broad claims.207 However, the pioneer patent rule has not been invoked 
by the Federal Circuit in recent years.208 
In European patent law the demand that claims shall be “supported by the 
description” (Art. 84 EPC) is interpreted as to mean that there must be a basis in 
the description for the subject matter of every claim and that “the scope of the 
claims must not be broader than is justified by the extent of the description and 
drawings and also the contribution to the art.”209 In other words, it is the 
definition of the invention in the claims that needs support.  
According to EPO case law, this requirement reflects the general legal 
principle that the extent of the patent monopoly, as defined by the claims, should 
correspond to the technical contribution to the art in order for it to be supported 
or justified. This means that the definitions in the claims should essentially 
correspond to the scope of the invention as disclosed in the description: the 
claims should not extend to subject matter which, after reading the description, 
would still not be at the disposal of the person skilled in the art.210 Even though 
European patent law sets forth that claims and scope must correspond, a certain 
 
206. See Huys et al., supra note 50. See also Holman, supra note 50. 
207. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 127 with the references cited in supra note 101. See 
also CHISUM, supra note 52, § 18.04 [2]. 
208. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 127. 
209. European Patent Convention, supra note 24, Guidelines for Examination in the 
European Patent Office, pt. C, ch. III, § 6.1. (2010).  
210. See Decision of the European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case T 409/91 653 (Mar. 
18, 1993), O.J. E.P.O. 653 (1994) relating to European Patent No. 0 261 958 concerning middle 
distillate compositions with reduced wax crystal size (Point 3.3 of the Reasons). See also European 
Patent Convention, supra note 24, Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office, pt. C, 
ch. III, § 6.1. (2010). 
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degree of generalization is commonly accepted.211 Moreover, inventions which 
open up a whole new field are entitled to more generality in the claims than 
inventions which are concerned with advances in known technology.212 Thus, 
European patent law is willing to provide wide protection for pioneering 
inventions as well. 
In biotechnology 
In the early days of plant biotechnology, European patents have been 
awarded wide claims. A typical example is one of the very first plant patents 
granted in 1989 to Lubrizol Genetics, with patent claims for genetically modified 
“plant cells”213 and “plants.”214 The claims were awarded, notwithstanding the fact 
that the description disclosed transformation of only two plant families, namely 
sunflower and tobacco.215 Similar claims were granted for other Agrobacterium-
tumefaciens-mediated gene modification systems and the resulting transformed 
“plant cells” and “plants.”216 Also in these cases, claims encompassing the whole 
 
211. See European Patent Convention, supra note 24, Guidelines for Examination in the 
European Patent Office, pt. C, ch. III, § 6.2. (2010) (“Most claims are generalizations from one or 
more particular examples. The extent of generalization permissible is a matter which the examiner 
must judge in each particular case in the light of the relevant prior art . . . . A fair statement of claim is 
one which is not so broad that it goes beyond the invention nor yet so narrow as to deprive the 
applicant of a just reward for the disclosure of his invention. The applicant should be allowed to 
cover all obvious modifications of, equivalents to and uses of that which he has described. In 
particular, if it is reasonable to predict that all the variants covered by the claims have the properties 
or uses the applicant ascribes to them in the description, he should be allowed to draw his claims 
accordingly.”). 
212. Id. 
213. See Claim 19 of European Patent No. 0 122 791 (B1) (issued Mar. 29, 1989) (“A plant cell 
produced according to the method of any of Claims 10–18.”). 
214. See id. at Claim 20 (“A plant or plant tissue grown from a plant cell according to claim 
19.”). 
215. See id. at 8 (stating that the “invention is exemplified by the introduction and expression 
of phaseolin, a major seed storage protein of beans, into sunflower and tobacco plant tissues”). 
216. See Claim 4 of European Patent No. 0 120 515 (B1) concerning a process for the 
incorporation of foreign DNA into the genome of dicotyledonous plants awarded to Leiden 
University (“Plants and plant cells obtained after the genetic properties of the original plants c.q. plant 
cells have been modified with application of the process according to claim 1.”). See also Claim 19 
European Patent No. 0 126 546 (B1) (“A plant, a plant tissue, or a plant cell produced according to 
the method of any of Claims 9–18.”). The B1 document states once again that “the invention is 
exemplified by introduction and expression of a structural gene for phaseolin, the major seed storage 
protein of the bean Phaseolus vulgaris L., into sunflower and tobacco plant cells.” Id. at 8. Furthermore, 
see Claim European Patent No. 0 131 620 (B1) at 23 (“A seed obtained from a plant produced by the 
method of any of claims 5 to 7.”). The B1 document states: 
[T]his invention is likely to be useful to transform cells from any type of plant 
which can be infected by bacteria from the genus Agrobacterium. It is believed 
that virtually all dicotyledonous plants, and certain monocots, can be infected 
by one or more strains of Agrobacterium . . . . Certain types of plant cells can 
be cultured in vitro and regenerated into differentiated plants using techniques 
known to those skilled in the art. Such plant types include potatoes, tomatoes, 
carrots, alfalfa and sunflowers.  
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plant kingdom were awarded, including both dicotyledonous and 
monocotyledonous plants, even though the experiments described in the patent 
specification were related to a few varieties of plants only, mostly potatoes, 
tomatoes, carrots, alfalfa, and/or sunflowers. 
Wide claims were also granted at the onset of animal biotechnology. The 
most prominent example here is the patent granted for the Harvard onco-mouse, 
with claims for a “non-human mammalian animal,”217 even though the description 
only disclosed experiments with mice.218 The application and grant of these 
pioneering plant and animal patents gave rise to a great deal of EPO 
jurisprudence. However, the disputes mostly revolved around the eligibility of 
animals for patent protection219 and hardly ever focused on the breadth of the 
claims at hand.220 
Broad formulation can also be witnessed in the area of human genetics, even 
today. Patents relating to human genes quite often encompass broadly formulated 
gene claims, covering many types of genes.221 Gene patents often include broad 
method claims as well, claiming the link between a mutation and a disease without 
 
Id. at 14. For further information, see GEERTRUI VAN OVERWALLE, OCTROOIEERBAARHEID VAN 
PLANTENBIOTECHNOLOGISCHE UITVINDINGEN [PATENTABILITY OF PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGICAL 
INVENTIONS] 739 (1996). 
217. See Claim 19 of European Patent No. 0 169 672 (B1), supra note 72, at 11 (“A transgenic 
non-human mammalian animal whose germ cells and somatic cells contain an activated oncogene 
sequence as a result of chromosomal incorporation into the animal genome, or into the genome of an 
ancestor of said animal, said oncogene optionally being further defined according to any one of the 
claims 3 to 10.”).  
218. For more, see Van Overwalle, supra note 59. 
219. More in particular in the light of the exclusion of plant and animal varieties in European 
Patent Convention Art. 53(b), now interpreted somewhat more liberally thanks to Art. 4 of EU 
Biotech Directive at 18, and its counterpart in the European Patent Convention, supra note 24, 
Implementing Regulations, Pt. II, Ch. V, R. 27. For more on the line of case law on plant and animals 
patents, see VAN OVERWALLE, supra note 60; Geertrui Van Overwalle, Biotechnology and Patents: Global 
Standards, European Approaches and National Accents, in GENETIC ENGINEERING AND THE WORLD 
TRADE SYSTEM 77 (Daniel Wüger & Thomas Cottier eds., 2008). 
220. In the Harvard onco-mouse case, European Patent No. 0 169 672 (B1) (issued May 13, 
1992),, breadth of claims was indeed an issue. After intense debate, the EPO Opposition Division 
narrowed the claim down to rodents and the EPO Technical Board of Appeal later narrowed it to 
transgenic mice, mainly on ethical grounds, particularly animal suffering. 
221. See Thomas B. Kepler, Colin Crossman & Robert Cook-Deegan, Metastasizing Patent 
Claims on BRCA1, 95 GENOMICS 312 (2010). Many patents make claims on DNA sequences; some 
include claims on oligonucleotides related to the primary patented gene. Kepler et al. used 
bioinformatics to quantify the reach of one such claim from U.S. patent 4.747.282 on BRCA1. They 
found that human chromosome 1 (which does not contain BRCA1) contains over 300,000 
oligonucleotides covered by this claim, and that 80% of cDNA and mRNA sequences contributed to 
GenBank before the patent application was filed also contain at least one claimed oligonucleotide. 
Any “isolated” DNA molecules that include such 15 bp nucleotide sequences would fall under the 
claim as granted by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. Anyone making, using, selling, or 
importing such a molecule for any purpose within the United States would thus be infringing the 
claim. This claim and others like it turn out, on examination, to be surprisingly broad, and if enforced 
would have substantial implications for medical practice and scientific research. 
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specifying steps as to how this link is determined. A typical example here is the 
claim related to the testing for spinocerebellar ataxia 6 (SCA6) demanding 
protection for “a method of determining whether an individual has or is at risk for 
developing spinocerebellar ataxia type 6 (SCA-6), comprising assessing whether 
the number of CAG nucleotide repeat units in the alpha1A calcium channel 
subunit gene of said individual is greater than a control number, thereby indicating 
that said individual has or is at risk for developing SCA6,” and thereby referring to 
the use of “any” test.222 In view of the prevailing patentability criteria it has been 
suggested that it should be impossible to construe claims so broadly that they 
would cover an indefinite number of tests.223 However, the examples show that 
nevertheless, such broad claims are granted.224 
Policy lever 
The pioneering patent rule and related breadth of claim doctrine is a judicial 
micro policy lever. Application of the nominally neutral rule is likely to result in 
differing claim language and differing patent protection in different industries. 
Burk and Lemley suggest that the rule produces effects in the pharmaceutical 
industry, where innovation is likely to take the form of discrete new inventions 
opening up entire fields of inquiry and new markets for treatment of an illness or 
disease. By contrast, industries such as software are characterized by incremental 
improvements.225 This view should be put in perspective for two reasons. First, 
recent surveys point out that a lot of incremental improvements take place in the 
pharmaceutical sector as well, leading to so-called evergreening.226 More 
importantly, rather than suggesting that the pioneering patent rule creates 
differences among industries, the pioneering rule may lead to differences in one 
and the same industry, favoring research and development in the explorative and 
pioneering high days within that industry, and reluctantly accommodating 
advances in later years. Thus broad claims are more likely to be accepted in “new” 
technology fields, such as the early days of biotechnology, rather than in “known” 
technologies, such as the later stages within those areas of biotechnology which 
have already been widely explored. 
Moreover, it may be doubted that the pioneering patent rule is always 
applied consistently, even within the same (stage within an) industry.227 
 
222.     European Patent No. 1 015 628, Claim 1, at 34 (providing a method of screening 
individuals at risk for developing diseases caused by trinucleotide repeat sequence instability). 
223. See Huys et al., supra note 50. 
224. Id. 
225. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 127–28. 
226. See European Commission, The Final Report of the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry, (July 8, 
2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/index.html. 
227. As we have clearly demonstrated, the EPO grants wide protection for transgenic plants: 
based on experiments with only a few plant varieties, claims were awarded for “plants.” This seems at 
odds with the instructions in the European Patent Convention, supra note 24, Guidelines for 
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2.3. Patent Rights and Limitations 
2.3.1. Research exemption 
In general 
In the U.S. the research exemption exists as a judicially created theory.228 The 
exception has recently been narrowed down considerably in the landmark case 
Madey v. Duke University.229 In Madey v. Duke University—which in fact involved 
electron laser technology—it was recalled that:  
 
Regardless of whether a particular institution or entity is engaged in an 
endeavor for commercial gain, so long as the act is in furtherance of the 
alleged infringer’s legitimate business and is not solely for amusement, to 
satisfy idle curiosity, or for strict philosophical inquiry, the act does not 
qualify for the very narrow and strictly limited experimental use 
defense.230 
 
Furthermore, the profit or nonprofit status of the user is not decisive for the 
applicability of the doctrine. 
In Europe, the research exemption is phrased as a statutory restriction to the 
rights of the patent holder. The original European “mother” provision states that 
the rights that are conferred by a patent shall not extend to “acts done for 
experimental purposes relating to the subject matter of the patented invention.”231 
The equivalent provisions in the European member states mirror but sometimes 
deviate from this wording. Because different national legislations and court rulings 
exist, the exact scope of the exemption differs from country to country. However, 
there seems to be a general consensus that the exemption applies irrespective of 
 
Examination in the European Patent Office, pt. C, ch. III, §6.1. (2010), and more in particular the 
example relating to “plant seedlings”:  
The question of support is illustrated by the following example: (i) seedlings by 
subjecting them to a controlled cold shock so as to produce specified results, 
whereas the description discloses the process applied to one kind of plant only. 
Since it is well-known that plants vary widely in their properties, there are well-
founded reasons for believing that the process is not applicable to all plant 
seedlings. Unless the applicant can provide convincing evidence that the 
process is nevertheless generally applicable, he must restrict his claim to the 
particular kind of plant referred to in the description. A mere assertion that the 
process is applicable to all plant seedlings is not sufficient.  
Id. § 6.3. 
228. See CHISUM, supra note 52, § 16.03.  
229. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  
230. Id. at 1362. 
231. See Article 27 of the Agreement relating to Community patents, done at Luxembourg on 
Dec. 15, 1989, 1989 O.J. (L 401) 1–27. The so-called Community Patent Convention has never 
entered into force. Discussions were resumed in 2000 in The Framework of a Proposal for a Council 
Regulation on the Community Patent, COM (2000) 412 final (Jan. 8, 2000).  
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the place of the experiment: experiments are exempted, whether they are carried 
in a public laboratory, a hospital, or a private company. Agreement also exists with 
regard to the nature of the experiments: experiments “on” the patented subject 
matter fall under the research exemption, whereas experiments “with” the 
patented subject matter are not shielded by the exception. Doubts mainly arise 
with regard to the final purpose of the experiment: are only experiments with a 
strict noncommercial scientific goal exempted, or also experiments with a 
commercial or a mixed scientific/commercial objective?232 
In biotechnology 
In an aim to foster biotechnological innovation, and more in particular, to 
shield the use of research tools233 from infringement, the patent legislator of one 
European member state, namely Belgium, decided to reshape and widen the 
research exemption. In 2005, the Belgian Patent Act was reworded to stipulate 
that the rights of a patent holder do not extend to “acts carried out for scientific 
purposes ‘on’ or ‘with’ the subject matter of the invention.”234 The new wording 
aims at both exempting research “on” and research “with” the subject matter of 
the invention to guarantee a maximum freedom to operate for research activities. 
“On” refers to experiments where it is verified whether the patented invention 
works the way it is described in the patent or whether the invention is indeed 
novel and inventive as claimed in the patent, in other words, experiments relating 
to the activity, function, usefulness, or feasibility of the patented invention itself. 
Experiments “with” refers to experiments where the patented invention is used to 
investigate something else, in other words, where the patented invention is used as 
an instrument, as an “Apparativ” (for instance, a patented scale which is used to 
weigh compounds for manufacturing a vaccine).  
The new wording aims at exempting both experiments with a strict scientific 
 
232. There is a vast literature on this issue. See, e.g., P. DIE CHROCZIEL, BENUTZUNG 
PATENTIERTER ERFINDUNGEN ZU VERSUCHS-UND FORSCHUNGSZWECKEN (1986); William R. 
Cornish, Experimental Use of Patented Inventions in European Community States, 29 INT’L REV. INTELL. 
PROP. & COMPETITION L.  735, 735–53 (1998); Joseph Straus, The Research Exemption: The Situation in 
Germany, in OCTROOIRECHT EN GENEESMIDDELEN [PATENT LAW AND MEDICINES] 107, 107–20 
(Geertrui Van Overwalle ed., 2000); Geertrui Van Overwalle et al., Models for Facilitating Access to Patents 
on Genetic Inventions, 7(2) NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 143, 143–48 (2006). 
233. Research tools are instruments, reagents, methods, and information, the main 
commercial value of which is furthering research, see NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, REAPING THE 
BENEFITS OF GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC RESEARCH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, 
INNOVATION, AND PUBLIC HEALTH 51–53 (2006). 
234. New wording of Art. 28 (2) of the Belgian Patent Act, Wet van 28 April 2005 tot 
Wijziging van de Wet van 28 Maart 1984 op de Uitvindingsoctrooien, wat Betreft de 
Octrooieerbaarheid van de Biotechnologische Uitvindingen [introduced by the Act of Apr. 28, 2005 
to modify the Act of Mar. 28 1984 on Invention Patents, with Regard to the Patentability of 
Biotechnological Inventions], BELGISCH STAATSBLAD [B.S.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], May 13, 
2005, 3d ed., http://www.staatsbald.be. For an in-depth analysis of the renewed Belgian research 
exemption, see Van Overwalle, supra note 193, at 889–920. 
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purpose and acts with a mixed scientific/commercial aim.235 Indeed, in the debate 
on whether to opt for a strict or a wide interpretation of the notion “scientific 
purpose,” the Belgian legislator opts for a wide scope of interpretation. In the 
strict approach, only acts serving a strict scientific goal, aimed at expanding 
knowledge or testing a proposition, are shielded from infringement. In a wide 
approach, acts with a strict scientific or a mixed scientific and commercial goal, 
aimed at developing new applications, improved therapeutic effects, more 
effective production methods, new indications, etc., are also exempted. Purely 
commercial acts236 do not in any way fall under the renewed research 
exemption.237 
Policy lever 
The conventional European research exemption (research-“on”-exemption) 
might well be a statutory micro policy lever, introduced to foster research and 
follow-on innovation across sectors, and resorting wider effect in certain sectors 
than others. The broadened Belgian research exemption (research-“on”/“with”-
exemption) can definitely be seen as a statutory macro policy lever, intended to foster 
innovation in a specific industry, namely the biotechnology industry. Our 
conclusion on this point is fully in line with the observations expressed by Burk 
and Lemley, that the statutory experimental-use-“on” provision functions as a 
global policy lever, pertaining to affect all industry sectors, whereas the 
experimental-use-“with” provision, although nominally industry-neutral, 
constitutes in fact a macro policy lever for the biotechnology industry.238 
However, it remains to be seen to what extent the broadened research 
exception or experimental-use-“with” exemption will indeed fulfill its primary 
objective of enabling use of patented products and tools, and stimulate (mixed 
fundamental and commercial) research and development in the field of 
biotechnology. Doubtful borderline cases may arise in day-to-day practice. What 
about spin-offs originating from university-based research with commercial 
objectives? Or pharmaceutical and/or biotechnology companies having a clear-cut 
 
235. See Marc Verwilghen, Statement of the Minister for Economic Affairs, on the Scope of 
the Research Exemption, Chambre des Représentants de Belgique [House of Representative of 
Belgium] Doc. 51 1348/006, 2004–2005, at 58–59 (Mar. 7, 2005), available at http://www.lachambre 
.be/FLWB/pdf/51/1348/51K1348006.pdf (provided that mixed research is mainly scientific in 
nature, which excludes companies with mainly commercial goals, from the scope of the exemptions). 
See also Marc Verwilghen, Statement of the Minister for Economic Affairs, on the Scope of the 
Research Exemption, Chambre des Représentants de Belgique [House of Representative of Belgium] 
Doc. 3-1088/3, 2004–2005 at 2. 
236. E.g., the preparation of the registration dossier for clinical trials and acts required in order 
to be eligible for a license to commercialize so-called me-too medicines. 
237. See Council Directive 2004/27/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 136) 34 (EC) (the preparation of the 
registration dossier for clinical trials are exempted from patent infringement under this Directive and 
the equivalent Belgian variant of the so-called “Bolar” exemption). 
238. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 113. 
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commercial mission, but hosting large research activities as well? But, more 
importantly, there might be a tremendous downside to establishing a wide 
experimental-use-“with” exemption. Trade secret protection might increase or, 
even worse, research activities might be stifled in those sectors where new 
research tools are being developed, as a result of the fact that the prospect of an 
adequate patent protection is being eroded.239 
2.3.2. Compulsory licensing 
In general 
Many countries around the world allow compulsory licenses in their national 
legislation. In Europe, national legislators have traditionally introduced 
compulsory licenses for failure to work patents, dependency of patents, and public 
interest motives such as national economy, national security, or national 
emergency.240 
The U.S. is often thought of as one of the few countries without compulsory 
license mechanisms. But in fact, in a limited number of cases, U.S. courts or 
government officials may grant compulsory licenses on the basis of specific legal 
provisions.241 Furthermore, in U.S. patent and antitrust cases the actual effect of a 
refusal of a judge to grant an injunction to the patent owner, or an order to license 
out will be that the alleged infringer can continue using the patented subject 
matter under the conditions set by the court without the authorization of the 
patent owner. Hence, the ultimate effects are similar to the grant of a compulsory 
license.242 
In biotechnology 
In the aftermath of the Myriad controversy,243 various European countries 
 
239. See Geertrui Van Overwalle, Research Tools in the R&D Phase, Belgian Report Prepared for 
The Institute for Future Technology (IFTECH) and Commissioned by the Japanese Patent Office 40 
(2008). 
240. For an in-depth analysis of the history, the grounds, the application procedure, and the 
scope of the various types of compulsory licenses, see Esther Van Zimmeren & Geertrui Van 
Overwalle, A Paper Tiger? Compulsory License Regimes for Public Health in Europe, 1 INT’L R. INTELL. 
PROP. & COMPETITION L. 4, 4–40 (2011).  
241. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2006) (government use); 42 U.S.C. § 2183 (2006) (Atomic 
Energy Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2006) (Clean Air Act); 7 U.S.C. § 2404 (2006) (Plant Variety 
Protection Act); 35 U.S.C. § 203 (2006) (“march in right” in the so-called Bayh-Dole Act). 
242. Van Zimmeren & Van Overwalle, supra note 240. 
243. Myriad Genetics obtained several European and U.S. patents for the screening of breast 
cancer genes, but licensed the test exclusively to a limited number of commercial genetic laboratories 
within specific geographical regions. This highly restrictive licensing policy gave rise to a strong and 
worldwide reaction. There is a vast literature on the European response to the Myriad patents. The 
interested reader might care to take a look at Gert Matthijs & Dicky Halley, European-Wide Opposition 
Against the Breast Cancer Gene Patents, 10 EUR. J. HUM. GENET. 783 (2002); KAROLINA A. 
HERRLINGER, DIE PATENTIERUNG VON KRANKHEITSGENEN [THE PATENTING OF DISEASE 
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have adjusted existing compulsory license regimes, or designed additional 
compulsory license mechanisms to remedy problems resulting from restrictive 
licensing practices in the area of genetics, in particular in the field of genetic 
testing. In France, the existing compulsory license for public interest was 
broadened to include genetic diagnostics in 2004.244 In Belgium a new compulsory 
license for public health was introduced in the Patent Act in 2005.245 The French 
and Belgian compulsory license is considered legitimate for reasons of public 
health if the quantity or the quality of medicines or methods available to the public 
is insufficient, if medicines or methods are only available at abnormally high 
prices, if the patent is exploited in a manner contrary to public health interests, or 
if the patent is worked in a manner resulting in anticompetitive practices qualified 
as such in a final administrative or court decision.246 The compulsory license not 
only can be invoked against obstructive patents in the field of diagnostics but also 
against patents in the pharmaceutical field at large. In particular compulsory 
licenses can be granted with respect to patents issued for “medicines, medical 
devices, in vitro diagnostic medical devices, related therapeutic products, processes 
 
GENES] (2005); Ian R. Walpole et al., Human Gene Patents: The Possible Impacts on Genetic Services 
Healthcare, 179 MED. J. AUST. 203 (2003); Geertrui Van Overwalle, IPR Issues and High Quality Genetic 
Testing, in QUALITY ISSUES IN CLINICAL GENETIC SERVICES 251 (Ulf Kristoffersson et al. eds., 
2010). 
244. See Art. 18 of Loi 2004–800 du 6 août 2004 relative à la Bioéthique [Law 2004–800 of 
Aug. 6, 2004 on Bioethics], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [OFFICIAL 
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Aug. 7, 2004, Text 1 of 92. See also Art. 10 of Loi 2004–1338 du 8 Décembre 
2004 relative à la Protection des Inventions Biotechnologiques [Law 2004–1338 of Dec. 8, 2004 on 
the Protection of Biotechnological Inventions], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE, 
Dec. 8, 2004, Text 1 of 95. 
 Switzerland also included a separate compulsory license in case of anticompetitive practices 
with regard to diagnostic products or processes. See Bundesgesetz über die Erfindungspatente 
[Federal Law on Patents for Invention] June 22, 2007, AS 2551–584 (2008) (Switz.), available at 
http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/as/2008/2551.pdf. The Swiss regime will not be further discussed here. 
For more, see Christophe Germann, The Swiss Approach to Compulsory Licensing for Diagnostic Products and 
Processes, in GENE PATENTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH 149–58 (Geertrui Van Overwalle ed., 2007); Van 
Zimmeren & Van Overwalle, supra note 240. 
245. Article 31 bis of the Belgian Patent Act, introduced by the Act of Apr. 28, 2005 to 
modify the Act of Mar. 28, 1984 on Invention Patents, with regard to the Patentability of 
Biotechnological Inventions, BELGISCH STAATSBLAD [B.S.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], May 13, 
2005, 3d ed., http://www.staatsbald.be. For an in-depth analysis of the history, scope and application 
procedure of this newly designed license, see Jérôme Debrulle et al., La licence obligatoire belge pour raisons 
de santé publique in GENE PATENTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 81, at 161–98 (with a summary in 
English at 199-209); Van Overwalle, supra note 193. 
246. CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE [hereinafter C.P.I.] art. L.613-16 (Fr.). The 
Belgian Patent Act stipulates that “[in] the interest of public health, the King, by decree established after 
consultation in the Council of Ministers, can grant a license for the exploitation and application of an 
invention protected by a patent.” See Article 31 of the Belgian Patent Act, supra note 245, § 1 
(emphasis added). These examples are largely a reflection of the examples provided in the French IP 
Code. The proposal to include this more detailed wording also in the Belgian Patent Act in order to 
increase the transparency and the strength of the provision was refused. So, rather than defining the 
notion “public health” in the patent act, the concept is clarified by providing some examples in a 
political statement. Id. 
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for obtaining such products, products necessary in obtaining these products, 
processes for manufacturing such products, and ex vivo diagnostic methods.”247  
Policy lever 
The traditional compulsory license regimes for non-working and dependency 
are statutory micro policy levers. These license mechanisms have been designed to 
“prevent the abuses which might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights 
conferred by the patent,”248 irrespective of the sector or area where these abuses 
might emerge. It is quite likely, however, that the compulsory license for 
dependency will be employed more often in sectors characterized by follow-on 
innovation than other industries. The newly shaped compulsory license regime for 
public health is definitely a statutory macro policy lever. Although initially designed 
as a measure to resolve problems in the area of genetics, it is conceived as a 
remedy to solve problems in the pharmaceutical field at large. 
Rather than a direct measure to seize abusive patent holders, the compulsory 
license may act as an indirect policy instrument with a preventive and dissuading 
effect towards patent holders applying (extremely) restrictive licensing policies and 
may compel a noncooperative patent holder to enter into fair and reasonable 
licensing negotiations. It is exactly this preventive threat function which may turn 
the compulsory licensing mechanism into more than just another tool of symbolic 
 
247. C.P.I. art. L.613-16. In the Belgian Patent Act the scope of application has been modeled 
after the French system. Compulsory licenses can be granted for “a) a medicine, a medical device, a 
medical device or product for diagnosis, a derived or combinable therapeutic product; b) the process 
or product necessary for the fabrication of one or more products indicated under a); and c) a 
diagnostic method applied outside the human or animal body.” Id. at Art. 31 bis §1. Translation 
provided by Van Overwalle & Haasl in GENE PATENTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 81. 
One of the reasons why the field of application of the compulsory license regime was broadened 
from diagnostics to pharmaceuticals, was to avoid the criticism that the new regime runs counter to 
the nondiscrimination prescription of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1C 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS]. Some have argued, however, that this was not 
necessary, as the TRIPS rule only applies to the grant of patent rights, TRIPS Art. 27. 
 In addition to national initiatives to solve domestic public health problems, European legislation 
has been introduced to aid developing countries with health problems. A European Regulation on 
compulsory licensing of patents relating to the manufacture of pharmaceutical products for export to 
countries with public health problems was accepted in 2006. Council Regulation 816/2006, on 
Compulsory Licensing of Patents Relating to the Manufacture of Pharmaceutical Products for Export 
to Countries with Public Health Problems, 2006 O.J. (L157) (EC). The regulation obliges Member 
States to grant a compulsory license for the manufacture and sale of patented pharmaceutical 
products for export to countries without or with insufficient production facilities in the 
pharmaceutical sector so long as a number of conditions are fulfilled. For some more background 
information, see Paul Vandoren & Patrick Ravillard, A New EC Initiative to Allow Export of Medicines 
under Compulsory Licences to Poor Countries, 8 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 103.  See also Compulsory Licensing 
of Pharmaceuticals and TRIPS: Frequently Asked Questions, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Jan. 24, 2011), available 
at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_faq_e.htm. 
248. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 5.A.2, Mar. 20, 1883, 828 
U.N.T.S. 305. 
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lawmaking. 
2.3.3. Patent term 
In general 
U.S. patent law sets forth that a patent shall last for twenty years from the 
date on which the patent application was filed (35 U.S.C. § 154 (a) (2) (2010)). 
Similarly, European patent law prescribes that the term of the European patent 
shall be twenty years from the date of filing of the application (Art. 63 (1°) EPC).  
In medicine and biotechnology 
From 1991 onwards, EPC contracting states can extend the term of a 
European patent, under the same conditions as those applying to national patents, 
if the subject matter of the European patent is a product or a process for 
manufacturing a product or a use of a product which has to undergo an 
administrative authorization procedure required by law before it can be put on the 
market in that state (Art. 63 (2) EPC). As a result, various EU member states have 
promulgated an extension regime of maximum five years in the pharmaceutical 
sector249 (resulting in so-called supplementary protection certificates), extendable 
with an extra six months for medicinal products for pediatric use.250 In the U.S., 
similar extension regimes exist for pharmaceutical patents.251 
Next to regimes providing longer terms of protection in certain sectors, 
alternative national regimes have been put in place with shorter protection terms, 
amounting to so-called “petty patents,” “utility models,” or “Gebrauchsmuster.”252 
However, in an attempt to harmonize the varying national regimes on this 
 
249. See Council Regulation 1768/92 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 
June 1992 (the Creation of a Supplementary Protection Certificate for Medicinal Products). For an in-
depth analysis, see VAN OVERWALLE, supra note 232. A similar extension regime of five years has 
been introduced for plant protection products. See Council Regulation 1610/96 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 1996 Concerning the Creation of a Supplementary 
Protection Certificate for Plant Protection Products, 1996 O.J. (L 198) 30–35. 
250. See Council Regulation 1901/2006, 1996 O.J. (L 378) 1 (EC) of Dec. 12, 2006 on 
Medicinal Products for Pediatric Use and Amending Regulation (EEC) No. 1768/92, Council 
Directive 2001/20/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 121) 34 (EC), Council Directive 2001/83/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 311) 
67 (EC), and Council Regulation (EC) 726/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 136) 1 (EC). 
251. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984. Pub. L. No. 98–
417, 98 Stat. 1585; 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2002). 
252. For the regime in Germany, see, e.g., Karsten Königer, Registration Without Examination: The 
Utility Model—A Useful Model, in 6 PATENTS AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS IN A GLOBALIZED 
WORLD (Prinz zu Waldeck und Pyrmont et al. eds.,  2009); for the regime in the Netherlands, see, e.g., 
E.A. Van Nieuwenhoven Helbach, Sier-en gebruiksmodellen, in A1-15 CIER-LEZINGEN. 
MODELLENRECHT (1986–1987); for the regime in Belgium, see, e.g., Geertrui Van Overwalle, Europese 
Harmonisatie in het Octrooirecht, het Kwekersrecht en het Bebruiksmodellenrecht: van Wiel Naar Mens naar Wieltje, 
INTELLECTUELE RECHTEN—DROITS INTELLECTUELS 149, 149–68 (1998). 
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point,253 the EU legislature clearly stated that inventions relating to biological 
material or to chemical or pharmaceutical substances or processes were excluded 
from such protection regimes,254 because utility model protection is tailored to 
technical inventions involving a specific (read: lower) level of inventiveness, 255 
which is out of place in biology and pharma.256  
Policy lever 
The supplementary protection certificate regime is a clear example of a 
statutory macro policy lever. Prolongation of the patent term has been introduced 
explicitly to accommodate the need for an adequate term of protection in specific 
industries, namely industries characterized by substantial administrative 
authorization procedures, such as the pharmaceutical sector. The patent term 
extension initiative shows an increased interest from the legislator to tailor patent 
law to the administrative needs of particular industries, in casu the pharmaceutical 
industry. Here, the extension is triggered in an attempt to achieve differentiation 
of amortization/return on investment possibilities. 
The utility model framework is an example of a mixed statutory micro/macro 
policy lever. Although the utility model regime could in principle apply in all 
industry sectors, a major impact was expected in industries characterized by minor 
technical inventions, such as mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, and 
the automotive industry,257 as well as microtechnology, micromechanics, toy 
manufacture, clock and watch making, and optics.258 The utility model thus 
functions as a micro policy lever. Since the utility model is expressly not made 
available for biological and pharmaceutical inventions, the utility model acts as a 
macro policy lever as well. 
 
253. See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Directive Approximating 
the Legal Arrangements for the Protection of Inventions by Utility, at 13, COM (1997) 691 final (Feb. 3, 1998). 
See also Amended Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive Approximating the Legal 
Arrangements for the Protection of Inventions by Utility Model at 2, COM (1999) 309 final (July 12, 1999). 
254. See Article 4 (b) and (c) of EU Utility Model Proposal, 1997. 
255. See Art. 6 of the Commission of the European Communities, Amended Proposal for an 
European Parliament and Council Directive Approximating the Legal Arrangements for the 
Protection of Inventions by Utility Model (1997). See also id. at Recital 7.  
256. See id. §62 (“[T]hese sectors are complex ones in which property rights involving no 
examination as to novelty or inventive step are out of place.”). The European Union Utility Model 
Proposal was later withdrawn, following the screening exercise of proposals on which the EU 
legislator had not yet reached a decision and which were found not to be consistent with the Lisbon 
and Better Regulation criteria, unlikely to make further progress in the legislative process, or found to 
be no longer topical for objective reasons. See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament, Outcome of the Screening of Legislative Proposals Pending Before the Legislator, at 3, COM 
(2003) 462 final (Sept. 27, 2005); see also Withdrawal of Commission Proposals Following Screening 
for their General Relevance, Their Impact on Competitiveness and Other Aspects, 2006 O.J. (C 64) 3. 
257. See supra note 255, §§ 35, 45. 
258. See id. §6. 
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3. CONCLUSIONS 
Our European-U.S. tour d’horizon has now come to an end. Time has come to 
stand back and conclude on the peculiarities of the policy levers put into operation 
in Europe, and sketch a few lines of comparison with the U.S. landscape. 
3.1. European Policy Levers in Biotechnology 
3.1.1. Policy levers 
Our study reveals that many policy levers are put into operation to tailor 
European patent law to biotechnological innovation in Europe. In total, some 
seventeen policy levers have been uncovered in current European patent law 
which have particular effect on the biotech (or adjacent chemical and 
pharmaceutical) industry (see Table 2. Detailed Overview of European Policy 
Levers in Biotechnology). In the category of patent acquisition, policy levers 
concerning patentable subject matter have been put into operation, more in 
particular the technical character rule, the morality clause, and the medical method 
doctrine. Levers concerning patentability requirements have also been used, by 
adjusting the novelty requirement (first and second medical use doctrine, selection 
invention rules, and testing exemption), the inventive step requirement 
(expectation of success doctrine and secondary indicia approach), the industrial 
applicability standard, the skilled person doctrine, and the enabling disclosure 
requirement. In the field of patent scope, policy levers have been handled 
concerning product patent claim scope, clarity of claims, and breadth of claims. In 
the area of patent rights, policy levers have been used including the research 
exemption, the compulsory license, and patent term. 
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 Industry neutral 
 Effect on innovation in biotechnology 
(human DNA) 
 Micro policy lever 













 Industry neutral 
 Effect on innovation in biotechnology 
(transgenic plants, transgenic animals, 
human DNA, human stem cells) 
 Micro policy lever 
 Originally statutory (EPC), then 
jurisprudential (EPO), now statutory (EU) 
 Medical methods  Industry specific 
 Aimed at having effect on innovation in 
health care 
 Macro policy lever 
 Statutory (EPC) 
Novelty Medical use 










 Industry specific 
 Effect mainly on innovation in 
pharmaceutical sector 
 Macro policy lever 
 Statutory (EPC) 
 
 Industry specific 
 Effect mainly on innovation in 
pharmaceutical sector 
 Macro policy lever 
 Originally jurisprudential (EPO), now 
statutory (EPC) 
 Selection invention  Industry neutral 
 Effect mainly on innovation in 
pharmaceutical and chemical sector 
 Micro policy lever 
 Jurisprudential (EPO) 
 Testing exemption  Industry neutral 
 Effection mainly on innovation in 
pharmaceutical and biotechnological sector 
 Micro policy lever 
 Jurisprudential (EPO) 
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Inventive step Expectation of 
success 
 Industry neutral 
 Effect on innovation in young (vs. 
established) industries, hence indirect effect 
in biotechnology 
 Micro policy lever 





 Industry neutral 
 Effect unclear for the moment 
 Micro policy lever? 
 Jurisprudential (EPO) 











 Industry specific 
 Higher standard in biotechnology (DNA) 
 Macro policy lever 
 Statutory (EU) 
 
 Industry neutral 
 Effect on downstream (vs. upstream) 
innovation closer to market, hence indirect 
effect on innovation in biotechnology 
sector 
 Micro policy lever 
 Jurisprudential (EPO) 
Skilled person PSITA  Industry neutral 
 Effect on innovation in new (vs. old) and 
advanced (vs. low) technologies, hence 
indirect effect on biotechnology 
 Micro policy lever 
 Jurisprudential (EPO) 
Enabling disclosure Written description  Industry specific 
 Higher standard in biotechnology 
 Macro policy lever 
 Originally jurisprudential (EPO), now 
statutory (EPC IRs)  
2. PATENT  
SCOPE 
 
Scope of product 
claims 
 Industry specific 
 Limited (purpose bound) scope in 
biotechnology (DNA) 
 Macro policy lever 
 Statutory (national) (EU) 
 Clarity of claims  Industry neutral 
 Effect on innovation in biotechnology 
(DNA) 
 Micro policy lever 
 Jurisprudential (EPO) 
 Breadth of claims  Industry neutral 
 Effect on innovation in new (vs. known) 
technologies, hence indirect effect in 
biotechnology in the early days 
 Micro policy lever 
 Jurisprudential (EPO) 
Assembled Issue 2 11-7-11 (Do Not Delete) 11/7/2011  10:16 AM 
500 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  1:2 
 




 The list of policy levers presented here is by no means exhaustive. Additional 
rules, standards, or doctrines can most likely be uncovered. Rather, the policy 
levers discussed here can be considered as the most visible exponents, as yet, of 
the attempt of the European patent actors (legislators and courts) to tailor patent 
law to the needs of the biotechnology sector. The multitude of levers shows that 
the current European patent system holds substantial potential for technology-
specific application of its patent law. Even though the EPC may have been 
conceived at its inception as a nominally neutral patent statute, our study clearly 
reveals that substantial discretion to differ the patent system by industry, and in 
















 Industry neutral 
 Effect on innovation in biotechnology 
(DNA, research tools) 
 Micro policy lever 
 Statutory (EU + national) 
 
 Industry specific 
 Created to have an effect on follow-on 
innovation in biotechnology (DNA, 
research tools) 
 Micro policy lever 















 Industry neutral 
 Effect on sectors characterized by follow-
on innovation 
 Micro policy lever 
 Statutory (national) 
 
 Industry specific 
 Effect on innovation in pharmacy 
(medicines) and biotechnology (diagnostic 
methods) 
 Macro policy lever 
 Statutory (national) 











 Industry specific 
 Effect on innovation in pharmaceutical 
sector 
 Macro policy lever 
 Statutory (national) 
 
 Industry neutral 
 Effect in sectors with lower level of 
innovation 
 Micro policy lever 
 Statutory (EU) 
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particular to tailor it to the specificities of the biotechnology sector, is built into 
the system over the years. Although the EPC was introduced as a unitary259 
regulatory tool, intended to operate the same way across technologies, EPO case 
law has shown increased interest and ability in tailoring patent law to the needs of 
distinct technology sectors, and in particular the biotechnology sector. 
3.1.2. Macro versus micro policy levers 
Our study shows that in Europe substantially more micro policy levers have 
been set to work in the biotechnology sector than macro policy levers (see Table 3. 
Comparison of the Various European Policy Levers in Biotechnology; see also 
Table 4. Summary of the Various European Policy Levers in Biotechnology). 
  
 
259. The term “unitary” comes from BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 65, as does the term 
“uniform,”id. at 95. 
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Table 3. Comparison of the Various European Policy Levers in 
Biotechnology* 
 
  Macro policy lever 
(industry specific) 
Micro policy lever 
(industry neutral)
























EPC  Medical 
methods 
 Medical use 
(first) 







   
EU → 
national 
    Research 
exemption (“on”) 
 Patent term 
(shorter) 












 Patent term 
(longer) 
















 Clarity of 
claims 














 EPO → 
EPC 
 Medical use 
(second) 










   Morality  
*The policy levers which were split up (first/second medical use; industrial applicability 
DNA/general; research on/on-with; compulsory license for dependency/public health; patent 
term longer/shorter) have been printed in italics. 
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 The prevalence of micro policy levers in Europe rather comes as a surprise. 
We expected that a relation would show up between the nature of policy measure 
(macro/micro) and the type of policy actor (legislator/court), and expected a 
positive correlation between macro policy levers and statutory measures. Indeed, 
given the civil law background in which European (patent) law develops, a 
prevalence of well-articulated macro rules openly set forth by the legislature was 
anticipated. However, a clear prevalence of jurisprudential micro policy levers 
emerged. 
 
Table 4. Summary of the Various European Policy Levers in 
Biotechnology * 
 
 Macro policy lever 
 



















4 3  3 10 
Jurisprudential  
(EPO)
 8  8 
Jurisprudential → 
Statutory 




 1  1 
Subtotal 5 3 11 3 22 
Total 8 14 22 
*For sake of comparison, the policy levers split up in Tables 2 and 3 (first/second medical 
use; industrial applicability DNA/general; research on/on-with; compulsory license 
dependency/public health; patent term longer/shorter) have been counted as separate policy 
levers here. This leads to an increase of the policy levers by five. The net amount of policy 
levers uncovered is seventeen instead of twenty-two. 
 
Several of the micro policy levers have a direct impact on the biotechnology 
sector. Clear examples are the technical character approach,260 the morality 
doctrine,261 the selection invention rule,262 and the testing exemption rule.263 
 
260. See supra Part 2.1.1. 
261. See supra Part 2.1.2.  
262. See supra Part 2.1.5. 
263. See supra Part 2.1.6. 
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However, many micro policy levers produce an indirect effect on the biotechnology 
industry. Some policy levers rather affect the biotechnology sector indirectly 
because it is a young, advanced, and complex industry branch. An illustrative 
example is the use of the expectation of success doctrine.264 This nominally 
neutral doctrine does not produce an effect in well-defined technology or industry 
sectors. Rather, the doctrine has an effect in “young” industries, such as 
biotechnology, where the level of uncertainty is high, compared to “established” 
industries where the level of uncertainty is low(er). A similar example is the skilled 
person doctrine.265 The rule is not being perceived differently in different industry 
sectors. Rather, the level of the skilled person differs between “old” and “new” 
fields of research. In “old” conventional technical areas the standard of the PSITA 
seems to be lower than the level of the PSITA in “new” technological fields. 
Furthermore, the level of PSITA differs between “low” and “advanced” 
technologies. In “low” key technologies, the level of the PSITA seems to be 
lower, as it can be a single skilled person. In advanced and more complex fields of 
research, the level is higher, as the PSITA can be held to be a team of skilled 
persons. Since the biotechnological field is both “new” and pretty “advanced,” the 
level of the PSITA can differ from other sectors, and the PSITA can, indirectly, be 
seen as a judicial micro policy lever in biotechnology. Yet another example of 
indirect influence is the breadth of claim doctrine and the related pioneering 
patent rule. This doctrine does not produce a specific effect in a particular sector. 
Rather, the broad claim doctrine is more likely to be accepted in “new” technology 
fields, such as the early days of biotechnology, than in “known” technology fields, 
such as the later stages within those areas of biotechnology which have already 
been widely explored.266  
Quite exceptionally, some policy levers are both a macro and micro policy 
lever. The key example here is the industrial applicability rule, which acts as a 
macro policy lever in biotechnology, since it clearly sets a higher standard for 
human genes by demanding a “function.” The same rule acts as a micro policy 
lever in the pharmaceutical sector, since it unintentionally produces a greater effect 
in industry sectors characterized by downstream innovation.267 
3.1.3. Statutory versus jurisprudential policy levers 
According to our limited268 study, about the same amount of statutory and 
jurisprudential policy levers has been put into operation in Europe to tailor the 
biotechnology sector. The statutory policy levers come into being by an explicit 
action from the legislature. On various occasions, the EU legislature has expressly 
 
264. See supra Part 2.1.7. 
265. See supra Part 2.1.10. 
266. See supra Part 2.2.3. 
267. See supra Part 2.1.9. 
268. See supra Part 1.2.1. 
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introduced exceptions to patentable subject matter and has modulated 
patentability requirements, resulting in a different gate of entry for 
biotechnological innovations. The EU legislature believed that achieving optimal 
innovation in biotechnology required explicit intervention through statutory 
initiatives. This should not come as a surprise, given that Europe is characterized 
by a civil law tradition, where formal interventions of government are much more 
common practice than in common law jurisdictions. 
The jurisprudential policy levers were either explicitly or implicitly implemented 
by the EPO Boards of Appeal.269 Illustrative examples of micro policy levers 
explicitly deployed in European case law in biotechnology are the expectation of 
success rule,270 the PSITA standard,271 the enabling disclosure doctrine,272 and, to 
a lesser extent, the selection invention doctrine.273 Key examples of policy levers 
implicitly put to work in biotechnology are the clarity of claims and the breadth of 
claims doctrine. It remains to be seen to what extent the explicit policy levers 
encountered here give evidence of a deliberate and conscious attempt within the 
EPO to apply the same rules differently in different sectors. Our research 
indicates that the expectation of success rule and the PSITA standard274 did not 
vary in biotechnology compared to other industries, but rather differed according 
to features such as young/experienced industry, old/new fields of research, and 
low/advanced technologies. Furthermore, differentiation is not signaled as a major 
issue within the EPO—witness the clear and strong attention for quality, and not 
for (the maintenance of) diversity in some recent high level documents from the 
EPO.275 
 
269. To decide whether policy levers were put to work explicitly or implicitly, we examined 
which of the jurisprudential EPO levers that we uncovered were mentioned under a separate heading 
in CASE LAW OF THE BOARDS OF APPEAL OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 84, and 
in Part C of the European Patent Convention, supra note 24, Guidelines for Examination in the 
European Patent Office. We admit this is a pretty “rough” method to discern explicit and implicit use 
of policy levers. More refined analytical tools need to be thought of. 
270. CASE LAW OF THE BOARDS OF APPEAL OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra 
note 84, at 132 (Section I. Patentability—D. Inventive Step—6. Expectation of success, especially in 
the field of genetic engineering and biotechnology). 
271. Id. at 136 (Section I. Patentability—D. Inventive Step—7. Skilled person—7.1.3. 
Definition of the skilled person in the art in the field of biotechnology). 
272. Id. at 178 (Section II. Conditions to be met by an application—A. Sufficiency of 
disclosure—5. The requirement of sufficiency of disclosure in the biotechnology field). 
273. See id. 
274. See supra Part 3.1.2. 
275. See Securing the Stability of the Patent System, in EPO Ann. Rep., at 5–7 (2008) echoing the 
view of the President of the EPO, Alison Brimelow (“It is now also clear that the consequences of 
the unforeseen success of patents are not all positive, as is evident from frequently critical public 
reactions to issues such as the growing mounds of unprocessed applications. Accordingly, the 
European Patent Office (EPO) last year intensified its efforts to make the patent system more 
effective both in Europe and internationally, with special emphasis on enhancing procedural 
efficiency . . . . In the EPO’s view, the second key element in this stabilization process is the ongoing 
review and improvement of the European procedure. The EPO is devoting particular attention to 
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The use of specific policy levers in EPO case law has far-reaching effects. 
First, the deployment of certain levers by the EPO Boards has an influence on the 
legislator. Quite often, the jurisprudential levers have given the impetus for the 
introduction of statutory levers. Looking at certain policy levers in the field of 
biotechnology in Europe shows that some contemporary statutory policy levers 
were initially created by the EPO Boards. An illustrative example is the technical 
character rule: originated as a judicial policy lever, the technical character rule was 
later formally embedded in patent legislation, namely in the EU Biotechnology 
Directive, which makes it a statutory policy lever.276 Another key example is the 
morality clause: initially embedded in the EPC as a rather pale provision 
(Art. 53 (b) EPC), the morality clause was activated at the advent of biotechnology 
by the EPO Boards of Appeal, and was later captured by the legislator, who 
implemented the clause in a formal patent statute, namely the EU Biotechnology 
Directive.277 Yet another example is the second medical use rule: originally shaped 
by EPO case law, the rule was later formally enacted in the EPC.278 
The application of certain policy levers in EPO case law is also highly 
influential, as certain EPO judicial levers may have effects on national courts. 
Although EPO verdicts do not have any precedent value on the courts of the 
EPC contracting states, which are totally autonomous in their rulings, EPO case 
law has a great influence on national judges and ultimately carries great weight in 
defining patent practice in European member states. Illustrative in this regard is 
the statement of U.K. justice Neuberger in the Kirin-Amgen case: “I am reluctant 
 
further enhancing patent quality, which is also dependent on the quality of the applications that are 
filed. Suitable rules governing divisional applications are being discussed, as are appropriate internal 
means of permanently raising the bar in terms of the quality of grant proceedings.”). See also Quality 
over Quantity: On Course to Raise the Bar, in EPO Ann. Rept., at 8 (2008) (“A final issue in the same 
context concerns the influence that can be exerted through the EPO’s fee structure and hence the 
best approach to financing the European patent system in order to guarantee its stability in the long 
term as well.”). A portfolio of measures set to launch in the spring of 2010 will raise the bar on the 
quality of patents while simultaneously improving the efficiency of the granting process. These steps 
will better protect inventors who turn to the European Patent Office and, at the same time, see the 
EPO grant patents only for innovations having sufficient inventive merit and meeting the needs of 
society. This program of measures has been designed with three aims in mind: to secure a clear scope 
for the search at the beginning of the procedure and thereby build on solid foundations; to save time 
in the application process by reducing the procedural steps through which inventors and the EPO 
must pass; and, ultimately, to increase the chances of worthy applicants being granted robust patents. 
See also EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, Raising the Bar, PATENT INFORMATION NEWS, Feb. 2009, at 4 
(stating: “As reported in Patent Information News 2/2009, the ‘Raising the bar’ initiative at the EPO 
is not about raising the level of inventive step. Rather, it aims to communicate current best practice 
with respect to the assessment of inventive step at the EPO and to ensure a consistent and clear 
standard for the assessment of inventive step across all technical fields.”) (emphasis added). 
276. See supra Part 2.1.1. 
277. See supra Part 2.1.2. As we have explained earlier, policy levers introduced by the 
European Union Biotechnology Directive then trickled down to the national statutory level, as well as 
the EPC level, through the Implementing Regulations. 
278. See supra Part 2.1.4. 
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not to follow the approach of the Board, particularly in light of the sheer number 
of consistent decisions on this point. However, I am not bound by decisions of 
the Board . . . .”279 Given the few patent infringement and nullity cases in the 
various EPC member states, the decisions of the EPO Boards are vital to the 
efficient operation of the patent system in Europe, and are particularly useful to 
the court systems of the smaller countries whose low number of decided cases 
provides little help to would-be plaintiffs or defendants.280 
Not only may rulings from the EPO Technical Boards of Appeal or from the 
Enlarged Board of Appeal produce far reaching effects, decisions from the EPO 
Opposition Division can also create significant industry-specific flexibility. Cases 
in point are the foundational interpretations of the morality clause by the 
Opposition Division to allow patents in the field of human genes (Howard 
Florey)281 and transgenic plants (Lubrizol ).282 
The reverse influence of national jurisprudential levers on EPO case law is 
far less prominent. Even when a court of an EPC contracting state would put into 
operation a policy lever in the field of biotechnology, it is quite unlikely that this 
lever would be picked up at the European level and be formally embedded in the 
EPC or be translated into an EU measure. National courts have no say over the 
EPO, let alone the EU, so policy levers applied nationally do not feed back into 
the European system automatically. National (civil) courts hardly play a role here 
in triggering modifications in the EPC. Much more than creators of policy levers, 
national courts in Europe are followers—and to a certain extent also watchdogs—
of the policy levers established by the EPO.283 
Jurisprudential differentiation has various advantages, as Burk and Lemley 
have repeatedly pointed out.284 Jurisprudential diversification, however, can also 
have some downsides. Statutory levers are explicitly articulated and thus create 
transparency and (a great level of) legal certainty, whereas jurisprudential levers 
may be applied implicitly. Furthermore, jurisprudential levers may change over 
time, which may lead to legal uncertainty. 
3.1.4. Pre-grant versus post-grant policy levers 
Our study shows that in Europe much more pre-grant policy levers have 
been put to work, compared to post-grant policy levers (see Table 4. Summary of 
the Various European Policy Levers in Biotechnology). Some sixteen pre-grant 
 
279. Kirin-Amgen Inc. v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH, [2002] R.P.C. 1 (Eng.).  
280. William Bird, Using the EPO Opposition Procedure as a Strategy against Patents on Diagnostic 
Method, in GENE PATENTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 81, at 73–84. 
281. See supra Part 2.1.2. (in particular the holding in the Howard Florey case). 
282. See supra Part 2.1.2. (in particular the holding in the Lubrizol case). 
283. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 128. 
284. See id. at 65. (Burk and Lemley have a clear preference for case-by-case judicial tailoring 
by the courts and clearly indicate why.).  
Assembled Issue 2 11-7-11 (Do Not Delete) 11/7/2011  10:16 AM 
508 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  1:2 
 
policy levers have been encountered, versus six post-grant policy levers. This 
result may be due to the fact that our research did not include national case law, 
which might have shed some more light on the application of post-grant policy 
levers. 
Quite remarkably, the majority of pre-grant levers are jurisprudential in 
nature or have started off as case law levers and were later embedded in statutes 
(12/16, see Table 4. Summary of the Various European Policy Levers in 
Biotechnology). All post-grant levers (4/20), are national statutory levers. 
3.1.5. European versus national policy levers 
The results on pre-grant versus post-grant levers should not come as a 
surprise in light of the current institutional patent architecture. Deciding on the 
coming into existence of European patents—and thus on putting into operation 
pre-grant policy levers relating to patent acquisition and patent scope—is the 
exclusive competence of the EPO, encompassing legislative (EPC) and judicial 
branches (EPO Boards). In contrast, deciding on the exercise of patents—and 
thus on putting into effect post-grant levers relating to patent rights and 
limitations—is the exclusive competence of EPO member states.285 
Against this background of division of competences, it was to be expected 
that policy levers relating to patent acquisition and patent scope would mainly 
originate within the EPO, whereas policy levers on patent rights and limitations 
would come about at the national level. More insightful information is to be 
expected when research is expanded to national jurisprudence. 
3.1.6. Private interest versus public interest levers 
Not all policy levers uncovered in the present study may come to the 
advantage of the biotechnology industry. Closer analysis of the various policy 
levers reveals that rather than expanding the patent system to accommodate 
biotechnology inventions and to stimulate innovation in the biotechnology sector, 
some policy levers narrow down the patent potential for biotechnological 
inventions in Europe. “Tailoring” the patent system to biotech inventions does 
not always result in broadening, but can also end up in limiting the patent 
incentive.  
Policy levers aiming to expand the current patent realm towards 
biotechnological inventions definitely include the technical character rule as 
applied to DNA (turning DNA from discoveries into inventions), the first and 
second medical use doctrine, and the selection invention rule. 
Policy levers intended to narrow down the patent gate of entry for 
biotechnological inventions can be classified in three distinct categories. A first 
 
285. See supra Part 2.2. 
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series of limiting policy levers is put into operation to foreclose appropriation of 
technical knowledge, to increase the public domain, and to facilitate research and 
development and follow-on innovation in biotechnology. Clear examples are the 
purpose-bound doctrine (limited scope of product claims) and the research “on”-
plus-“with” exception rule. A second series of minimizing policy levers is put to 
work to safeguard public health. An illustrative example is the medical method 
doctrine, which was established in a concern to ensure that those who carry out 
such methods as part of the medical treatment of humans or the veterinary 
treatment of animals are not inhibited by patents.286 Another example is the 
compulsory license for public health, which was introduced to seize abusive patent 
holders in the area of biotechnology and pharma, in an attempt to ensure fair and 
reasonable licensing negotiations, hence, reasonable access to healthcare. A third 
series of diminishing levers feeds into the ethical sensitivity surrounding bio-
patents. The most prominent example in this regard is the use of the morality 
clause. 
3.2. Comparing European and U.S. Policy Levers 
Burk and Lemley describe a dozen policy levers courts already use to 
differentiate patent law in different industries.287 Some of these policy levers are 
also put into practice in Europe to accommodate biotechnological inventions. 
This is the case for the abstract idea-technical character rule,288 the commercial 
success doctrine,289 the industrial applicability/utility standard,290 the 
PSITA/PHOSITA approach,291 the enabling disclosure requirement,292 the 
pioneering patent rule,293 and the research exemption/experimental use 
doctrine.294 Other policy levers have not clearly shown up when screening 
European patent law for biotechnology shaped rules or doctrines. This is the case 
for the reasonable interchangeability doctrine,295 the element-by-element 
analysis,296 the reverse doctrine of equivalents,297 and the reasonable royalty 
rule.298 
Rules that were put into operation as macro policy levers in the U.S. were 
not always also employed as macro policy levers in Europe. Two examples are the 
 
286. See supra Part 2.1.3. 
287. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 109. 
288. See id. at 122–24. 
289. See id. at 117–18. 
290. See id. at 110–12. 
291. See id. at 114–17. 
292. See id. at 118–22. 
293. See id. at 127–28. 
294. See id. at 112–14. 
295. See id. at 124–25. 
296. See id. at 125–26. 
297. See id. at 128. 
298. See id. at 128–30. 
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enabling disclosure rule, which has been applied differently to biotechnology and 
software in both constituencies, and the industrial applicability/utility rule that is 
applied more stringently in biotechnology—especially with regard to DNA 
inventions—than in other sectors. On the other hand, rules or doctrines that were 
deployed as micro policy levers in the U.S. were often put to work in the same 
fashion in Europe. By way of example, we refer to the secondary considerations of 
nonobviousness, more in particular the commercial success doctrine, which is 
being applied nominally across all technology sectors, but which primarily benefits 
industries that deal with inventions that translate directly into commercial 
products.299 
4. CRITICAL ASSESSMENT: “THE PATENT CRISIS” REVISITED 
Now that we have arrived at the end of our analysis, we would like to turn to 
the beginning of the book which prompted our study. In The Patent Crisis, Burk 
and Lemley start from two (empirical) observations: (1) innovation and patent 
patterns differ by sector, and (2) the patent system has a unitary architecture. 
These observations trigger them to set forth two (normative) questions: (1) what is 
the most adequate response to industry-specific innovation and patent patterns, 
and (2) who is best positioned to provide such a modular response? The 
(normative) vision of Burk and Lemley is that (1) tailoring unitary patent rules is 
the best solution to fit the diverse needs of innovators in today’s technology 
industries, and (2) courts are best suited to tailor the unitary patent rules through 
the use of policy levers. This twofold claim raises some fundamental questions. 
4.1. Tailoring 
Burk and Lemley claim that the best response to industry specific innovation 
and patent patterns is tailoring of the unitary patent rules: “The doctrines we have 
discussed . . . all implicate the technology-specific potential of patent law, and they 
are all capable of being used to bring patent law in line with optimal patent 
policy.”300 Burk and Lemley join the consensus position that the major objective 
of the patent system is to promote innovation by granting exclusive rights.301 They 
link up with the standard understanding that patent law is a utilitarian mechanism 
to encourage investors to invest. According to Burk and Lemley, the best way to 
achieve this goal is not to apply the one tool similarly across industries, but to 
apply the patent tool differently in different industries.302 Modulating patent law 
 
299. See id. at 110. 
300. See id. at 130. 
301. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1620 
n.147 (2003). 
302. Given the idiosyncratic profile of technical and economic determinants for research, 
development, and return on investment each distinct technology displays, there is no a priori reason 
to believe that a single type of legal incentive will work best for every industry. “Indeed, there is every 
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will best serve the goal patent law is set to achieve. 
But why is the tailoring of the patent system to diverse needs of industries the 
best option? Why is tailoring the unitary patent rules on a case-by-case basis the 
best solution? Why should patent law be applied with sensitivity to the 
characteristics of different industries? In their book, Burk and Lemley do not 
provide well-established normative criteria in responding this question. The 
authors do not extensively argue which criteria have been applied to reach this 
viewpoint. Only some vague indications of why one solution is more 
“attractive” 303 than another are put forward, such as flexibility304 and 
favoritism.305  
The (implicit) ideology underlying their approach seems to be that adjusting 
patent law to different sectors is the best way to serve the economic effect of 
patent law. The major (albeit not articulated) normative criterion substantiating 
their approach may well be optimal economic effect. Apart from the 
(methodological) question of how this effect can be measured, such a viewpoint 
calls for further reflection. What about other normative criteria, for example 
fairness? Will tailoring patent law to the needs of industry always result in a fair 
outcome? Will modulating patent law provide the fairness of a just reward? Might 
tailoring not result in either over- or under-rewarding certain innovators or 
industries? And what about legal certainty in a regime which is being applied 
differently per industry sector, and where changing and wobbling norms are set 
forth? Not to mention transparency: What about a system where differing norms 
are being applied implicitly and unconsciously? And not-well-articulated standards 
float around in administrative patent agencies? 
The point is taken that tailoring patent law may well provide more adequate 
impulses to innovation. But economic effect on innovation may not be the only 
criterion to measure the value of tailoring. Other elements such as fairness of a 
just reward, legal certainty, and transparency may spur a more nuanced decision 
on what is the best way to accommodate differing patterns of innovation.  
Articulating why tailoring is the best solution will help in deciding whether 
more or less tailoring is desirable. An important question for Europe is whether 
we should retain the current system, and acknowledge and embrace the sectorial 
differences established by the legislature and the patent offices, or whether we 
should call for a standstill. In Europe, significant tailoring with regard to eligible 
 
reason to believe that achieving optimal innovation in different industries will require greater or lesser 
measures of legal incentives.” Burk & Lemley, supra note 301, at 23. 
303. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 6. 
304. Id. (“A patent system that lacks the flexibility to deal with radical differences between 
industries will break rather than bend.”). 
305. Id. at 6 (“And a patent system whose flexibility depends on particular industries lobbying 
Congress for specialized rules unlikely to produce desirable rules . . . . [T]he lessons of recent efforts 
at patent reform are not encouraging for those who would rely on Congress.”). 
Assembled Issue 2 11-7-11 (Do Not Delete) 11/7/2011  10:16 AM 
512 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  1:2 
 
subject matter exists. But do we need more? And what for? There is also 
significant differentiation with regard to patentability requirements. But do we 
want more? The same question applies to modulation with regard to scope of 
protection and exercise of rights. 
4.2. Courts 
Burk and Lemley further claim that courts are best placed to modulate the 
patent system and are “best positioned”306 to tailor patent law to the varying needs 
of industry. They suggest that, as a general principle, a flexible common law 
approach of ongoing judicial oversight will best accommodate new and different 
technologies within the general framework of a patent statute.307 
Here, Burk and Lemley do explain why legislatures and administrative 
agencies are ill placed to address statutory upkeep. The authors are far from 
convinced that it is a good idea to leave the tailoring to the legislator: practical 
unfeasibility,308 legal uncertainty,309 demarcation problems,310 and lack of general 
character311 may be the downsides of legislative interference. A number of 
elements caution against the tailoring of the patent system to the needs of 
particular industries by administrative agencies too: lack of accountability (of the 
staff of the administrative agency)312 and lack of neutrality—consumer 
prejudice.313 
But it seems that their positive choice for the courts to carry out an industry-
specific judicial policy is based on an authoritative and pragmatic—and rather 
weak—argument, rather than on a normative one. It is argued that courts can and 
should apply the general rules of patent law with sensitivity to the characteristics 
of different industries, because the Federal Circuit already does this, consciously 
or not. The patent statute and the common law of patents are “chock-full of 
 
306. Id. at 5. 
307. Id. at 104. 
308. Id. at 97 (“[While] economics can make useful policy suggestions as to how patents work 
in different industries, we are skeptical of the ability of a statute to translate those suggestions into 
detailed patent rules for each industry.”). 
309. Id. (“Rewriting patent law for each industry would involve substantial uncertainty since 
fewer interpretative cases would come up involving each statute.”). 
310. Id. (“Industry specific legislation would also require a great deal of line drawing, as the 
boundaries between industries are vague and notoriously mutable . . . . Drug delivery systems might 
be thought of as medical devices, pharmaceuticals or biotechnology . . . presumably a different law 
would apply depending on how the invention was characterized.”). 
311. Id. (“The history of industry-specific statutes suggests that many fail because they are 
drafted with then-current technology in mind and are not sufficiently general to accommodate the 
inevitable changes in technology.”). 
312. Id.  at 106. 
313. Id. (“The PTO interacts regularly with those seeking patents, but very little with third 
parties affected by the patents they grant. It is little wonder, then, that the PTO in the 1990’s stated its 
mission as “to help our customers get patents.”). 
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examples of judicially created, industry specific rules.”314 
Furthermore, can the thesis of Burk and Lemley about the pivotal role of the 
courts hold out, in light of the European experience? The results of our limited315 
study reveal that in European patent law a large part of the policy levers were put 
to work by the legislator, and that another significant part was created by the courts 
and later codified in statutory law, in other words, legislative reform confirming 
judicial discretion. The European experience teaches that the patent system might 
also work with a legislature selectively applying industry-specific protection 
statutes. 
Our study further shows that the most trendsetting case law under European 
patent law was set forth by the EPO Technical Boards of Appeal and the EPO 
Enlarged Board of Appeal, both organs within an administrative international body. 
Are the EPO Boards to be viewed as administrative organs and their verdicts as 
administrative decisions? Or are the EPO Boards to be qualified as courts and 
their verdicts as true jurisprudential decisions? Recently, the EPO Boards of 
Appeal have been recognized as courts or tribunals of an international 
organization.316 Even if the question whether EPO Boards can be qualified as 
 
314. Id. at 109. 
315. See supra Part 1.2.1. 
316.  See Decision of European Patent Office, Board of Appeal, Case G 0002/06 (Nov. 25, 
2008), supra note 78. The appellant argued that, since Rule 28(c) of the European Patent Convention, 
supra note 24 (formerly Rule 23 (c)) repeated the wording of Article 6 (2) (c) of the EU Biotechnology 
Directive, the EPO Enlarged Board of Appeal was interpreting the law of the European Union (EU) 
and was required by Article 234 of the remedy, to ask for a ruling by the ECJ, in the present situation 
where the interpretation of Article 6 (2) (c) of the Directive is not free of doubt (i.e. not acte clair). The 
appellant claimed that the Enlarged Board of Appeal meets the ECJ criteria of being a court or 
tribunal, and the ECJ case Parfums Christian Dior SA v. Evora BV, 1998 R.P.C. 166 is a precedent 
for a court under an international treaty and having jurisdiction for more than a single EU member 
state asking for a ruling. The appellant further argued that the vast majority of EPC states are member 
states of the EU and the Enlarged Board of Appeal sits in such a state. Not asking the ECJ for a 
ruling would bear the risk that national courts would subsequently apply (and be obliged to apply) an 
interpretation of Article 6 of the Directive which does not accord with that applied by the EPO. See 
id. at 310 (the President of the EPO responded that the Boards of Appeal of the EPO are not courts 
or tribunals of a member state of the EU, and there is no power under the EPC for a Board of 
Appeal to refer questions to the ECJ); id. at 314 (main points made on behalf of the President of the 
European Patent Office in writing and at the oral Proceedings); id. at 318 (Reason 3) (The EPO 
Enlarged Board of Appeal finally concluded that neither the EPC nor the Implementing Regulations 
thereto make any provision for a referral by any instance of the EPO of questions of law to the ECJ. 
The Boards of Appeal are a creation of the EPC, and their powers are limited to those given in the 
EPC. Prima facie the conclusion must be that the absence of any provision enabling such a referral 
makes such referral impossible.) (emphasis added).  Id.  at 320 (Reasons 4 and 5): 
Nor does Article 234 of the EC Treaty giving the ECJ jurisdiction to give 
preliminary rulings concerning inter alia the validity and interpretation of acts of 
the institutions of the European Community, such as the Directive, appear to 
provide any basis for a Board of Appeal of the EPO to request the ECJ to give 
a ruling on any questions before such Board of Appeal. Article 234 of the EC 
Treaty requires the question to be raised in a case pending before a court or 
tribunal of an EU member state. Whereas EPO Boards of Appeal have been 
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courts might be answered in the affirmative, do they fit the civil court concept 
Burk and Lemley have in mind? What is so specific, so unique about a civil court 
that they, and they only, can best perform the task of tailoring, rather than the 
judicial organs within the patent administration? Is it the legal environment? Civil 
courts operate within a wide set of well recognized procedural and substantive 
laws, whereas the EPO is an international organization operating in an 
“incomplete legal environment.”317 Is it the training and background of the 
judges? Civil courts are staffed with legally trained judges, whereas the EPO 
courts 318 are mainly equipped with scientists. Is it their autonomy? Civil courts are 
staffed with independent judges, whereas the EPO Boards are crewed with 
bureaucrats, who in spite of the fact that they are guaranteed independence and 
non-intervention from the executive powers as to their judicial 
functions (Art. 23 EPC) may be found to fall short of the standards set up 
internationally for courts of law.319 Is it accountability? In the U.S., direct recourse 
from the USPTO Board of Appeals is possible to civil courts, namely the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), whereas no direct recourse with a civil 
court, nor with the CJEU,320 is possible against the decisions from the EPO 
Boards.  
Spelling out what are the necessary features of “a court” is needed. Defining 
 
recognized as being courts or tribunals, they are not courts or tribunals of an 
EU member state but of an international organization whose contracting states 
are not all members of the EU . . . . The Administrative Council of the EPO as 
legislator responsible for the Implementing Regulations found it necessary to 
introduce what are now Rules 26 to 29 (formerly 23b to 23e [of the European 
Patent Convention, supra note 24] so that the provisions of the EPC 
correspond to those of the Directive. Thereby all Contracting States to the 
EPC, even those not members of the EU, have indicated their will that these 
rules be used to interpret the EPC when considering whether or not a 
European patent should be granted. But this cannot be taken as conferring 
some new power or imposing some new obligation on the Boards of Appeal to 
ask for an interpretation by the ECJ of the EPC or its Implementing 
Regulations. Certainly the Contracting States to the EPC which are not 
member states of the EU cannot be presumed to have conferred jurisdiction 
on the ECJ. 
317.  CATARINA HOLTZ, DUE PROCESS FOR EUROPEAN PATENTING: A COMPARATIVE 
JURISPRUDENCE STUDY 3 (2007). See also FELICE MORGENSTERN, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 3 (1986). 
318.  We will not go into the issue again here, whether the EPO Boards of Appeal can be 
considered to be “courts.” See infra Part 1.2.1. 
319.  See Consultative Council of Eur. Judges, Report of the 2nd meeting—Strasbourg, 21–23 
November 2001 (2002), available at https://wcd.coe.int/wcd/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1047753 
&Site=DGHL&BackColorInternet=B9BDEE&BackColorIntranet=FFCD4F&BackColorLogged=F
FC679 (on the independence, efficiency and role of the judges, which lays down a minimum 
standards for national courts of law). 
320.  No appeal lies open from the EPO to the European Court of Justice, contrary to the 
current regime for Community Plant Variety Rights and Community Trademarks. See also supra Part 
1.2.1. 
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which of the characteristics set forth here are relevant to be nominated as the best 
and most suitable actor, and examining to what extent the EPO Boards fit into 
this best actor definition, is most desirable. This will help in deciding who is best 
positioned to tailor industry’s diverse needs in the future in Europe—the 
legislator, the EPO Boards, or the national courts. A choice for the one or the 
other can only be made by weighing the various options against a set of well-
articulated and elaborated normative criteria. 
5. FINAL REMARKS 
5.1. Future Research 
First and foremost, a further critical examination of the basic normative 
assumptions underlying the Burk and Lemley vision, and of alternative normative 
outlooks, is urgently needed. On top of such reflection and analysis, more 
descriptive-analytical research needs to be done as well. The present study was our 
very first attempt to portray in a systematic manner the way in which policy levers 
have been put into operation in European patent law to accommodate 
bioinventions. Although the results are very insightful already, the list of policy 
levers presented here is not complete by far. Additional rules and standards or 
doctrines which have been created to accommodate biotechnological inventions 
can likely be uncovered. Further research is needed to bring additional policy 
levers, relevant in biotechnology, to the fore. 
The present study examined three different bodies of patent legislation: the 
EPC and its Implementing Regulations, the EU Biotechnology Directive, and a 
selection of national patent acts, more in particular the patent acts of Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and France. Future research should give more attention to the 
specific guidelines in the sector of biotechnology introduced by patent offices. 
Particularly, the EPO Examination Guidelines, as well national guidelines, should 
be examined more systematically to see whether additional levers can be 
discerned. 
For the present study, only one of the three levels of patent case law was 
explored in depth: the EPO case law of the Technical Boards of Appeal, including 
decisions from the Technical Boards of Appeal and the Enlarged Boards of 
Appeal. To obtain a more complete picture of the current use of policy levers in 
case law, further research needs to be carried out to explore even more EPO case 
law. In addition, the current overview needs to be complemented with 
jurisprudential decisions from national courts. Even though the analysis of EPO 
case law may be quite indicative for the current use of policy levers in 
biotechnology, further research is needed to provide a more complete sketch. 
Analyzing biotechnology-related case law of the courts in the thirty-eight EPC 
contracting states seems like a daunting task, but one that might be extremely 
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informative on the workings of European patent law in practice.321 Last but not 
least, long-awaited case law of the CJEU needs to be followed up.322 
The present study focused on policy levers in the biotechnology sector. 
Studying policy levers in another industry sector such as software would 
contribute to the analysis, as it would provide a kind of benchmark, and deepen 
our understanding of the levers in biotechnology. 
Our study analyzed policy levers independently from one another. However, 
the optimal setting for any given policy lever may depend in part on how other 
levers are deployed.323 There is an extensive economics literature on the 
interaction among intellectual property policy levers. Further research is also 
needed to examine the interaction among different policy levers in biotechnology. 
And this brings us to our last point. The results of the present study call for 
further study in light of economic theories and findings on the various modes of 
innovation, and on the interrelationship between innovation theories and patent 
theories. There is a vast body of literature on this issue that has not been taken 
into account yet in the present study.324 It will be most interesting to look into 
empirical economic evidence on the effects of the differing use of policy levers 
across industries.325 
 
321. Such a quest may well be initiated by analyzing the cases discussed in European Patent 
Office, European National Patent Decisions Report, 2004. Even though the selection of cases is very 
limited, it may represent a good starting point, having to be supplemented with a state-of-the-art 
search for national case law. 
322. See Case C-34/10, Oliver Brüstle v. Greenpeace e.V., Oct. 18, 2011, available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6 (a request from the German Bundesgerichtshof (the Federal 
Court of Justice) of Dec. 17, 2009 concerning the ability of an inventor to patent methods and 
products involving the use of human embryonic stem cells (Article 6 of the EU Biotechnology 
Directive)); see also Case C-428/08, Monsanto Tech. LLC v. Cefetra BV, July 6, 2010, 2010 E.C.R. 7, 
available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/ (a request from the Dutch court of ‘s Gravenhage 
of Sept. 24, 2008 concerning the scope of patent claims for transgenic plants (Articles 8 and 9 of the 
EU Biotechnology Directive)). 
323. What has been examined most so far is the interaction of length and breadth. See, e.g., 
Richard Gilbert and Carl Shapiro, Optimal Patent Length and Breadth, 21 RAND J. ECON. 106, 106–12 
(1990); Paul Klemperer, How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?, 21 RAND J. ECON. 113, 120-
24 (1990); Nancy T. Gallini, Patent Length and Breadth with Costly Imitation, 24 RAND J. ECON. 52, 60 
(1992). See Paula Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 
YALE L.J. 1575, 1585 (2002).  
324. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 79–92 and the references cited there. See also Burk 
& Lemley, supra note 301, and the references cited there; Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent 
Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155–206 (2002) and the references cited there; 
DOMINIQUE GUELLEC & BRUNO VAN POTTELSBERGHE DE LA POTTERIE, THE ECONOMICS OF 
THE EUROPEAN PATENT SYSTEM IP POLICY FOR INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 250 (1st ed. 
2007) and the many valuable references cited there. 
325. An example of such research, providing more than just some more anecdotal evidence, is 
to be found in Hazel V.J. Moir, How High is the Inventive Step? Some Empirical Evidence, Address at the 
4th Annual Conference of the EPIP Association (Sept. 24–25, 2009), available at 
http://www.epip.eu/conferences/epip04/files/MOIR_Hazel.pdf. See also Kristina B. Dahlin & Dean 
M. Behrens, When is Invention Really Radical? Defining and Measuring Technological Radicalness, 34(5) RES. 
POL. 717, 717–37 (2005). 
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5.2. Concluding Thoughts 
A big value of the book The Patent Crisis and How the Courts Can Solve It of 
Burk and Lemley is that it demystifies the image of a unitary patent system. The 
authors collected wide evidence that the current, nominally technology-neutral 
patent system in fact has different effects in different industries. Further, they 
demonstrated that the courts can play a pivotal role in further tailoring the patent 
system to the differences in varying technological sectors. The courts do apply the 
nominally unitary patent system with sensitivity to the needs and features of 
different industries. 
Turning the spotlights to Europe, our analysis shows that the alleged unitary 
European patent system, in particular the EPC, is not always applied in the same 
way in different circumstances either. Furthermore, not the civil courts, but the 
EPO is responsible for tailoring the patent system to the diversities in differing 
technological sectors by way of administrative case law. This internal case law, 
although having no precedence over national court decisions, has a wide-ranging 
effect, and at various occasions has been integrated in European patent legislation. 
European patent law holds substantial potential for technology-specific 
application. Even though the European Convention (EPC) may have been 
conceived at its inception as a nominally neutral patent statute, our study clearly 
reveals that substantial discretion to differ the patent system by industry, and in 
particular to tailor it to the specificities of the biotechnology sector, was built into 
the system over the years. Although the EPC was introduced as a unitary 
regulatory tool intended to operate the same way across technologies, EPO case 
law has shown increased interest and ability in tailoring patent law to the needs of 
distinct technology sectors, and in particular the biotechnology sector. 
Not all policy levers uncovered come to the advantage of the biotechnology 
industry, though. Closer analysis of the various policy levers reveals that rather 
than expanding the patent system to accommodate biotechnology inventions and 
stimulating innovation in the biotechnology sector, some policy levers narrow 
down the patent potential for biotechnological inventions in Europe in an attempt 
to reflect concerns of public health and ethical conscience. 
 
